Skip to content
Heist/ feed
Back to feed
MediumFix available

Trigger.dev: Blind SSRF via alert-channel webhook

Type: advisorySources: OSV

### Summary A WEBHOOK alert channel stores a user-supplied `url`. When an alert fires (deployment/run failure, error groups), the webapp server (`alertsWorker` -> `DeliverAlertService`) POSTs the HMAC-signed alert payload to that URL via `fetch(webhook.url, ...)`. The URL is never validated against a host allowlist or private-IP/metadata blocklist (a repo-wide search for `169.254`, `isPrivate`, `isLoopback`, `net.isIP`, `ssrf` returns ZERO hits), and the API route's URL field is just `z.string().optional()` (no syntax check at all). So an authenticated tenant can point the webhook at internal infrastructure or `169.254.169.254` and the multi-tenant server fetches it. ### Affected `apps/webapp`, HEAD `5d99457` (current main). ### Root cause - Source (API route): `app/presenters/v3/ApiAlertChannelPresenter.server.ts` `ApiAlertChannelData.url = z.string().optional()` (no host validation); route `app/routes/api.v1.projects.$projectRef.alertChannels.ts` (PAT-auth). - Store: `app/v3/services/alerts/createAlertChannel.server.ts` persists `{url, secret, version}` verbatim. - Sink: `app/v3/services/alerts/deliverAlert.server.ts:973` `fetch(webhook.url, {method:"POST", headers:{"x-trigger-signature-hmacsha256":...}, body:rawPayload})`; identical at `deliverErrorGroupAlert.server.ts:258`. Runs inside the webapp process; `fetch` follows redirects (IMDSv1-via-redirect). No egress guard anywhere. ### Runtime PoC (proven on self-host) Seeded a project + STAGING env + a WEBHOOK channel with

Products
trigger.dev
Affected versions
Not specified
Fixed versions
4.5.2
CVEs
CVE-2026-114076
Confirmed fixed CVEs
Not specified
Updated in this feed
31 Oct 2026, 14:08 UTC · Revision 1

Source evidence

Trigger.dev: Blind SSRF via alert-channel webhook

core-osv · Original source

Published 2 Oct 2026, 22:35 UTC

### Summary A WEBHOOK alert channel stores a user-supplied `url`. When an alert fires (deployment/run failure, error groups), the webapp server (`alertsWorker` -> `DeliverAlertService`) POSTs the HMAC-signed alert payload to that URL via `fetch(webhook.url, ...)`. The URL is never validated against a host allowlist or private-IP/metadata blocklist (a repo-wide search for `169.254`, `isPrivate`, `isLoopback`, `net.isIP`, `ssrf` returns ZERO hits), and the API route's URL field is just `z.string().optional()` (no syntax check at all). So an authenticated tenant can point the webhook at internal infrastructure or `169.254.169.254` and the multi-tenant server fetches it. ### Affected `apps/webapp`, HEAD `5d99457` (current main). ### Root cause - Source (API route): `app/presenters/v3/ApiAlertChannelPresenter.server.ts` `ApiAlertChannelData.url = z.string().optional()` (no host validation); route `app/routes/api.v1.projects.$projectRef.alertChannels.ts` (PAT-auth). - Store: `app/v3/services/alerts/createAlertChannel.server.ts` persists `{url, secret, version}` verbatim. - Sink: `app/v3/services/alerts/deliverAlert.server.ts:973` `fetch(webhook.url, {method:"POST", headers:{"x-trigger-signature-hmacsha256":...}, body:rawPayload})`; identical at `deliverErrorGroupAlert.server.ts:258`. Runs inside the webapp process; `fetch` follows redirects (IMDSv1-via-redirect). No egress guard anywhere. ### Runtime PoC (proven on self-host) Seeded a project + STAGING env + a WEBHOOK channel with

osv:GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4

trigger.dev

Fixed versions: 4.5.2

Complete source record
{
  "id": "f2013c5239709fe2c40895216508f844bc6380262c203d9f9a57b07faef4e098",
  "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "Trigger.dev: Blind SSRF via alert-channel webhook",
    "summary": "### Summary A WEBHOOK alert channel stores a user-supplied `url`. When an alert fires (deployment/run failure, error groups), the webapp server (`alertsWorker` -> `DeliverAlertService`) POSTs the HMAC-signed alert payload to that URL via `fetch(webhook.url, ...)`. The URL is never validated against a host allowlist or private-IP/metadata blocklist (a repo-wide search for `169.254`, `isPrivate`, `isLoopback`, `net.isIP`, `ssrf` returns ZERO hits), and the API route's URL field is just `z.string().optional()` (no syntax check at all). So an authenticated tenant can point the webhook at internal infrastructure or `169.254.169.254` and the multi-tenant server fetches it. ### Affected `apps/webapp`, HEAD `5d99457` (current main). ### Root cause - Source (API route): `app/presenters/v3/ApiAlertChannelPresenter.server.ts` `ApiAlertChannelData.url = z.string().optional()` (no host validation); route `app/routes/api.v1.projects.$projectRef.alertChannels.ts` (PAT-auth). - Store: `app/v3/services/alerts/createAlertChannel.server.ts` persists `{url, secret, version}` verbatim. - Sink: `app/v3/services/alerts/deliverAlert.server.ts:973` `fetch(webhook.url, {method:\"POST\", headers:{\"x-trigger-signature-hmacsha256\":...}, body:rawPayload})`; identical at `deliverErrorGroupAlert.server.ts:258`. Runs inside the webapp process; `fetch` follows redirects (IMDSv1-via-redirect). No egress guard anywhere. ### Runtime PoC (proven on self-host) Seeded a project + STAGING env + a WEBHOOK channel with ",
    "evidence": "osv:GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4",
    "products": [
      {
        "name": {
          "value": "trigger.dev",
          "evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
        },
        "prerequisites": [],
        "fixed_versions": [
          {
            "value": "4.5.2",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
          }
        ],
        "affected_versions": []
      }
    ],
    "severity": "medium",
    "structured": {
      "id": "GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2026-114076",
        "GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4"
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "type": "CVSS_V3",
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N"
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "ranges": [
            {
              "type": "SEMVER",
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "4.5.2"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "package": {
            "name": "trigger.dev",
            "purl": "pkg:npm/trigger.dev",
            "ecosystem": "npm"
          },
          "database_specific": {
            "source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4/GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4.json",
            "last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 4.5.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-21T10:57:22.483043237Z",
      "provider": "osv",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4",
        "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4199",
        "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/34b1a181c2a1d33a53ebab88f84b05f81fea4254",
        "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev",
        "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.2"
      ],
      "provider_metadata": {
        "cwe_ids": [
          "CWE-918"
        ],
        "severity": "MODERATE",
        "github_reviewed": true,
        "nvd_published_at": null,
        "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-02T22:35:31Z"
      }
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2026-114076",
        "evidence": "/aliases"
      }
    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
  },
  "source_id": "core-osv",
  "document_id": 392975,
  "published_at": "2026-10-02T22:35:31+00:00"
}