Dasel: Unbounded recursion in JSON and XML readers causes unrecoverable stack-overflow DoS

## Summary `dasel`'s JSON and XML readers parse nested structures with unbounded recursion, one native stack frame per nesting level, with no depth guard. A small (sub-10 MB), deeply nested document drives the Go runtime past its goroutine stack limit and triggers a `fatal error: stack overflow`. This is **unrecoverable**: it is a runtime fatal error, not a `panic`, so a consumer's `defer`/`recover` cannot intercept it, the entire process dies. Both readers are affected; neither has a depth limit, and the JSON reader additionally has no input-size cap (the XML reader caps size at 10 MB but not depth). ## Affected Versions `github.com/tomwright/dasel/v3` and all v3.x releases through **v3.11.0** (current `main`, commit `abc1e1d`). This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.1. Pre-v3 is out of scope. ## Description ### JSON reader @ `parsing/json/json_reader.go` `decodeValue` (line 54) dispatches to the mutually-recursive `decodeObject` (line 78) and `decodeArray` (line 140). Each calls back into both for nested values (`decodeArray`→`decodeArray` at line 151, `decodeObject` at 163; `decodeObject`→`decodeArray` at 95, `decodeObject` at 111). Every `[` or `{` in the input adds one stack frame. There is **no depth counter and no `len(data)` cap** anywhere in the reader. ### XML reader @`parsing/xml/reader.go` `parseElement` (line 172) recurses at line 211 for every `xml.StartElement`. The file declares explicit DoS guards — `maxXMLSize = 10_000_000`, comment count/length — but these bou