OpenClaw allows unauthenticated discovery TXT records to steer routing and TLS pinning
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Discovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) include TXT records such as `lanHost`, `tailnetDns`, `gatewayPort`, and `gatewayTlsSha256`. TXT records are unauthenticated. Prior to version 2026.2.14, some clients treated TXT values as authoritative routing/pinning inputs. iOS and macOS used TXT-provided host hints (`lanHost`/`tailnetDns`) and ports (`gatewayPort`) to build the connection URL. iOS and Android allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint (`gatewayTlsSha256`) to override a previously stored TLS pin. On a shared/untrusted LAN, an attacker could advertise a rogue `_openclaw-gw._tcp` service. This could cause a client to connect to an attacker-controlled endpoint and/or accept an attacker certificate, potentially exfiltrating Gateway credentials (`auth.token` / `auth.password`) during connection. As of time of publication, the iOS and Android apps are alpha/not broadly shipped (no public App Store / Play Store release). Practical impact is primarily limited to developers/testers running those builds, plus any other shipped clients relying on discovery on a shared/untrusted LAN. Version 2026.2.14 fixes the issue. Clients now prefer the resolved service endpoint (SRV + A/AAAA) over TXT-provided routing hints. Discovery-provided fingerprints no longer override stored TLS pins. In iOS/Android, first-time TLS pins require explicit user confirmation (fingerprint shown; no silent TOFU) and discovery-based direct connects are TLS-only. I
- Products
- Not specified
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-26327
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 4 Nov 2026, 19:15 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
OpenClaw allows unauthenticated discovery TXT records to steer routing and TLS pinning
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 19 Feb 2026, 22:59 UTC
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Discovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) include TXT records such as `lanHost`, `tailnetDns`, `gatewayPort`, and `gatewayTlsSha256`. TXT records are unauthenticated. Prior to version 2026.2.14, some clients treated TXT values as authoritative routing/pinning inputs. iOS and macOS used TXT-provided host hints (`lanHost`/`tailnetDns`) and ports (`gatewayPort`) to build the connection URL. iOS and Android allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint (`gatewayTlsSha256`) to override a previously stored TLS pin. On a shared/untrusted LAN, an attacker could advertise a rogue `_openclaw-gw._tcp` service. This could cause a client to connect to an attacker-controlled endpoint and/or accept an attacker certificate, potentially exfiltrating Gateway credentials (`auth.token` / `auth.password`) during connection. As of time of publication, the iOS and Android apps are alpha/not broadly shipped (no public App Store / Play Store release). Practical impact is primarily limited to developers/testers running those builds, plus any other shipped clients relying on discovery on a shared/untrusted LAN. Version 2026.2.14 fixes the issue. Clients now prefer the resolved service endpoint (SRV + A/AAAA) over TXT-provided routing hints. Discovery-provided fingerprints no longer override stored TLS pins. In iOS/Android, first-time TLS pins require explicit user confirmation (fingerprint shown; no silent TOFU) and discovery-based direct connects are TLS-only. I
osv:CVE-2026-26327
Complete source record
{
"id": "8c018272609ee0835a5f331201d37445b8502913a067f80daa745504db0078a8",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-26327",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "OpenClaw allows unauthenticated discovery TXT records to steer routing and TLS pinning",
"summary": "OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Discovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) include TXT records such as `lanHost`, `tailnetDns`, `gatewayPort`, and `gatewayTlsSha256`. TXT records are unauthenticated. Prior to version 2026.2.14, some clients treated TXT values as authoritative routing/pinning inputs. iOS and macOS used TXT-provided host hints (`lanHost`/`tailnetDns`) and ports (`gatewayPort`) to build the connection URL. iOS and Android allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint (`gatewayTlsSha256`) to override a previously stored TLS pin. On a shared/untrusted LAN, an attacker could advertise a rogue `_openclaw-gw._tcp` service. This could cause a client to connect to an attacker-controlled endpoint and/or accept an attacker certificate, potentially exfiltrating Gateway credentials (`auth.token` / `auth.password`) during connection. As of time of publication, the iOS and Android apps are alpha/not broadly shipped (no public App Store / Play Store release). Practical impact is primarily limited to developers/testers running those builds, plus any other shipped clients relying on discovery on a shared/untrusted LAN. Version 2026.2.14 fixes the issue. Clients now prefer the resolved service endpoint (SRV + A/AAAA) over TXT-provided routing hints. Discovery-provided fingerprints no longer override stored TLS pins. In iOS/Android, first-time TLS pins require explicit user confirmation (fingerprint shown; no silent TOFU) and discovery-based direct connects are TLS-only. I",
"evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-26327",
"products": [],
"severity": "high",
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"id": "CVE-2026-26327",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26327",
"GHSA-pv58-549p-qh99"
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"type": "CVSS_V4",
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}
],
"affected": [
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"repo": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw",
"type": "GIT",
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"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:openclaw:openclaw:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",
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"source": "CPE_RANGE"
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"database_specific": {
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"modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:38.751220162Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14",
"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/26xxx/CVE-2026-26327.json",
"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-pv58-549p-qh99",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26327",
"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/d583782ee322a6faa1fe87ae52455e0d349de586"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
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],
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/26xxx/CVE-2026-26327.json"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-26327",
"evidence": "/id"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 506059,
"published_at": "2026-02-19T22:59:36.376+00:00"
}