Out-of-bounds write in the Nuvoton NPCX eSPI Target-Attached-Flash receive path from an unvalidated host-supplied packet length

The Nuvoton NPCX eSPI driver parses Target-Attached-Flash (TAF) requests in espi_taf_parse() (drivers/espi/espi_npcx.c), taking the 12-bit length field directly out of the request header in the FLASHRXBUF FIFO. For write and RPMC OP1 requests it copied DIV_ROUND_UP(len, 4) words into struct espi_taf_pckt.src, a fixed 16-word (64-byte) member of a static structure, without ever comparing the length against that buffer or against the negotiated eSPI receive payload size (rx-plsize, 64 bytes on all in-tree NPCX/NPCK SoCs). Both the loop counter and the word count were uint8_t, so the copy ran up to 255 iterations. An eSPI controller that emits a flash request whose header claims a payload larger than the negotiated maximum therefore drives up to 239 32-bit stores past the end of the structure — roughly 956 bytes of out-of-bounds write into .bss — from the eSPI flash receive interrupt handler, while the source reads walk past the end of the 18-word FLASHRXBUF register array into neighbouring eSPI registers. The same unvalidated length was then passed on to flash_write() in espi_taf_npcx_flash_write() with the 64-byte src buffer as source, reading up to 4 KB of adjacent controller SRAM into SPI flash at a host-chosen address, where the host can read it back. A related fixed-size stack buffer in taf_npcx_completion_handler() was overflowed by four bytes on the maximum-size completion path on SoCs whose tx-plsize is 64. The defect is reachable only from the eSPI host side, and only