Trigger.dev: Blind SSRF via alert-channel webhook
### Summary A WEBHOOK alert channel stores a user-supplied `url`. When an alert fires (deployment/run failure, error groups), the webapp server (`alertsWorker` -> `DeliverAlertService`) POSTs the HMAC-signed alert payload to that URL via `fetch(webhook.url, ...)`. The URL is never validated against a host allowlist or private-IP/metadata blocklist (a repo-wide search for `169.254`, `isPrivate`, `isLoopback`, `net.isIP`, `ssrf` returns ZERO hits), and the API route's URL field is just `z.string().optional()` (no syntax check at all). So an authenticated tenant can point the webhook at internal infrastructure or `169.254.169.254` and the multi-tenant server fetches it. ### Affected `apps/webapp`, HEAD `5d99457` (current main). ### Root cause - Source (API route): `app/presenters/v3/ApiAlertChannelPresenter.server.ts` `ApiAlertChannelData.url = z.string().optional()` (no host validation); route `app/routes/api.v1.projects.$projectRef.alertChannels.ts` (PAT-auth). - Store: `app/v3/services/alerts/createAlertChannel.server.ts` persists `{url, secret, version}` verbatim. - Sink: `app/v3/services/alerts/deliverAlert.server.ts:973` `fetch(webhook.url, {method:"POST", headers:{"x-trigger-signature-hmacsha256":...}, body:rawPayload})`; identical at `deliverErrorGroupAlert.server.ts:258`. Runs inside the webapp process; `fetch` follows redirects (IMDSv1-via-redirect). No egress guard anywhere. ### Runtime PoC (proven on self-host) Seeded a project + STAGING env + a WEBHOOK channel with
- Products
- trigger.dev
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 4.5.2
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-114076
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:08 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Trigger.dev: Blind SSRF via alert-channel webhook
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 2 Oct 2026, 22:35 UTC
### Summary A WEBHOOK alert channel stores a user-supplied `url`. When an alert fires (deployment/run failure, error groups), the webapp server (`alertsWorker` -> `DeliverAlertService`) POSTs the HMAC-signed alert payload to that URL via `fetch(webhook.url, ...)`. The URL is never validated against a host allowlist or private-IP/metadata blocklist (a repo-wide search for `169.254`, `isPrivate`, `isLoopback`, `net.isIP`, `ssrf` returns ZERO hits), and the API route's URL field is just `z.string().optional()` (no syntax check at all). So an authenticated tenant can point the webhook at internal infrastructure or `169.254.169.254` and the multi-tenant server fetches it. ### Affected `apps/webapp`, HEAD `5d99457` (current main). ### Root cause - Source (API route): `app/presenters/v3/ApiAlertChannelPresenter.server.ts` `ApiAlertChannelData.url = z.string().optional()` (no host validation); route `app/routes/api.v1.projects.$projectRef.alertChannels.ts` (PAT-auth). - Store: `app/v3/services/alerts/createAlertChannel.server.ts` persists `{url, secret, version}` verbatim. - Sink: `app/v3/services/alerts/deliverAlert.server.ts:973` `fetch(webhook.url, {method:"POST", headers:{"x-trigger-signature-hmacsha256":...}, body:rawPayload})`; identical at `deliverErrorGroupAlert.server.ts:258`. Runs inside the webapp process; `fetch` follows redirects (IMDSv1-via-redirect). No egress guard anywhere. ### Runtime PoC (proven on self-host) Seeded a project + STAGING env + a WEBHOOK channel with
osv:GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4
trigger.dev
Fixed versions: 4.5.2
Complete source record
{
"id": "f2013c5239709fe2c40895216508f844bc6380262c203d9f9a57b07faef4e098",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Trigger.dev: Blind SSRF via alert-channel webhook",
"summary": "### Summary A WEBHOOK alert channel stores a user-supplied `url`. When an alert fires (deployment/run failure, error groups), the webapp server (`alertsWorker` -> `DeliverAlertService`) POSTs the HMAC-signed alert payload to that URL via `fetch(webhook.url, ...)`. The URL is never validated against a host allowlist or private-IP/metadata blocklist (a repo-wide search for `169.254`, `isPrivate`, `isLoopback`, `net.isIP`, `ssrf` returns ZERO hits), and the API route's URL field is just `z.string().optional()` (no syntax check at all). So an authenticated tenant can point the webhook at internal infrastructure or `169.254.169.254` and the multi-tenant server fetches it. ### Affected `apps/webapp`, HEAD `5d99457` (current main). ### Root cause - Source (API route): `app/presenters/v3/ApiAlertChannelPresenter.server.ts` `ApiAlertChannelData.url = z.string().optional()` (no host validation); route `app/routes/api.v1.projects.$projectRef.alertChannels.ts` (PAT-auth). - Store: `app/v3/services/alerts/createAlertChannel.server.ts` persists `{url, secret, version}` verbatim. - Sink: `app/v3/services/alerts/deliverAlert.server.ts:973` `fetch(webhook.url, {method:\"POST\", headers:{\"x-trigger-signature-hmacsha256\":...}, body:rawPayload})`; identical at `deliverErrorGroupAlert.server.ts:258`. Runs inside the webapp process; `fetch` follows redirects (IMDSv1-via-redirect). No egress guard anywhere. ### Runtime PoC (proven on self-host) Seeded a project + STAGING env + a WEBHOOK channel with ",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "trigger.dev",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "4.5.2",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "medium",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-114076",
"GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.2"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "trigger.dev",
"purl": "pkg:npm/trigger.dev",
"ecosystem": "npm"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4/GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4.json",
"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 4.5.1"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-21T10:57:22.483043237Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4",
"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4199",
"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/34b1a181c2a1d33a53ebab88f84b05f81fea4254",
"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev",
"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.2"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"severity": "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-02T22:35:31Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-114076",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 392975,
"published_at": "2026-10-02T22:35:31+00:00"
}