WhatsApp MCP: Unauthenticated bridge API allows message sending and arbitrary file exfiltration
WhatsApp MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for WhatsApp, enabling Claude to read and send WhatsApp messages. Prior to version 0.2.1, the `whatsapp-bridge` HTTP API listens on `127.0.0.1:8080` without authentication and without Host header validation, and the `/api/send` endpoint accepts an absolute `media_path` parameter without confining it to a safe directory. Combined, these issues allow any local process running as the same user as the bridge to send WhatsApp messages from the paired account without authorization; the same caller to read arbitrary files readable by the user (e.g. SSH private keys, browser session data, source code, dotfiles) and exfiltrate them as WhatsApp document attachments; and/or a remote attacker to trigger the same operations via DNS rebinding from a webpage the user visits, since no Host header validation is performed. In MCP environments, "local caller" extends beyond processes the user explicitly launched — sibling MCP servers, IDE extensions, and tool-triggered flows running in the user's session can act as the effective caller. This issue is fixed in whatsapp-mcp v0.2.1 and corresponding Docker images / release artifacts. Users should upgrade immediately. The fix introduces bearer token authentication on the bridge HTTP API (configured via environment variable, required on all requests, validated with constant-time comparison); host header allow-list validation to prevent DNS rebinding; and confinement of `media_path` to a co
- Products
- Not specified
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-46555
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 3 Nov 2026, 01:33 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
WhatsApp MCP: Unauthenticated bridge API allows message sending and arbitrary file exfiltration
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 20 Jul 2026, 17:06 UTC
WhatsApp MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for WhatsApp, enabling Claude to read and send WhatsApp messages. Prior to version 0.2.1, the `whatsapp-bridge` HTTP API listens on `127.0.0.1:8080` without authentication and without Host header validation, and the `/api/send` endpoint accepts an absolute `media_path` parameter without confining it to a safe directory. Combined, these issues allow any local process running as the same user as the bridge to send WhatsApp messages from the paired account without authorization; the same caller to read arbitrary files readable by the user (e.g. SSH private keys, browser session data, source code, dotfiles) and exfiltrate them as WhatsApp document attachments; and/or a remote attacker to trigger the same operations via DNS rebinding from a webpage the user visits, since no Host header validation is performed. In MCP environments, "local caller" extends beyond processes the user explicitly launched — sibling MCP servers, IDE extensions, and tool-triggered flows running in the user's session can act as the effective caller. This issue is fixed in whatsapp-mcp v0.2.1 and corresponding Docker images / release artifacts. Users should upgrade immediately. The fix introduces bearer token authentication on the bridge HTTP API (configured via environment variable, required on all requests, validated with constant-time comparison); host header allow-list validation to prevent DNS rebinding; and confinement of `media_path` to a co
osv:CVE-2026-46555
Complete source record
{
"id": "5b2cf270a503d85be66dc15ec67fc0d98a730b782c338c7dc67435ca6b6e24e0",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-46555",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "WhatsApp MCP: Unauthenticated bridge API allows message sending and arbitrary file exfiltration",
"summary": "WhatsApp MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for WhatsApp, enabling Claude to read and send WhatsApp messages. Prior to version 0.2.1, the `whatsapp-bridge` HTTP API listens on `127.0.0.1:8080` without authentication and without Host header validation, and the `/api/send` endpoint accepts an absolute `media_path` parameter without confining it to a safe directory. Combined, these issues allow any local process running as the same user as the bridge to send WhatsApp messages from the paired account without authorization; the same caller to read arbitrary files readable by the user (e.g. SSH private keys, browser session data, source code, dotfiles) and exfiltrate them as WhatsApp document attachments; and/or a remote attacker to trigger the same operations via DNS rebinding from a webpage the user visits, since no Host header validation is performed. In MCP environments, \"local caller\" extends beyond processes the user explicitly launched — sibling MCP servers, IDE extensions, and tool-triggered flows running in the user's session can act as the effective caller. This issue is fixed in whatsapp-mcp v0.2.1 and corresponding Docker images / release artifacts. Users should upgrade immediately. The fix introduces bearer token authentication on the bridge HTTP API (configured via environment variable, required on all requests, validated with constant-time comparison); host header allow-list validation to prevent DNS rebinding; and confinement of `media_path` to a co",
"evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-46555",
"products": [],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "CVE-2026-46555",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46555",
"GHSA-7jj9-4qqq-4xc4"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"repo": "https://github.com/verygoodplugins/whatsapp-mcp",
"type": "GIT",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6bb5359e8ee68e3285745c8bb86d6c9be88ae2b1"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.2.1"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "6bb5359e8ee68e3285745c8bb86d6c9be88ae2b1"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_TAG",
"original_tag": "v0.2.1"
},
{
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:verygoodplugins:whatsapp_mcp_server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.2.1"
}
],
"source": "CPE_RANGE"
}
]
}
}
],
"versions": [
"v0.2.0",
"v0.1.0"
],
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-46555.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:25.018947343Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/verygoodplugins/whatsapp-mcp/blob/main/SECURITY.md",
"https://github.com/verygoodplugins/whatsapp-mcp/releases/tag/v0.2.1",
"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/46xxx/CVE-2026-46555.json",
"https://github.com/verygoodplugins/whatsapp-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-7jj9-4qqq-4xc4",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46555"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-306",
"CWE-346"
],
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/46xxx/CVE-2026-46555.json"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-46555",
"evidence": "/id"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 491659,
"published_at": "2026-07-20T17:06:22.232+00:00"
}