LiquidJS has a renderLimit DoS guard bypass via empty `{% for %}` body
## Summary The `renderLimit` option — documented in `docs/source/tutorials/dos.md` as the mechanism that "mitigates this by limiting the time consumed by each render() call" — can be fully bypassed by a `{% for %}` (or `{% tablerow %}`) tag whose body is empty. The per-iteration time check is reached only when the body contains at least one template node, so a template like `{%- for i in (1..N) -%}{%- endfor -%}` iterates the full collection without ever consulting `renderLimit`. With a configured `renderLimit` of 50 ms, a single `parseAndRenderSync` call has been observed to consume **2.26 seconds** (~45× over the limit) and scales linearly with `N` up to `memoryLimit`, allowing a low-privileged template author to wedge an event-loop thread for an attacker-chosen duration. ## Details `Render.renderTemplates` is the single point at which `renderLimit` is consulted: ```ts // src/render/render.ts 14: public * renderTemplates (templates: Template[], ctx: Context, emitter?: Emitter): IterableIterator { 15: if (!emitter) { 16: emitter = ctx.opts.keepOutputType ? new KeepingTypeEmitter() : new SimpleEmitter() 17: } 18: const errors = [] 19: for (const tpl of templates) { 20: ctx.renderLimit.check(getPerformance().now()) 21: try { 22: const html = yield tpl.render(ctx, emitter) ... 32: } ``` The check at line 20 lives **inside** the `for (const tpl of templates)` body. When `templates.length === 0`, the loop body never executes, so the limiter is never consulted on that invocation.
- Products
- liquidjs
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 10.26.0
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-44645
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 1 Nov 2026, 18:43 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
LiquidJS has a renderLimit DoS guard bypass via empty `{% for %}` body
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 27 May 2026, 00:11 UTC
## Summary The `renderLimit` option — documented in `docs/source/tutorials/dos.md` as the mechanism that "mitigates this by limiting the time consumed by each render() call" — can be fully bypassed by a `{% for %}` (or `{% tablerow %}`) tag whose body is empty. The per-iteration time check is reached only when the body contains at least one template node, so a template like `{%- for i in (1..N) -%}{%- endfor -%}` iterates the full collection without ever consulting `renderLimit`. With a configured `renderLimit` of 50 ms, a single `parseAndRenderSync` call has been observed to consume **2.26 seconds** (~45× over the limit) and scales linearly with `N` up to `memoryLimit`, allowing a low-privileged template author to wedge an event-loop thread for an attacker-chosen duration. ## Details `Render.renderTemplates` is the single point at which `renderLimit` is consulted: ```ts // src/render/render.ts 14: public * renderTemplates (templates: Template[], ctx: Context, emitter?: Emitter): IterableIterator { 15: if (!emitter) { 16: emitter = ctx.opts.keepOutputType ? new KeepingTypeEmitter() : new SimpleEmitter() 17: } 18: const errors = [] 19: for (const tpl of templates) { 20: ctx.renderLimit.check(getPerformance().now()) 21: try { 22: const html = yield tpl.render(ctx, emitter) ... 32: } ``` The check at line 20 lives **inside** the `for (const tpl of templates)` body. When `templates.length === 0`, the loop body never executes, so the limiter is never consulted on that invocation.
osv:GHSA-8xx9-69p8-7jp3
liquidjs
Fixed versions: 10.26.0
Complete source record
{
"id": "ff657af1bad873696a6987fa9370e90f14e595cfe163942a301afb0dd85025d3",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-8xx9-69p8-7jp3",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "LiquidJS has a renderLimit DoS guard bypass via empty `{% for %}` body",
"summary": "## Summary The `renderLimit` option — documented in `docs/source/tutorials/dos.md` as the mechanism that \"mitigates this by limiting the time consumed by each render() call\" — can be fully bypassed by a `{% for %}` (or `{% tablerow %}`) tag whose body is empty. The per-iteration time check is reached only when the body contains at least one template node, so a template like `{%- for i in (1..N) -%}{%- endfor -%}` iterates the full collection without ever consulting `renderLimit`. With a configured `renderLimit` of 50 ms, a single `parseAndRenderSync` call has been observed to consume **2.26 seconds** (~45× over the limit) and scales linearly with `N` up to `memoryLimit`, allowing a low-privileged template author to wedge an event-loop thread for an attacker-chosen duration. ## Details `Render.renderTemplates` is the single point at which `renderLimit` is consulted: ```ts // src/render/render.ts 14: public * renderTemplates (templates: Template[], ctx: Context, emitter?: Emitter): IterableIterator { 15: if (!emitter) { 16: emitter = ctx.opts.keepOutputType ? new KeepingTypeEmitter() : new SimpleEmitter() 17: } 18: const errors = [] 19: for (const tpl of templates) { 20: ctx.renderLimit.check(getPerformance().now()) 21: try { 22: const html = yield tpl.render(ctx, emitter) ... 32: } ``` The check at line 20 lives **inside** the `for (const tpl of templates)` body. When `templates.length === 0`, the loop body never executes, so the limiter is never consulted on that invocation. ",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-8xx9-69p8-7jp3",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "liquidjs",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
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"fixed_versions": [
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"value": "10.26.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
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"severity": "medium",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-8xx9-69p8-7jp3",
"aliases": [
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"GHSA-8xx9-69p8-7jp3"
],
"metrics": [
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
}
],
"affected": [
{
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"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
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"introduced": "0"
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{
"fixed": "10.26.0"
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm"
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"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-8xx9-69p8-7jp3/GHSA-8xx9-69p8-7jp3.json"
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],
"modified": "2026-10-27T15:15:08.159614848Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/security/advisories/GHSA-8xx9-69p8-7jp3",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44645",
"https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/commit/5b9c3469085e01c79e2d0af28e2a13f730e1793d",
"https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs",
"https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/blob/v10.26.0/CHANGELOG.md",
"https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/releases/tag/v10.26.0"
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-27T00:11:46Z"
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"source_id": "core-osv",
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"published_at": "2026-05-27T00:11:46+00:00"
}