wger: cross-tenant admin notes/contracts leak via gym=None bypass (5 views)
### Summary Five gym management views in wger apply a flawed gym-scope guard (`gym_a != gym_b`) that silently passes when both operands are `None`. A trainer with `gym.gym_trainer` and `gym.add_adminusernote` permissions and no gym assignment (`gym=None`) can read private admin notes, uploaded documents, gym contracts, user configuration, and user permission data for **any other unaffiliated user** on the instance. The subsequent querysets filter only on the attacker-supplied `member_id` with no secondary gym-scoped validation, so all records are disclosed. ### Details **Files**: `wger/gym/views/user.py`, `wger/gym/views/admin_notes.py`, `wger/gym/views/document.py`, `wger/gym/views/contract.py`, `wger/gym/views/user_config.py` The same flawed comparison pattern appears across at least five views: ```python # VULNERABLE - applied in admin_notes_list, documents_list, contracts_list, # user_config, and gym_permissions_user_edit if request.user.userprofile.gym != user.userprofile.gym: return HttpResponseForbidden() # After the guard (admin notes example): notes = AdminUserNote.objects.filter(member=member) # only filtered by member_id ``` When both `request.user.userprofile.gym` and `user.userprofile.gym` are `None`, Python evaluates `None != None` as `False`, and `HttpResponseForbidden` is never reached. The subsequent queryset applies only the attacker-supplied `member` (user ID) as a filter — there is no secondary check tying the queryset to the requesting trainer's gym. All
- Products
- wger
- Affected versions
- 1.1, 1.1.1, 1.2, 1.2rc1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.6.1, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2.0, 2.1
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-43976
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 30 Oct 2026, 18:13 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
wger: cross-tenant admin notes/contracts leak via gym=None bypass (5 views)
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 15 Oct 2026, 10:22 UTC
### Summary Five gym management views in wger apply a flawed gym-scope guard (`gym_a != gym_b`) that silently passes when both operands are `None`. A trainer with `gym.gym_trainer` and `gym.add_adminusernote` permissions and no gym assignment (`gym=None`) can read private admin notes, uploaded documents, gym contracts, user configuration, and user permission data for **any other unaffiliated user** on the instance. The subsequent querysets filter only on the attacker-supplied `member_id` with no secondary gym-scoped validation, so all records are disclosed. ### Details **Files**: `wger/gym/views/user.py`, `wger/gym/views/admin_notes.py`, `wger/gym/views/document.py`, `wger/gym/views/contract.py`, `wger/gym/views/user_config.py` The same flawed comparison pattern appears across at least five views: ```python # VULNERABLE - applied in admin_notes_list, documents_list, contracts_list, # user_config, and gym_permissions_user_edit if request.user.userprofile.gym != user.userprofile.gym: return HttpResponseForbidden() # After the guard (admin notes example): notes = AdminUserNote.objects.filter(member=member) # only filtered by member_id ``` When both `request.user.userprofile.gym` and `user.userprofile.gym` are `None`, Python evaluates `None != None` as `False`, and `HttpResponseForbidden` is never reached. The subsequent queryset applies only the attacker-supplied `member` (user ID) as a filter — there is no secondary check tying the queryset to the requesting trainer's gym. All
osv:PYSEC-2026-4313
wger
Fixed versions: Not specified
Complete source record
{
"id": "d2d699ddca404db112f233b966e173fb37249cd80c8b467a8eb06136582a04ef",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/PYSEC-2026-4313",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "wger: cross-tenant admin notes/contracts leak via gym=None bypass (5 views)",
"summary": "### Summary Five gym management views in wger apply a flawed gym-scope guard (`gym_a != gym_b`) that silently passes when both operands are `None`. A trainer with `gym.gym_trainer` and `gym.add_adminusernote` permissions and no gym assignment (`gym=None`) can read private admin notes, uploaded documents, gym contracts, user configuration, and user permission data for **any other unaffiliated user** on the instance. The subsequent querysets filter only on the attacker-supplied `member_id` with no secondary gym-scoped validation, so all records are disclosed. ### Details **Files**: `wger/gym/views/user.py`, `wger/gym/views/admin_notes.py`, `wger/gym/views/document.py`, `wger/gym/views/contract.py`, `wger/gym/views/user_config.py` The same flawed comparison pattern appears across at least five views: ```python # VULNERABLE - applied in admin_notes_list, documents_list, contracts_list, # user_config, and gym_permissions_user_edit if request.user.userprofile.gym != user.userprofile.gym: return HttpResponseForbidden() # After the guard (admin notes example): notes = AdminUserNote.objects.filter(member=member) # only filtered by member_id ``` When both `request.user.userprofile.gym` and `user.userprofile.gym` are `None`, Python evaluates `None != None` as `False`, and `HttpResponseForbidden` is never reached. The subsequent queryset applies only the attacker-supplied `member` (user ID) as a filter — there is no secondary check tying the queryset to the requesting trainer's gym. All ",
"evidence": "osv:PYSEC-2026-4313",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "wger",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [],
"affected_versions": [
{
"value": "1.1",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "1.1.1",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "1.2",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "1.2rc1",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "1.3",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "1.4",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "1.5",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "1.6",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "1.6.1",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "1.7",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "1.8",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "1.9",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "2.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "2.1",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
}
]
}
],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "PYSEC-2026-4313",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-43976",
"GHSA-c72h-82w6-rqfp",
"PYSEC-2026-4313"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.1"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "wger",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/wger",
"ecosystem": "PyPI"
},
"versions": [
"1.1",
"1.1.1",
"1.2",
"1.2rc1",
"1.3",
"1.4",
"1.5",
"1.6",
"1.6.1",
"1.7",
"1.8",
"1.9",
"2.0",
"2.1"
],
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/vulns/wger/PYSEC-2026-4313.yaml"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-15T14:45:10.349862114Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/wger-project/wger/security/advisories/GHSA-c72h-82w6-rqfp",
"https://github.com/wger-project/wger",
"https://github.com/wger-project/wger/releases/tag/2.6",
"https://pypi.org/project/wger",
"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c72h-82w6-rqfp",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43976"
]
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-43976",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 332651,
"published_at": "2026-10-15T10:22:46.832742+00:00"
}