Security advisory
`_nx_icmpv6_validate_options()` scans the option area with `while (length > 2)` (`common/src/nx_icmpv6_validate_options.c:79`). An area whose size leaves a one- or two-byte residue exits the loop with that tail unexamined; the residue is not negative, so the function returns `NX_SUCCESS`. Its zero-length rejection never sees those bytes. Every consumer then re-walks the same area, reading a two-byte option header at the residue and subtracting `nx_icmpv6_option_length << 3` with no zero check and no remaining-length check. Three outcomes follow, selected by bytes the attacker controls. **Zero length byte.** The walker subtracts zero and advances zero. All four handlers loop forever — `_nx_icmpv6_process_ra` (`nx_icmpv6_process_ra.c:245, :528`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_ns` (`:251, :329`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_na` (`:147, :156`) and `_nx_icmpv6_process_redirect` (`:247, :350`). The walk runs in the IP thread, which is the highest-priority thread and does not yield inside the loop, so the system stops until a watchdog reset and the frame can be replayed after each one. **Non-zero length byte on a short residue.** The three unsigned counters underflow — `2 - 8` becomes `0xFFFFFFFA` — and the walk continues past the packet buffer, reading until it faults or meets a zero length byte and freezes. The Router Advertisement counter is signed and exits cleanly in this case. **One-byte residue.** The walker reads a two-byte option header, over-reading one byte. During a runaway walk, stray by
- Products
- Not specified
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-102714
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 4 Nov 2026, 13:53 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
`_nx_icmpv6_validate_options()` scans the option area with `while (length > 2)` (`common/src/nx_icmpv6_validate_options.c:79`). An area whose size leaves a one- or two-byte residue exits the loop with that tail unexamined; the residue is not negative, so the function returns `NX_SUCCESS`. Its zero-length rejection never sees those bytes. Every consumer then re-walks the same area, reading a two-byte option header at the residue and subtracting `nx_icmpv6_option_length << 3` with no zero check and no remaining-length check. Three outcomes follow, selected by bytes the attacker controls. **Zero length byte.** The walker subtracts zero and advances zero. All four handlers loop forever — `_nx_icmpv6_process_ra` (`nx_icmpv6_process_ra.c:245, :528`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_ns` (`:251, :329`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_na` (`:147, :156`) and `_nx_icmpv6_process_redirect` (`:247, :350`). The walk runs in the IP thread, which is the highest-priority thread and does not yield inside the loop, so the system stops until a watchdog reset and the frame can be replayed after each one. **Non-zero length byte on a short residue.** The three unsigned counters underflow — `2 - 8` becomes `0xFFFFFFFA` — and the walk continues past the packet buffer, reading until it faults or meets a zero length byte and freezes. The Router Advertisement counter is signed and exits cleanly in this case. **One-byte residue.** The walker reads a two-byte option header, over-reading one byte. During a runaway walk, stray by
osv:CVE-2026-102714
Complete source record
{
"id": "495cd7c051c43d31418c3778a55a09998a3343eeeb1efb4f68c1e603cd2c9363",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-102714",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "CVE-2026-102714",
"summary": "`_nx_icmpv6_validate_options()` scans the option area with `while (length > 2)` (`common/src/nx_icmpv6_validate_options.c:79`). An area whose size leaves a one- or two-byte residue exits the loop with that tail unexamined; the residue is not negative, so the function returns `NX_SUCCESS`. Its zero-length rejection never sees those bytes. Every consumer then re-walks the same area, reading a two-byte option header at the residue and subtracting `nx_icmpv6_option_length << 3` with no zero check and no remaining-length check. Three outcomes follow, selected by bytes the attacker controls. **Zero length byte.** The walker subtracts zero and advances zero. All four handlers loop forever — `_nx_icmpv6_process_ra` (`nx_icmpv6_process_ra.c:245, :528`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_ns` (`:251, :329`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_na` (`:147, :156`) and `_nx_icmpv6_process_redirect` (`:247, :350`). The walk runs in the IP thread, which is the highest-priority thread and does not yield inside the loop, so the system stops until a watchdog reset and the frame can be replayed after each one. **Non-zero length byte on a short residue.** The three unsigned counters underflow — `2 - 8` becomes `0xFFFFFFFA` — and the walk continues past the packet buffer, reading until it faults or meets a zero length byte and freezes. The Router Advertisement counter is signed and exits cleanly in this case. **One-byte residue.** The walker reads a two-byte option header, over-reading one byte. During a runaway walk, stray by",
"evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-102714",
"products": [],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "CVE-2026-102714",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-102714",
"GHSA-39p4-p83c-58hr"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"repo": "https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo",
"type": "GIT",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1a0e9e43a03e37ddecfb6b49e9b078d6e1803d05"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "6.5.1.202602"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
}
]
}
}
],
"versions": [
"v6.4.1_rel",
"v6.5.1.202602_rel",
"v6.5.0.202601_rel",
"v6.4.5.202504_rel",
"v6.4.4.202503a",
"v.6.4.4.202503_rel",
"v6.4.3_rel",
"v6.4.2_rel",
"v6.4.0_rel",
"v6.3.0_rel",
"v6.2.1_rel",
"v6.2.0_rel",
"v6.1.12_rel",
"v6.1.11_rel",
"v6.1.10_rel",
"v6.1.9_rel",
"v6.1.8_rel",
"v6.1.7_rel",
"v6.1.6_rel",
"v6.1.5_rel",
"v6.1.4_rel",
"v6.1.3_rel",
"v6.1.2_rel",
"v6.1_rel",
"v6.0.2_rel",
"v6.0.1_rel",
"v6.0_rel"
],
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-102714.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:35.871418459Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/102xxx/CVE-2026-102714.json",
"https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-39p4-p83c-58hr",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102714"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-1287",
"CWE-191",
"CWE-835"
],
"cna_assigner": "eclipse",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/102xxx/CVE-2026-102714.json"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-102714",
"evidence": "/id"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 503329,
"published_at": "2026-09-29T17:41:28.517+00:00"
}