SCBE-AETHERMOORE Unauthenticated AetherBrowser Ops API Exposes Operator Email Digests

### Summary The AetherBrowser API server (`scripts/aetherbrowser/api_server.py`) exposes the `POST /api/ops/check-email` endpoint without any authentication. Any remote attacker can call this endpoint and trigger execution of the `email_reader.py` subprocess, which connects to configured ProtonMail or Gmail accounts via IMAP and returns email metadata (sender, subject, body snippet) in the JSON response. The server binds to `0.0.0.0:8100` by default with CORS set to `allow_origins=["*"]`, making it reachable from any network or browser origin. This constitutes a critical information-disclosure vulnerability. ### Details `scripts/aetherbrowser/api_server.py` registers the following route at line 3008 (report excerpt references line 2987; the actual line is 3008): ```python @app.post("/api/ops/check-email") async def ops_check_email(): script = ROOT / "scripts" / "apollo" / "email_reader.py" result = await asyncio.to_thread( _run_subprocess, [sys.executable, str(script)], timeout=30, ) return { "output": result.get("stdout", "")[:2000], ... } ``` No `Depends()` guard, middleware check, or API-key validation is applied. The decorator is a plain `@app.post(...)`, so FastAPI registers the route with zero access control. The server is bound to all interfaces (line 4065/4070): ```python uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=port) # default port 8100 ``` CORS middleware is configured to allow any origin (lines 486–492): ```python app.add_middleware( CORSMiddleware, allow_origins=["*"