Decompression bomb DoS in Req via auto-decoded archive and compressed response bodies
Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in wojtekmach Req allows attacker-controlled HTTP servers to exhaust memory in a Req client via decompression-bomb response bodies. Req's default response pipeline includes Req.Steps.decode_body/1 and Req.Steps.decompress_body/1 in lib/req/steps.ex. decode_body/1 dispatches on the server-supplied content-type (or URL extension) and calls :zip.extract(body, [:memory]) for application/zip, :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory]) for application/x-tar, and :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory, :compressed]) for application/gzip / .tgz. Each returns the full decompressed archive contents as a [{name, bytes}] list in memory, with no per-entry or total size cap. decompress_body/1 walks the content-encoding header and chains :zlib/:brotli/:ezstd decoders, so a response advertising content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip inflates through multiple layers without bound. Both steps are enabled by default, no caller opt-in is required, and the attacker controls the content-type and content-encoding headers on their own server (or on any host reached via Req's automatic redirect following). A sub-megabyte response can expand to multiple gigabytes on the victim, crashing the BEAM process. This issue affects req: from 0.1.0 before 0.6.1.
- Products
- Not specified
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-49755
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 4 Nov 2026, 05:19 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Decompression bomb DoS in Req via auto-decoded archive and compressed response bodies
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 8 Jun 2026, 15:20 UTC
Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in wojtekmach Req allows attacker-controlled HTTP servers to exhaust memory in a Req client via decompression-bomb response bodies. Req's default response pipeline includes Req.Steps.decode_body/1 and Req.Steps.decompress_body/1 in lib/req/steps.ex. decode_body/1 dispatches on the server-supplied content-type (or URL extension) and calls :zip.extract(body, [:memory]) for application/zip, :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory]) for application/x-tar, and :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory, :compressed]) for application/gzip / .tgz. Each returns the full decompressed archive contents as a [{name, bytes}] list in memory, with no per-entry or total size cap. decompress_body/1 walks the content-encoding header and chains :zlib/:brotli/:ezstd decoders, so a response advertising content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip inflates through multiple layers without bound. Both steps are enabled by default, no caller opt-in is required, and the attacker controls the content-type and content-encoding headers on their own server (or on any host reached via Req's automatic redirect following). A sub-megabyte response can expand to multiple gigabytes on the victim, crashing the BEAM process. This issue affects req: from 0.1.0 before 0.6.1.
osv:CVE-2026-49755
Complete source record
{
"id": "a3ed3d360feb05d744ba0d5d399a7ed7023d999615f3858015082448a5ae8104",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-49755",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Decompression bomb DoS in Req via auto-decoded archive and compressed response bodies",
"summary": "Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in wojtekmach Req allows attacker-controlled HTTP servers to exhaust memory in a Req client via decompression-bomb response bodies. Req's default response pipeline includes Req.Steps.decode_body/1 and Req.Steps.decompress_body/1 in lib/req/steps.ex. decode_body/1 dispatches on the server-supplied content-type (or URL extension) and calls :zip.extract(body, [:memory]) for application/zip, :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory]) for application/x-tar, and :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory, :compressed]) for application/gzip / .tgz. Each returns the full decompressed archive contents as a [{name, bytes}] list in memory, with no per-entry or total size cap. decompress_body/1 walks the content-encoding header and chains :zlib/:brotli/:ezstd decoders, so a response advertising content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip inflates through multiple layers without bound. Both steps are enabled by default, no caller opt-in is required, and the attacker controls the content-type and content-encoding headers on their own server (or on any host reached via Req's automatic redirect following). A sub-megabyte response can expand to multiple gigabytes on the victim, crashing the BEAM process. This issue affects req: from 0.1.0 before 0.6.1.",
"evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-49755",
"products": [],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "CVE-2026-49755",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49755",
"EEF-CVE-2026-49755",
"GHSA-655f-mp8p-96gv"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"repo": "https://github.com/wojtekmach/req",
"type": "GIT",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "ce7113a52efd04012c6f9e8d0b8267439f5fd6b8"
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{
"fixed": "36a82523e864739787340604f65ecce26699a0a9"
},
{
"fixed": "84977e5b1a83f26e749d55ad06e3625464af4e8d"
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"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:wojtekmach:req:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"range": [
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"introduced": "0.1.0"
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{
"fixed": "0.6.1"
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],
"source": "CPE_RANGE"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "84977e5b1a83f26e749d55ad06e3625464af4e8d"
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"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
}
]
}
},
{
"repo": "https://github.com/wojtekmach/req.git",
"type": "GIT",
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"database_specific": {
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"range": [
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"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
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],
"versions": [
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"v0.5.7",
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"v0.5.2",
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"v0.5.0",
"v0.4.14",
"v0.4.13",
"v0.4.12",
"v0.4.11",
"v0.4.10",
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"v0.3.6",
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"v0.3.1",
"v0.3.0",
"v0.2.1",
"v0.2.0",
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],
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-49755.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:33.367779378Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-49755.html",
"https://github.com",
"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-49755",
"https://repo.hex.pm",
"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/49xxx/CVE-2026-49755.json",
"https://github.com/wojtekmach/req/security/advisories/GHSA-655f-mp8p-96gv",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49755",
"https://github.com/wojtekmach/req/commit/84977e5b1a83f26e749d55ad06e3625464af4e8d",
"https://github.com/wojtekmach/req",
"https://github.com/wojtekmach/req.git"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-409"
],
"cna_assigner": "EEF",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/49xxx/CVE-2026-49755.json"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-49755",
"evidence": "/id"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 500481,
"published_at": "2026-06-08T15:20:57.415+00:00"
}