ZITADEL: Actions V1 sandbox escape: host file read via require()

### Summary A vulnerability in ZITADEL Actions V1 allows an organization Action author to read files from the ZITADEL host filesystem through the JavaScript `require()` module loader. On common self-hosted deployments this can be chained to steal bootstrap credentials (including the Login Client PAT) and escalate from a single-tenant organization owner to instance administrator. ### Impact ZITADEL Actions V1 run custom JavaScript inside the ZITADEL server process at OIDC, SAML, and login-flow trigger points. The runtime enables the goja Node-compatible `require()` registry without restricting the source loader, so Action scripts can load host files readable by the ZITADEL process (notably `.js` and `.json`, and in some cases other file contents via error channels). An attacker with **ORG_OWNER** on any organization (which includes `org.action.write` and `org.flow.write`) can therefore: * Read process-readable host files, including configuration or secrets mounted into the API container (for example service-account material, projected secrets, or config carrying sensitive values). * On deployments that follow ZITADEL’s documented bootstrap paths (`ZITADEL_FIRSTINSTANCE_LOGINCLIENTPATPATH`, `ZITADEL_FIRSTINSTANCE_MACHINEKEYPATH`), recover instance-wide credentials such as the **IAM_LOGIN_CLIENT** PAT or the **IAM_OWNER** service-account key, enabling escalation to full instance control. This collapses the expected multi-tenant isolation boundary: a tenant organization administr