Fickling MLAllowlist analysis pass rendered inoperative by shared mutable state in AnalysisContext.shorten_code()
In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports — it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes — UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllow
- Products
- Not specified
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-14535
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 5 Nov 2026, 03:06 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Fickling MLAllowlist analysis pass rendered inoperative by shared mutable state in AnalysisContext.shorten_code()
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 4 Jul 2026, 13:31 UTC
In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports — it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes — UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllow
osv:CVE-2026-14535
Complete source record
{
"id": "130132a364ef3f0e47f20d49c8e8882628a5678b942ead7b8924f8edcda3ec6f",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-14535",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Fickling MLAllowlist analysis pass rendered inoperative by shared mutable state in AnalysisContext.shorten_code()",
"summary": "In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports — it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes — UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllow",
"evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-14535",
"products": [],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "CVE-2026-14535",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-14535",
"GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429",
"PYSEC-2026-2150"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"repo": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling",
"type": "GIT",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "41ce7cb01edd97072994039574a2301ebb3f463d"
},
{
"fixed": "c3c695cdcce451c04dfe892802675161614287a2"
}
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"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:trailofbits:fickling:*:*:*:*:*:python:*:*",
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.1.11"
}
],
"source": "CPE_RANGE"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "41ce7cb01edd97072994039574a2301ebb3f463d"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "c3c695cdcce451c04dfe892802675161614287a2"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_TAG",
"original_tag": "v0.1.12"
}
]
}
}
],
"versions": [
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"v0.1.10",
"v0.1.9",
"v0.1.8",
"v0.1.7",
"v0.1.6",
"v0.1.5",
"v0.1.4",
"master",
"v0.1.3",
"v0.1.2",
"v0.1.1",
"v0.1.0",
"v0.0.8",
"v0.0.7",
"v0.0.6",
"v0.0.5",
"v0.0.4",
"v0.0.3",
"v0.0.2",
"v0.0.1"
],
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-14535.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:42.013737628Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/releases/tag/v0.1.12",
"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/14xxx/CVE-2026-14535.json",
"https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14535",
"https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/41ce7cb01edd97072994039574a2301ebb3f463d",
"https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/pull/278",
"https://pypi.org/project/fickling/"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"cna_assigner": "BombadilSystems",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/14xxx/CVE-2026-14535.json"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-14535",
"evidence": "/id"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 509712,
"published_at": "2026-07-04T13:31:14.937+00:00"
}