Vikunja: Link-share principal ID collision allows cross-account API token issuance and management
Executive Summary Vikunja accepts both regular-user JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) and link-share JWTs through its generic authenticated API route group. A link-share JWT resolves to a `models.LinkSharing` principal whose `GetID()` method returns the numeric `link_shares.id`. The API-token management model then treats that generic numeric value as a `users.id` when it creates, lists, and deletes API tokens. Because `users.id` and `link_shares.id` are independent positive sequences, a link share whose ID equals another user's ID is treated as that user by `/api/v1/tokens`. An ordinary authenticated attacker can obtain a target's numeric user ID through authenticated user search and create link shares on an attacker-writable project until the link-share sequence reaches that value. The colliding link-share principal can then list the target's API-token metadata, issue a new API token owned by the target, and delete target-owned API tokens. The newly issued token operates with attacker-selected valid API scopes under the target user's existing permissions. I reviewed the vulnerable `v2.3.0` source, the introducing commit, the stable tag history, and the inspected main revision directly. I also reviewed the recorded local HTTP and native-router validation results. Dynamic testing used only a local `v2.3.0` Docker deployment with PostgreSQL and synthetic data; I did not test any public, hosted, or otherwise external instance. Historical tags were checked from source rather than exercised
- Products
- code.vikunja.io/api
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 2.4.0
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-68581
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 08:44 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Vikunja: Link-share principal ID collision allows cross-account API token issuance and management
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 9 Oct 2026, 20:42 UTC
Executive Summary Vikunja accepts both regular-user JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) and link-share JWTs through its generic authenticated API route group. A link-share JWT resolves to a `models.LinkSharing` principal whose `GetID()` method returns the numeric `link_shares.id`. The API-token management model then treats that generic numeric value as a `users.id` when it creates, lists, and deletes API tokens. Because `users.id` and `link_shares.id` are independent positive sequences, a link share whose ID equals another user's ID is treated as that user by `/api/v1/tokens`. An ordinary authenticated attacker can obtain a target's numeric user ID through authenticated user search and create link shares on an attacker-writable project until the link-share sequence reaches that value. The colliding link-share principal can then list the target's API-token metadata, issue a new API token owned by the target, and delete target-owned API tokens. The newly issued token operates with attacker-selected valid API scopes under the target user's existing permissions. I reviewed the vulnerable `v2.3.0` source, the introducing commit, the stable tag history, and the inspected main revision directly. I also reviewed the recorded local HTTP and native-router validation results. Dynamic testing used only a local `v2.3.0` Docker deployment with PostgreSQL and synthetic data; I did not test any public, hosted, or otherwise external instance. Historical tags were checked from source rather than exercised
osv:GHSA-vvcv-vpph-h844
code.vikunja.io/api
Fixed versions: 2.4.0
Complete source record
{
"id": "21c883f056fcb89d8805f8113b7a7f93d792ebfcc95e1912ea3258752eafaa5f",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-vvcv-vpph-h844",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Vikunja: Link-share principal ID collision allows cross-account API token issuance and management",
"summary": "Executive Summary Vikunja accepts both regular-user JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) and link-share JWTs through its generic authenticated API route group. A link-share JWT resolves to a `models.LinkSharing` principal whose `GetID()` method returns the numeric `link_shares.id`. The API-token management model then treats that generic numeric value as a `users.id` when it creates, lists, and deletes API tokens. Because `users.id` and `link_shares.id` are independent positive sequences, a link share whose ID equals another user's ID is treated as that user by `/api/v1/tokens`. An ordinary authenticated attacker can obtain a target's numeric user ID through authenticated user search and create link shares on an attacker-writable project until the link-share sequence reaches that value. The colliding link-share principal can then list the target's API-token metadata, issue a new API token owned by the target, and delete target-owned API tokens. The newly issued token operates with attacker-selected valid API scopes under the target user's existing permissions. I reviewed the vulnerable `v2.3.0` source, the introducing commit, the stable tag history, and the inspected main revision directly. I also reviewed the recorded local HTTP and native-router validation results. Dynamic testing used only a local `v2.3.0` Docker deployment with PostgreSQL and synthetic data; I did not test any public, hosted, or otherwise external instance. Historical tags were checked from source rather than exercised ",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-vvcv-vpph-h844",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "code.vikunja.io/api",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "2.4.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-vvcv-vpph-h844",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68581",
"GHSA-vvcv-vpph-h844",
"GO-2026-6753"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.22.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.0"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "code.vikunja.io/api",
"purl": "pkg:golang/code.vikunja.io/api",
"ecosystem": "Go"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-vvcv-vpph-h844/GHSA-vvcv-vpph-h844.json",
"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 2.3.0"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-19T21:41:06.033854160Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-vvcv-vpph-h844",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68581",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/95b7e673fb5ee407498fa4b13e8b4c57847a4a0b",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/e6b25bd57b537ef9a72b5acdadf446ca5ef77bfa",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.4.0",
"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vikunja-through-authentication-bypass-via-principal-id-collision"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:42:14Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-68581",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 376775,
"published_at": "2026-10-09T20:42:14+00:00"
}