Skip to content
Heist/ feed
Back to feed
HighFix available

obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP

Type: advisorySources: OSV

### Summary On a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured, serving a 2026-07-28-era client that declared `elicitation.form` support, a call to a dispatch-gated tool (`destructive: true`, or a scope with an HITL floor) that was offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined, cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval; the state is minted before the elicitation leg is asked, so it proves only that the resubmission belongs to the same call. ### Details Reproduced directly: a `destructive: true` tool call, offered `inputRequired`, answered with `{action: "decline"}` on the `elicitation/create` leg, still wrote. Present since the 2026-07-28 round trip shipped in v1.13.0 (THE-583). Only dispatch-gated tools were reachable; the sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools (`write_note` overwrite, `move_note`, and others) did not read the elicitation state on the modern wire at all, so they neither let a decline nor an approval through. ### Impact A client that echoes state after a decline can execute destructive vault operations (delete, cross-folder move, frontmatter replace, link rewrite) that the human explicitly refused. The precondition is a compliant client behaving incorrectly or a client under an attacker's control; the human's refusal is not enforc

Products
obsidian-tc
Affected versions
Not specified
Fixed versions
1.31.4
CVEs
CVE-2026-115477
Confirmed fixed CVEs
Not specified
Updated in this feed
31 Oct 2026, 22:25 UTC · Revision 1

Source evidence

obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP

core-osv · Original source

Published 23 Oct 2026, 17:30 UTC

### Summary On a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured, serving a 2026-07-28-era client that declared `elicitation.form` support, a call to a dispatch-gated tool (`destructive: true`, or a scope with an HITL floor) that was offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined, cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval; the state is minted before the elicitation leg is asked, so it proves only that the resubmission belongs to the same call. ### Details Reproduced directly: a `destructive: true` tool call, offered `inputRequired`, answered with `{action: "decline"}` on the `elicitation/create` leg, still wrote. Present since the 2026-07-28 round trip shipped in v1.13.0 (THE-583). Only dispatch-gated tools were reachable; the sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools (`write_note` overwrite, `move_note`, and others) did not read the elicitation state on the modern wire at all, so they neither let a decline nor an approval through. ### Impact A client that echoes state after a decline can execute destructive vault operations (delete, cross-folder move, frontmatter replace, link rewrite) that the human explicitly refused. The precondition is a compliant client behaving incorrectly or a client under an attacker's control; the human's refusal is not enforc

osv:GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc

obsidian-tc

Fixed versions: 1.31.4

Complete source record
{
  "id": "ddcf549f45ad7e149cb7fa8544133566cd6dd30cb66ddc0b1f2be8ea07900eb0",
  "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP",
    "summary": "### Summary On a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured, serving a 2026-07-28-era client that declared `elicitation.form` support, a call to a dispatch-gated tool (`destructive: true`, or a scope with an HITL floor) that was offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined, cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval; the state is minted before the elicitation leg is asked, so it proves only that the resubmission belongs to the same call. ### Details Reproduced directly: a `destructive: true` tool call, offered `inputRequired`, answered with `{action: \"decline\"}` on the `elicitation/create` leg, still wrote. Present since the 2026-07-28 round trip shipped in v1.13.0 (THE-583). Only dispatch-gated tools were reachable; the sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools (`write_note` overwrite, `move_note`, and others) did not read the elicitation state on the modern wire at all, so they neither let a decline nor an approval through. ### Impact A client that echoes state after a decline can execute destructive vault operations (delete, cross-folder move, frontmatter replace, link rewrite) that the human explicitly refused. The precondition is a compliant client behaving incorrectly or a client under an attacker's control; the human's refusal is not enforc",
    "evidence": "osv:GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc",
    "products": [
      {
        "name": {
          "value": "obsidian-tc",
          "evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
        },
        "prerequisites": [],
        "fixed_versions": [
          {
            "value": "1.31.4",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
          }
        ],
        "affected_versions": []
      }
    ],
    "severity": "high",
    "structured": {
      "id": "GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2026-115477",
        "GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc"
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "type": "CVSS_V4",
          "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "ranges": [
            {
              "type": "SEMVER",
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "1.13.0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "1.31.4"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "package": {
            "name": "obsidian-tc",
            "purl": "pkg:npm/obsidian-tc",
            "ecosystem": "npm"
          },
          "database_specific": {
            "source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc.json",
            "last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 1.31.3"
          }
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-23T17:45:03.905634155Z",
      "provider": "osv",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc",
        "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967",
        "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969",
        "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71",
        "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc",
        "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md",
        "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4",
        "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-115477"
      ],
      "provider_metadata": {
        "cwe_ids": [
          "CWE-285",
          "CWE-863"
        ],
        "severity": "HIGH",
        "github_reviewed": true,
        "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-23T15:17:29Z",
        "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-23T17:30:10Z"
      }
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2026-115477",
        "evidence": "/aliases"
      }
    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
  },
  "source_id": "core-osv",
  "document_id": 416469,
  "published_at": "2026-10-23T17:30:10+00:00"
}