f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write When updating an atomic-write file, f2fs_write_begin() may read the previously written data back from the COW inode: prepare_atomic_write_begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets use_cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode: f2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)->cow_inode : inode, ...); and f2fs_grab_read_bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption (STEP_DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto(). However, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode (folio->mapping->host == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was encrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode's context, not the COW inode's -- see f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off fio->page->mapping->host. fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise operates on folio->mapping->host. The COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits its encryption policy from there. With test_dummy_encryption the newly created COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a pre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g. already present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted. The read path then sets STEP_DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() on a folio whose host (the unencrypted original
- Products
- Kernel
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 6.12.114, 6.18.57, 6.6.160, 7.1.3
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-63811
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 4 Nov 2026, 02:34 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 19 Jul 2026, 12:02 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write When updating an atomic-write file, f2fs_write_begin() may read the previously written data back from the COW inode: prepare_atomic_write_begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets use_cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode: f2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)->cow_inode : inode, ...); and f2fs_grab_read_bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption (STEP_DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto(). However, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode (folio->mapping->host == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was encrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode's context, not the COW inode's -- see f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off fio->page->mapping->host. fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise operates on folio->mapping->host. The COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits its encryption policy from there. With test_dummy_encryption the newly created COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a pre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g. already present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted. The read path then sets STEP_DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() on a folio whose host (the unencrypted original
osv:CVE-2026-63811
Kernel
Fixed versions: 6.6.160, 6.12.114, 6.18.57, 7.1.3
Complete source record
{
"id": "140fd5434aed9df62a038ca43ba0478b35f01380aaf926b26ecdfc8282110a28",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-63811",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write",
"summary": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write When updating an atomic-write file, f2fs_write_begin() may read the previously written data back from the COW inode: prepare_atomic_write_begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets use_cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode: f2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)->cow_inode : inode, ...); and f2fs_grab_read_bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption (STEP_DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto(). However, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode (folio->mapping->host == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was encrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode's context, not the COW inode's -- see f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off fio->page->mapping->host. fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise operates on folio->mapping->host. The COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits its encryption policy from there. With test_dummy_encryption the newly created COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a pre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g. already present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted. The read path then sets STEP_DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() on a folio whose host (the unencrypted original ",
"evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-63811",
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"modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:32.560839446Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
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"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e4ab3907f44dc243d026048d7f5d477dae9267b",
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"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63811",
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"security_relevant": true,
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"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 499706,
"published_at": "2026-07-19T12:02:13.057+00:00"
}