Gitea migration SSRF through ALLOWED_DOMAINS address check bypass
When `[migrations] ALLOWED_DOMAINS` was configured, a hostname matching the allow list was accepted without checking its resolved address against the local-network restrictions. A user who can start repository migrations and control the DNS of an allowed hostname could make it resolve to loopback or private addresses and bypass `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false`, reaching internal services from the Gitea server. Instances without `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` configured are not affected by this specific bypass.
CVE-2026-101027
Primary source · Revision 1
Imported from structured advisory data. Source references identify upstream records or fields; verify affected versions and your deployed configuration.
Security context
Source reference: cve:CVE-2026-101027
Gitea
Source reference: /containers/cna/affected/0/product
- Affected versions
- Not stated in this record
- Fixed versions
- Not stated in this record
- Prerequisites
- Not stated in this record
Structured affected-version data
Original package identities and version rules from this source.
[
{
"vendor": "Gitea",
"product": "Gitea",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "1.27.3"
}
],
"packageName": "gitea.dev",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected"
}
]- Related CVEs
- CVE-2026-101027
Source reference:
/cveMetadata/cveId
Publisher severity
No explicit severity was provided.
- Event
- #11936 · Revision 1
- Added to Heist Feed
- Publisher date