Serialize JavaScript: Cross-site scripting (XSS) via unescaped in serialized function bodies

### Impact `serialize-javascript` escapes its output so it is safe to embed inside a `` into the output, terminating the script element early so the remainder is parsed as HTML. `SCRIPT_CLOSE_REGEXP` used `<\/script[^>]*>` as its first alternative. The character class excludes only `>`, so a single match could run from one `` anywhere in the source — swallowing a second, complete `` along the way. Only one replacement is emitted per match, and the plain-code branch neutralizes just the leading `<` (`'< ' + match.slice(1)`), so the swallowed tag was re-emitted verbatim. Reaching that shape requires `' }} ``` Embedded as the README documents (``) and parsed by Chromium, the script element ends at the injected tag and the `` becomes a live DOM node with its `onerror` handler executing in the page origin. Only the function path is affected. The same payload passed as **data** is escaped correctly, and `options.isJSON` / non-function values are unaffected. ### Patches Fixed in **7.1.2**. The wildcard now excludes `<` as well as `>` (`[^<>]*`), so a match can never reach past a second `<`. Every ``, and emits anything else as text. ### Workarounds Upgrade to **7.1.2**. If you cannot upgrade, 7.1.0 and earlier are unaffected, or avoid serializing functions whose source text is attacker-influenced. ### Regression note This is a regression specific to 7.1.1, not a long-standing issue. 7.1.0 and earlier applied the same wildcard but escaped the **entire** match, so no tag survived. Dow