Vikunja: Permissive Cross-domain Security Policy trusts every localhost origin which should not be trusted
## Summary Vikunja ships with `cors.origins` defaulting to `http://127.0.0.1:*` and `http://localhost:*`, and sends `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`, so a page served from any port on the user's own machine may make credentialed cross-origin requests to the API and read the responses. The mandatory `service.publicurl` is appended to that default list rather than replacing it, so a fully configured production deployment still trusts every localhost origin. Combined with the token refresh endpoint, which authenticates with the `vikunja_refresh_token` cookie and returns a bearer JWT in the response body, one `fetch()` from such a page yields a working access token for whoever is logged in, and from there the whole account. ## Vulnerability Details `cors.enable` defaults to true and `cors.origins` defaults to the two localhost wildcards: https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/blob/a881ac39eecd07575a5aede8e74727c28d5fd578/pkg/config/config.go#L495-L497 The middleware is registered with `AllowCredentials: true` and an `UnsafeAllowOriginFunc` that implements the port wildcard through `matchCORSOrigin`, since Echo v5 will not accept a wildcard port itself: https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/blob/a881ac39eecd07575a5aede8e74727c28d5fd578/pkg/routes/routes.go#L263-L281 The detail that turns a development convenience into a production exposure is the last line of configuration handling. Enabling CORS without a public URL is a fatal error, so every deployment sets one, and that
- Products
- code.vikunja.io/api
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-111922
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 08:44 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Vikunja: Permissive Cross-domain Security Policy trusts every localhost origin which should not be trusted
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 9 Oct 2026, 20:57 UTC
## Summary Vikunja ships with `cors.origins` defaulting to `http://127.0.0.1:*` and `http://localhost:*`, and sends `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`, so a page served from any port on the user's own machine may make credentialed cross-origin requests to the API and read the responses. The mandatory `service.publicurl` is appended to that default list rather than replacing it, so a fully configured production deployment still trusts every localhost origin. Combined with the token refresh endpoint, which authenticates with the `vikunja_refresh_token` cookie and returns a bearer JWT in the response body, one `fetch()` from such a page yields a working access token for whoever is logged in, and from there the whole account. ## Vulnerability Details `cors.enable` defaults to true and `cors.origins` defaults to the two localhost wildcards: https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/blob/a881ac39eecd07575a5aede8e74727c28d5fd578/pkg/config/config.go#L495-L497 The middleware is registered with `AllowCredentials: true` and an `UnsafeAllowOriginFunc` that implements the port wildcard through `matchCORSOrigin`, since Echo v5 will not accept a wildcard port itself: https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/blob/a881ac39eecd07575a5aede8e74727c28d5fd578/pkg/routes/routes.go#L263-L281 The detail that turns a development convenience into a production exposure is the last line of configuration handling. Enabling CORS without a public URL is a fatal error, so every deployment sets one, and that
osv:GHSA-m687-p538-r5hp
code.vikunja.io/api
Fixed versions: Not specified
Complete source record
{
"id": "7fe810f7ebf6b98bb3c25a12887b3df4357e25612f1b80ba7e071cad1b61be6d",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-m687-p538-r5hp",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Vikunja: Permissive Cross-domain Security Policy trusts every localhost origin which should not be trusted",
"summary": "## Summary Vikunja ships with `cors.origins` defaulting to `http://127.0.0.1:*` and `http://localhost:*`, and sends `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`, so a page served from any port on the user's own machine may make credentialed cross-origin requests to the API and read the responses. The mandatory `service.publicurl` is appended to that default list rather than replacing it, so a fully configured production deployment still trusts every localhost origin. Combined with the token refresh endpoint, which authenticates with the `vikunja_refresh_token` cookie and returns a bearer JWT in the response body, one `fetch()` from such a page yields a working access token for whoever is logged in, and from there the whole account. ## Vulnerability Details `cors.enable` defaults to true and `cors.origins` defaults to the two localhost wildcards: https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/blob/a881ac39eecd07575a5aede8e74727c28d5fd578/pkg/config/config.go#L495-L497 The middleware is registered with `AllowCredentials: true` and an `UnsafeAllowOriginFunc` that implements the port wildcard through `matchCORSOrigin`, since Echo v5 will not accept a wildcard port itself: https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/blob/a881ac39eecd07575a5aede8e74727c28d5fd578/pkg/routes/routes.go#L263-L281 The detail that turns a development convenience into a production exposure is the last line of configuration handling. Enabling CORS without a public URL is a fatal error, so every deployment sets one, and that ",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-m687-p538-r5hp",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "code.vikunja.io/api",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-m687-p538-r5hp",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-111922",
"GHSA-m687-p538-r5hp",
"GO-2026-6739"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.6.0"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
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"purl": "pkg:golang/code.vikunja.io/api",
"ecosystem": "Go"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-m687-p538-r5hp/GHSA-m687-p538-r5hp.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-19T21:40:54.835844206Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-m687-p538-r5hp",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-942"
],
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:57:50Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-111922",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 376752,
"published_at": "2026-10-09T20:57:50+00:00"
}