Excelize ColumnNameToNumber: int64 overflow yields an out-of-domain coordinate with nil error, causing negative slice index panic on r="0" rows
### Summary `ColumnNameToNumber` (lib.go:220-237) accumulates the bijective base-26 value of a column name in an int64 with only an upper-bound check (`col > MaxColumns`) applied after the loop and no overflow detection. A 14-letter column name whose true value is 3·2⁶⁴ — e.g. **`VGWQHXLSDVIKWV`** — wraps to `col = 0` and passes the guard, so `CellNameToCoordinates("VGWQHXLSDVIKWV1")` returns `(col=0, row=1, err=nil)`. When normalizing a `r="0"` row, `checkSheetR0` (excelize.go:417-443, called from `checkSheet` at excelize.go:405) runs its `checkRow` closure with `col = 0`: `colIdx := col - 1` becomes **-1**, and `sheetData.Row[rowIdx].C[-1]` (excelize.go:424) raises an unrecovered `panic: runtime error: index out of range [-1]`, killing the host process. ### Details - The row side of the same coordinate gate is enforced (`checkRowNum` at excelize.go:342-350 bounds `r` before the `make([]xlsxRow, row)` allocation; this includes the fix for GHSA-h69g-9hx6-f3v4 / CVE-2026-54063, present in the audited commit). The **column** side is not: `checkSheet`/`lastRowNum`/`checkSheetR0` treat `err == nil` from `CellNameToCoordinates` as proof of an in-domain coordinate (excelize.go:356, :438), which is unsound because of the wrap-around above. - The same unsound gate also feeds `ws.SheetData.Row[rowIdx].C[colNum-1]` in `xlsxWorksheet.checkRow` (rows.go:969): a row combining a valid large column (e.g. `XFD1`) with an overflowed column panics identically. - Reachable from any `workSheetRe
- Products
- github.com/xuri/excelize, github.com/xuri/excelize/v2
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 2.11.1-0.20260910071107-696050fbf14e
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-107217
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 28 Oct 2026, 08:47 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Excelize ColumnNameToNumber: int64 overflow yields an out-of-domain coordinate with nil error, causing negative slice index panic on r="0" rows
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 7 Oct 2026, 20:23 UTC
### Summary `ColumnNameToNumber` (lib.go:220-237) accumulates the bijective base-26 value of a column name in an int64 with only an upper-bound check (`col > MaxColumns`) applied after the loop and no overflow detection. A 14-letter column name whose true value is 3·2⁶⁴ — e.g. **`VGWQHXLSDVIKWV`** — wraps to `col = 0` and passes the guard, so `CellNameToCoordinates("VGWQHXLSDVIKWV1")` returns `(col=0, row=1, err=nil)`. When normalizing a `r="0"` row, `checkSheetR0` (excelize.go:417-443, called from `checkSheet` at excelize.go:405) runs its `checkRow` closure with `col = 0`: `colIdx := col - 1` becomes **-1**, and `sheetData.Row[rowIdx].C[-1]` (excelize.go:424) raises an unrecovered `panic: runtime error: index out of range [-1]`, killing the host process. ### Details - The row side of the same coordinate gate is enforced (`checkRowNum` at excelize.go:342-350 bounds `r` before the `make([]xlsxRow, row)` allocation; this includes the fix for GHSA-h69g-9hx6-f3v4 / CVE-2026-54063, present in the audited commit). The **column** side is not: `checkSheet`/`lastRowNum`/`checkSheetR0` treat `err == nil` from `CellNameToCoordinates` as proof of an in-domain coordinate (excelize.go:356, :438), which is unsound because of the wrap-around above. - The same unsound gate also feeds `ws.SheetData.Row[rowIdx].C[colNum-1]` in `xlsxWorksheet.checkRow` (rows.go:969): a row combining a valid large column (e.g. `XFD1`) with an overflowed column panics identically. - Reachable from any `workSheetRe
osv:GHSA-c85p-xxjj-2r75
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2
Fixed versions: 2.11.1-0.20260910071107-696050fbf14e
github.com/xuri/excelize
Fixed versions: Not specified
Complete source record
{
"id": "769d4115d321b0033daedf36d685a89892a21ca372c89d623f85a85de340e857",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-c85p-xxjj-2r75",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Excelize ColumnNameToNumber: int64 overflow yields an out-of-domain coordinate with nil error, causing negative slice index panic on r=\"0\" rows",
"summary": "### Summary `ColumnNameToNumber` (lib.go:220-237) accumulates the bijective base-26 value of a column name in an int64 with only an upper-bound check (`col > MaxColumns`) applied after the loop and no overflow detection. A 14-letter column name whose true value is 3·2⁶⁴ — e.g. **`VGWQHXLSDVIKWV`** — wraps to `col = 0` and passes the guard, so `CellNameToCoordinates(\"VGWQHXLSDVIKWV1\")` returns `(col=0, row=1, err=nil)`. When normalizing a `r=\"0\"` row, `checkSheetR0` (excelize.go:417-443, called from `checkSheet` at excelize.go:405) runs its `checkRow` closure with `col = 0`: `colIdx := col - 1` becomes **-1**, and `sheetData.Row[rowIdx].C[-1]` (excelize.go:424) raises an unrecovered `panic: runtime error: index out of range [-1]`, killing the host process. ### Details - The row side of the same coordinate gate is enforced (`checkRowNum` at excelize.go:342-350 bounds `r` before the `make([]xlsxRow, row)` allocation; this includes the fix for GHSA-h69g-9hx6-f3v4 / CVE-2026-54063, present in the audited commit). The **column** side is not: `checkSheet`/`lastRowNum`/`checkSheetR0` treat `err == nil` from `CellNameToCoordinates` as proof of an in-domain coordinate (excelize.go:356, :438), which is unsound because of the wrap-around above. - The same unsound gate also feeds `ws.SheetData.Row[rowIdx].C[colNum-1]` in `xlsxWorksheet.checkRow` (rows.go:969): a row combining a valid large column (e.g. `XFD1`) with an overflowed column panics identically. - Reachable from any `workSheetRe",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-c85p-xxjj-2r75",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "github.com/xuri/excelize/v2",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "2.11.1-0.20260910071107-696050fbf14e",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
},
{
"name": {
"value": "github.com/xuri/excelize",
"evidence": "/affected/1/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-c85p-xxjj-2r75",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-107217",
"GHSA-c85p-xxjj-2r75"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.1-0.20260910071107-696050fbf14e"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "github.com/xuri/excelize/v2",
"purl": "pkg:golang/github.com/xuri/excelize/v2",
"ecosystem": "Go"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-c85p-xxjj-2r75/GHSA-c85p-xxjj-2r75.json"
}
},
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.1.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.4.1"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "github.com/xuri/excelize",
"purl": "pkg:golang/github.com/xuri/excelize",
"ecosystem": "Go"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-c85p-xxjj-2r75/GHSA-c85p-xxjj-2r75.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-07T20:30:05.831565732Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/security/advisories/GHSA-c85p-xxjj-2r75",
"https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/pull/2394",
"https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/commit/696050fbf14e74e96a58eef2b16aaf72f381a6a8",
"https://github.com/qax-os/excelize"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129",
"CWE-190"
],
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T20:23:31Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-107217",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 97232,
"published_at": "2026-10-07T20:23:31+00:00"
}