Nx daemon and plugin worker sockets are accessible to other local users

## Summary Nx creates the Unix domain sockets for its daemon and its plugin workers in a shared temporary directory with default permissions, so any other user on the same machine can connect to them. The daemon accepts a `PROCESS_IN_BACKGROUND` request that names a module to load and invokes its default export, which turns socket access into code execution inside the daemon process. On a multi-user machine — a shared build server, a shared developer box, or a container running several accounts — one local user can execute code as another user running Nx. ## Severity Exploitable by any other unprivileged local user on a shared host while a daemon or plugin worker is running, with no user interaction. There is no known evidence of exploitation in the wild. ## Affected & Patched Versions | Package | Vulnerable | Patched | | --- | --- | --- | | `nx` | `>= 14.6.0, < 22.7.9`; `>= 23.0.0, < 23.1.2` | `22.7.9`, `23.1.2` | Every version in the ranges above is affected. The lower bound is 14.6.0, when the daemon request handler that turns socket access into code execution was added. > [!IMPORTANT] > Single-user machines are not exposed. The vulnerability requires another local account on the same host, so an ordinary laptop with one user account is unaffected — the exposure is shared CI runners, shared build and development servers, and containers or images that run more than one uid. > > Disabling the daemon is not sufficient on its own: the plugin worker sockets used by plugin isola