obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP
### Summary On a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured, serving a 2026-07-28-era client that declared `elicitation.form` support, a call to a dispatch-gated tool (`destructive: true`, or a scope with an HITL floor) that was offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined, cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval; the state is minted before the elicitation leg is asked, so it proves only that the resubmission belongs to the same call. ### Details Reproduced directly: a `destructive: true` tool call, offered `inputRequired`, answered with `{action: "decline"}` on the `elicitation/create` leg, still wrote. Present since the 2026-07-28 round trip shipped in v1.13.0 (THE-583). Only dispatch-gated tools were reachable; the sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools (`write_note` overwrite, `move_note`, and others) did not read the elicitation state on the modern wire at all, so they neither let a decline nor an approval through. ### Impact A client that echoes state after a decline can execute destructive vault operations (delete, cross-folder move, frontmatter replace, link rewrite) that the human explicitly refused. The precondition is a compliant client behaving incorrectly or a client under an attacker's control; the human's refusal is not enforc
- Products
- obsidian-tc
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 1.31.4
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-115477
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 22:25 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 23 Oct 2026, 17:30 UTC
### Summary On a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured, serving a 2026-07-28-era client that declared `elicitation.form` support, a call to a dispatch-gated tool (`destructive: true`, or a scope with an HITL floor) that was offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined, cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval; the state is minted before the elicitation leg is asked, so it proves only that the resubmission belongs to the same call. ### Details Reproduced directly: a `destructive: true` tool call, offered `inputRequired`, answered with `{action: "decline"}` on the `elicitation/create` leg, still wrote. Present since the 2026-07-28 round trip shipped in v1.13.0 (THE-583). Only dispatch-gated tools were reachable; the sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools (`write_note` overwrite, `move_note`, and others) did not read the elicitation state on the modern wire at all, so they neither let a decline nor an approval through. ### Impact A client that echoes state after a decline can execute destructive vault operations (delete, cross-folder move, frontmatter replace, link rewrite) that the human explicitly refused. The precondition is a compliant client behaving incorrectly or a client under an attacker's control; the human's refusal is not enforc
osv:GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc
obsidian-tc
Fixed versions: 1.31.4
Complete source record
{
"id": "ddcf549f45ad7e149cb7fa8544133566cd6dd30cb66ddc0b1f2be8ea07900eb0",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP",
"summary": "### Summary On a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured, serving a 2026-07-28-era client that declared `elicitation.form` support, a call to a dispatch-gated tool (`destructive: true`, or a scope with an HITL floor) that was offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined, cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval; the state is minted before the elicitation leg is asked, so it proves only that the resubmission belongs to the same call. ### Details Reproduced directly: a `destructive: true` tool call, offered `inputRequired`, answered with `{action: \"decline\"}` on the `elicitation/create` leg, still wrote. Present since the 2026-07-28 round trip shipped in v1.13.0 (THE-583). Only dispatch-gated tools were reachable; the sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools (`write_note` overwrite, `move_note`, and others) did not read the elicitation state on the modern wire at all, so they neither let a decline nor an approval through. ### Impact A client that echoes state after a decline can execute destructive vault operations (delete, cross-folder move, frontmatter replace, link rewrite) that the human explicitly refused. The precondition is a compliant client behaving incorrectly or a client under an attacker's control; the human's refusal is not enforc",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "obsidian-tc",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "1.31.4",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-115477",
"GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.13.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.31.4"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "obsidian-tc",
"purl": "pkg:npm/obsidian-tc",
"ecosystem": "npm"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc.json",
"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 1.31.3"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-23T17:45:03.905634155Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc",
"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967",
"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969",
"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71",
"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc",
"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md",
"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-115477"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-863"
],
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-23T15:17:29Z",
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-23T17:30:10Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-115477",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 416469,
"published_at": "2026-10-23T17:30:10+00:00"
}