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CVE-2026-102720

A DHCP server, or anyone on the LAN who answers a DISCOVER first, can make the client read about a kilobyte past the end of the received message. The option walk keeps a pointer and an offset in step, and the only bound check uses the offset: ```c /* addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7538, 7572 */ while (i < length - 1) { ... size = *(++data); /* data moves 1: type -> length byte */ data += size + 1; /* data moves size + 1 more */ i += size + 1; /* i moves only size + 1 */ } ``` A TLV option occupies size + 2 bytes. `data` is advanced by size + 2 in total, `i` by size + 1, so the offset falls one byte behind the real read position for every option the walk skips. After enough skipped options the check `i < length - 1` still holds while `data` is already past the end of the message, and the subsequent read of the type and length bytes comes from whatever follows. A single OFFER carrying a long run of skippable options is enough: ``` ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow READ of size 1 at 0x61b000000794 thread T5 #0 _nx_dhcp_search_buffer addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7541 #1 _nx_dhcp_get_option_value addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7082 0x61b000000794 is located 164 bytes to the right of 1648-byte region ``` A well formed OFFER through the same path is handled normally, the client records the offer and moves to REQUESTING, so the difference is the option layout rather than the harness. The read runs in the DHCP client thread while the client is still unconfigured, so it happ

eclipse-threadx/netxduoCVE-2026-102720
Structured advisory · Revision 1Original source
Evidence and details

Imported from structured advisory data. Source references identify upstream records or fields; verify affected versions and your deployed configuration.

Security context

Source reference: cve:CVE-2026-102720

eclipse-threadx/netxduo

Source reference: /containers/cna/affected/0/product

Affected versions
Not stated in this record
Fixed versions
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Prerequisites
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Related CVEs
CVE-2026-102720

Source reference: /cveMetadata/cveId

Publisher severity

medium

Source reference: /containers/cna/metrics

Event
#3916 · Revision 1
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advisoryOfficial CVE List

CVE-2026-102716

An unauthenticated client can drain the RTSP server's packet pool with a couple of dozen requests that carry a Session header the parser cannot convert. The Session branch returns the raw NetX error code instead of an RTSP status code: ```c /* addons/rtsp/nx_rtsp_server.c:2754 */ status = _nx_utility_string_to_uint(field_value_ptr, field_value_length, &session_id); if (status) { return(status); /* NX_INVALID_PARAMETERS / NX_SIZE_ERROR / NX_OVERFLOW */ } ``` Every other branch of the same function maps its failure to an RTSP status first. The CSeq branch eighteen lines earlier does exactly that (line 2736 returns NX_RTSP_STATUS_CODE_BAD_REQUEST). The raw code then reaches `_nx_rtsp_server_error_response_send` (nx_rtsp_server.c:1234), which does not recognise it, takes a path that returns without releasing the response packet it already allocated, and the block never goes back to the pool. Six requests with an empty Session header against a 22 packet pool: ``` valid requests: after request 6: pool available = 21, AFTER = 22 / 22 malformed requests: after request 6: pool available = 16, AFTER = 17 / 22 ``` One block per request, not returned when the client disconnects. Twenty six requests take the pool to zero and the server starts failing allocations, after which it serves nobody. If the pool is shared with the rest of the application, as it is in the shipped sample, the rest of the stack stops with it. Convert the `_nx_utility_string_to_uint` failure in the Session branch int

eclipse-threadx/netxduoCVE-2026-102716
Structured advisory · Revision 1Original source
Evidence and details

Imported from structured advisory data. Source references identify upstream records or fields; verify affected versions and your deployed configuration.

Security context

Source reference: cve:CVE-2026-102716

eclipse-threadx/netxduo

Source reference: /containers/cna/affected/0/product

Affected versions
Not stated in this record
Fixed versions
Not stated in this record
Prerequisites
Not stated in this record
Related CVEs
CVE-2026-102716

Source reference: /cveMetadata/cveId

Publisher severity

high

Source reference: /containers/cna/metrics

Event
#3913 · Revision 1
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advisoryOfficial CVE List

mDNS string-cache lookup matches on slot size, so a peer name aliases a shorter one and the response encoder writes past the packet

Any host on the LAN can send two mDNS records and make the responder write past the end of its transmit packet. The string table stores each name in a slot rounded up to a multiple of four: ```c /* addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:11436, 11443, 11447 */ memory_len = ((memory_len & 0xFFFFFFFC) + 8) & 0xFFFFFFFF; ... len = *((USHORT*)(p - 2)); /* slot size, not string length */ if ((len == memory_len) && ... _nx_mdns_name_match(start, memory_ptr, memory_size) ...) ``` The lookup that decides whether an incoming name is already stored compares the rounded slot size, so names of 12, 13, 14 and 15 characters share one bucket. A second name in the bucket is answered with the pointer to the first, and the record then carries a string up to three bytes longer than the length the caller accounted for. `_nx_mdns_packet_rr_add` (nxd_mdns.c:8911) sizes its only bound check from that stale length, and `_nx_mdns_name_string_encode` writes the real string. Two PTR records are enough, both ordinary mDNS responses to a `_http._tcp` query, with owner names whose lengths fall in the same bucket: ``` ==87491==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow WRITE of size 1 at 0x611000000124 thread T5 #0 _nx_mdns_name_string_encode addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:13096 #1 _nx_mdns_packet_rr_add addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:8911 0x611000000124 is 0 bytes to the right of 228-byte region ``` The overflow is one to three bytes of attacker-influenced name data past `nx_packet_data_end`. In a normal pool that lands in the next pa

eclipse-threadx/netxduoCVE-2026-102715
Structured advisory · Revision 1Original source
Evidence and details

Imported from structured advisory data. Source references identify upstream records or fields; verify affected versions and your deployed configuration.

Security context

Source reference: cve:CVE-2026-102715

eclipse-threadx/netxduo

Source reference: /containers/cna/affected/0/product

Affected versions
Not stated in this record
Fixed versions
Not stated in this record
Prerequisites
Not stated in this record
Related CVEs
CVE-2026-102715

Source reference: /cveMetadata/cveId

Publisher severity

high

Source reference: /containers/cna/metrics

Event
#3912 · Revision 1
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