Padding Oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey
In situations where an attacker receives automated notification of the success or failure of a decryption attempt an attacker, after sending a very large number of messages to be decrypted, can recover a CMS/PKCS7 transported encryption key or decrypt any RSA encrypted message that was encrypted with the public RSA key, using a Bleichenbacher padding oracle attack. Applications are not affected if they use a certificate together with the private RSA key to the CMS_decrypt or PKCS7_decrypt functions to select the correct recipient info to decrypt. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1d (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1c). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.0l (Affected 1.1.0-1.1.0k). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2t (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2s).
Evidence and details
Imported from structured advisory data. Source references identify upstream records or fields; verify affected versions and your deployed configuration.
Security context
Source reference: cve:CVE-2019-1563
OpenSSL
Source reference: /containers/cna/affected/0/product
- Affected versions
- Not stated in this record
- Fixed versions
- Not stated in this record
- Prerequisites
- Not stated in this record
- Related CVEs
- CVE-2019-1563
Source reference:
/cveMetadata/cveId
Publisher severity
No explicit severity was provided.