OpenReception: Confirmation-email links built from the request Host enable pending-account takeover via `POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation`
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 2.0.0, the account-confirmation link in emails is built from the request Host header, with no allowlist. The unauthenticated POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation rotates a pending invitee's confirmation token and emails a link whose host comes from the request. An attacker who sends one resend-confirmation with Host: attacker.example and a pending invitee's email causes that invitee to receive a confirmation email whose only link points to the attacker. If the invitee clicks, the one-time confirmation token reaches the attacker, who then confirms the account on the real tenant domain and registers a passkey they control, taking over the account before the legitimate invitee ever uses it. All released versions through v1.1.0 are affected; no patched version exists yet. Reaching the app with a spoofed Host depends on the front proxy: the stock Caddy catch-all forwards it, while an operator who configures explicit per-tenant proxy blocks is not affected (see Details 4). The invite path builds links from the trusted tenant.domain (invite/+server.ts:204-210); the resend-confirmation path builds them from the request Host. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.0.
- Products
- Not specified
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-58202
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 7 Nov 2026, 13:25 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
OpenReception: Confirmation-email links built from the request Host enable pending-account takeover via `POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation`
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 23 Oct 2026, 20:27 UTC
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 2.0.0, the account-confirmation link in emails is built from the request Host header, with no allowlist. The unauthenticated POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation rotates a pending invitee's confirmation token and emails a link whose host comes from the request. An attacker who sends one resend-confirmation with Host: attacker.example and a pending invitee's email causes that invitee to receive a confirmation email whose only link points to the attacker. If the invitee clicks, the one-time confirmation token reaches the attacker, who then confirms the account on the real tenant domain and registers a passkey they control, taking over the account before the legitimate invitee ever uses it. All released versions through v1.1.0 are affected; no patched version exists yet. Reaching the app with a spoofed Host depends on the front proxy: the stock Caddy catch-all forwards it, while an operator who configures explicit per-tenant proxy blocks is not affected (see Details 4). The invite path builds links from the trusted tenant.domain (invite/+server.ts:204-210); the resend-confirmation path builds them from the request Host. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.0.
osv:CVE-2026-58202
Complete source record
{
"id": "3bc8aee60bcb0f81ed0c40e57f6de5582c522f7fb4eb0b8634cf7be352ba490a",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-58202",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "OpenReception: Confirmation-email links built from the request Host enable pending-account takeover via `POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation`",
"summary": "OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 2.0.0, the account-confirmation link in emails is built from the request Host header, with no allowlist. The unauthenticated POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation rotates a pending invitee's confirmation token and emails a link whose host comes from the request. An attacker who sends one resend-confirmation with Host: attacker.example and a pending invitee's email causes that invitee to receive a confirmation email whose only link points to the attacker. If the invitee clicks, the one-time confirmation token reaches the attacker, who then confirms the account on the real tenant domain and registers a passkey they control, taking over the account before the legitimate invitee ever uses it. All released versions through v1.1.0 are affected; no patched version exists yet. Reaching the app with a spoofed Host depends on the front proxy: the stock Caddy catch-all forwards it, while an operator who configures explicit per-tenant proxy blocks is not affected (see Details 4). The invite path builds links from the trusted tenant.domain (invite/+server.ts:204-210); the resend-confirmation path builds them from the request Host. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.0.",
"evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-58202",
"products": [],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "CVE-2026-58202",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-58202",
"GHSA-w5g9-g2p4-2g4m"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"repo": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software",
"type": "GIT",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "51ef46d25d72c35bb4b69e018ddf64570668051b"
},
{
"fixed": "df5432776a1a5b47c3a64d64e9d05dbe2b7a7819"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.0"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "df5432776a1a5b47c3a64d64e9d05dbe2b7a7819"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "51ef46d25d72c35bb4b69e018ddf64570668051b"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_TAG",
"original_tag": "v2.0.0"
}
]
}
}
],
"versions": [
"v1.1.1",
"v1.1.0",
"v1.0.9",
"v1.0.8",
"v1.0.7",
"v1.0.6",
"v1.0.5",
"v1.0.4",
"v1.0.2",
"v1.0.1",
"v1.0.0",
"v1.0.0-rc2",
"v1.0.0-rc"
],
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-58202.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-31T02:31:00.051446917Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/releases/tag/v2.0.0",
"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/58xxx/CVE-2026-58202.json",
"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-w5g9-g2p4-2g4m",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58202",
"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/df5432776a1a5b47c3a64d64e9d05dbe2b7a7819"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-640"
],
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/58xxx/CVE-2026-58202.json"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-58202",
"evidence": "/id"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 519447,
"published_at": "2026-10-23T20:27:36.09+00:00"
}