@fastify/busboy vulnerable to CRLF injection via multipart Content-Disposition filename and name

### Impact `@fastify/busboy` 3.2.1 and earlier retains a bare carriage return or line feed inside the parsed `Content-Disposition` parameters returned to the application. The multipart header parser ends a header line only on the two-byte `\r\n` sequence, so a lone CR or LF embedded in a part header is carried verbatim into the `filename` and field `name` delivered by the `file` and `field` events. An application that forwards the supplied filename or name into a CR/LF-sensitive sink cannot anticipate the embedded control character. An attacker who uploads a file whose `filename` or field `name` contains a bare CR or LF can pollute filenames on disk when the upload is saved under its original name, inject forged lines into logs, or inject headers on a downstream hop that does not re-validate CR/LF, such as object-storage metadata or a proxied backend. Applications using `@fastify/busboy` directly, or through `@fastify/multipart` and its consumers, are affected. ### Patches Upgrade to `@fastify/busboy` 3.2.2 or later. ### Workarounds Validate or strip carriage return and line feed characters from the `filename` and field `name` before using them in any filesystem, logging, or outbound-header context.