Vikunja: Unbounded image decode on avatar and project-background uploads enables decode/resize amplification
### Summary The 50-megapixel decode guard exists only on the task-attachment preview path. Avatar and project-background uploads decode uploaded images with no pixel cap. Worse, the avatar resize fixes the output height at 1024 and derives the width from the aspect ratio, so a tiny extreme-aspect-ratio PNG expands to an enormous output image — an input-side pixel cap would not catch it. ### Details The only `maxPixels` check (50MP) is in `TaskAttachment.GetPreview` (`pkg/models/task_attachment.go` ~lines 332-338). No such check guards: - avatar upload: `pkg/modules/avatar/upload/upload.go` (~lines 82, 137, 141) - project background: `pkg/modules/background/handler/background.go` (~lines 174, 269, 289) `imaging.Resize(img, 0, 1024, imaging.Lanczos)` (upload.go ~line 141) fixes height=1024 and derives width from the aspect ratio: a 20000x10 input yields a ~2,048,000 x 1024 output (~2.1 billion pixels), so a few-hundred-byte file drives huge CPU and memory. ### PoC (verified at runtime against v2.5.0) ``` PUT /api/v1/user/settings/avatar/upload avatar=8000x8000 PNG (64MP, 192KB) -> 200 (accepted; exceeds the 50MP attachment cap) PUT /api/v1/user/settings/avatar/upload avatar=20000x10 PNG (681 bytes) -> 200 after ~19.6s of server processing ``` Contrast (guard present): uploading the 64MP PNG as a task attachment and requesting its preview returns in ~1ms without decoding — `GetPreview` rejects it via `maxPixels` and falls back to the raw file. ### Impact A small crafted upload d
- Products
- code.vikunja.io/api
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 2.6.0
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-91971
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 08:44 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Vikunja: Unbounded image decode on avatar and project-background uploads enables decode/resize amplification
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 9 Oct 2026, 20:52 UTC
### Summary The 50-megapixel decode guard exists only on the task-attachment preview path. Avatar and project-background uploads decode uploaded images with no pixel cap. Worse, the avatar resize fixes the output height at 1024 and derives the width from the aspect ratio, so a tiny extreme-aspect-ratio PNG expands to an enormous output image — an input-side pixel cap would not catch it. ### Details The only `maxPixels` check (50MP) is in `TaskAttachment.GetPreview` (`pkg/models/task_attachment.go` ~lines 332-338). No such check guards: - avatar upload: `pkg/modules/avatar/upload/upload.go` (~lines 82, 137, 141) - project background: `pkg/modules/background/handler/background.go` (~lines 174, 269, 289) `imaging.Resize(img, 0, 1024, imaging.Lanczos)` (upload.go ~line 141) fixes height=1024 and derives width from the aspect ratio: a 20000x10 input yields a ~2,048,000 x 1024 output (~2.1 billion pixels), so a few-hundred-byte file drives huge CPU and memory. ### PoC (verified at runtime against v2.5.0) ``` PUT /api/v1/user/settings/avatar/upload avatar=8000x8000 PNG (64MP, 192KB) -> 200 (accepted; exceeds the 50MP attachment cap) PUT /api/v1/user/settings/avatar/upload avatar=20000x10 PNG (681 bytes) -> 200 after ~19.6s of server processing ``` Contrast (guard present): uploading the 64MP PNG as a task attachment and requesting its preview returns in ~1ms without decoding — `GetPreview` rejects it via `maxPixels` and falls back to the raw file. ### Impact A small crafted upload d
osv:GHSA-4vh2-39rq-rq8j
code.vikunja.io/api
Fixed versions: 2.6.0
Complete source record
{
"id": "6f0d8ffc90aefeb82492f3773c233abc8264019285681e9dd87a74d772ba7303",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-4vh2-39rq-rq8j",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Vikunja: Unbounded image decode on avatar and project-background uploads enables decode/resize amplification",
"summary": "### Summary The 50-megapixel decode guard exists only on the task-attachment preview path. Avatar and project-background uploads decode uploaded images with no pixel cap. Worse, the avatar resize fixes the output height at 1024 and derives the width from the aspect ratio, so a tiny extreme-aspect-ratio PNG expands to an enormous output image — an input-side pixel cap would not catch it. ### Details The only `maxPixels` check (50MP) is in `TaskAttachment.GetPreview` (`pkg/models/task_attachment.go` ~lines 332-338). No such check guards: - avatar upload: `pkg/modules/avatar/upload/upload.go` (~lines 82, 137, 141) - project background: `pkg/modules/background/handler/background.go` (~lines 174, 269, 289) `imaging.Resize(img, 0, 1024, imaging.Lanczos)` (upload.go ~line 141) fixes height=1024 and derives width from the aspect ratio: a 20000x10 input yields a ~2,048,000 x 1024 output (~2.1 billion pixels), so a few-hundred-byte file drives huge CPU and memory. ### PoC (verified at runtime against v2.5.0) ``` PUT /api/v1/user/settings/avatar/upload avatar=8000x8000 PNG (64MP, 192KB) -> 200 (accepted; exceeds the 50MP attachment cap) PUT /api/v1/user/settings/avatar/upload avatar=20000x10 PNG (681 bytes) -> 200 after ~19.6s of server processing ``` Contrast (guard present): uploading the 64MP PNG as a task attachment and requesting its preview returns in ~1ms without decoding — `GetPreview` rejects it via `maxPixels` and falls back to the raw file. ### Impact A small crafted upload d",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-4vh2-39rq-rq8j",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "code.vikunja.io/api",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "2.6.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-4vh2-39rq-rq8j",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-91971",
"GHSA-4vh2-39rq-rq8j",
"GO-2026-6717"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.0"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "code.vikunja.io/api",
"purl": "pkg:golang/code.vikunja.io/api",
"ecosystem": "Go"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-4vh2-39rq-rq8j/GHSA-4vh2-39rq-rq8j.json",
"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 2.5.0"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-19T21:41:15.904955453Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-4vh2-39rq-rq8j",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91971",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/3688",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.6.0",
"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vikunja-before-2.6.0-denial-of-service-via-avatar-upload"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:52:15Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-91971",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 376790,
"published_at": "2026-10-09T20:52:15+00:00"
}