ApostropheCMS: Exposure of Sensitive Information via predictable export filenames
## Summary When a user exports content through `@apostrophecms/import-export`, the module copies the generated archive into uploadfs at `/exports/` and returns a public URL under `/uploads/exports/`. The filename is fully deterministic: site `shortName`, document type, a `YYYYMMDDHHmmss` timestamp, and the format extension. There is no secret token. Anyone who can guess that path can download the archive with a normal unauthenticated HTTP GET while the file is still present (10 minutes by default, longer if the site raises `importExport.export.expiration`). That is a different model from attachment URLs, which rely on hard-to-guess IDs. Sites that disable export, store uploads on a private backend with no anonymous read, or serve `/uploads` only behind authentication are not hit by the network download step—but the predictable naming is still a design flaw for the default local/public uploadfs layout. Import-only workflows and imports themselves are out of scope; this is specific to the export download URL. ## Affected configurations All of the following must apply: 1. The `@apostrophecms/import-export` module is enabled and export is allowed for at least one page or piece type, **and** 2. Export files are served the usual way: `copyIn` to `/exports/…` and delivery via the public `uploads` URL (default local uploadfs or any deployment that exposes the same path without per-file auth). If export is turned off per type or globally, or `/uploads` is not world-readable, an anonym
- Products
- @apostrophecms/import-export
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 3.7.1
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-112953
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 16:08 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
ApostropheCMS: Exposure of Sensitive Information via predictable export filenames
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 21 Oct 2026, 19:45 UTC
## Summary When a user exports content through `@apostrophecms/import-export`, the module copies the generated archive into uploadfs at `/exports/` and returns a public URL under `/uploads/exports/`. The filename is fully deterministic: site `shortName`, document type, a `YYYYMMDDHHmmss` timestamp, and the format extension. There is no secret token. Anyone who can guess that path can download the archive with a normal unauthenticated HTTP GET while the file is still present (10 minutes by default, longer if the site raises `importExport.export.expiration`). That is a different model from attachment URLs, which rely on hard-to-guess IDs. Sites that disable export, store uploads on a private backend with no anonymous read, or serve `/uploads` only behind authentication are not hit by the network download step—but the predictable naming is still a design flaw for the default local/public uploadfs layout. Import-only workflows and imports themselves are out of scope; this is specific to the export download URL. ## Affected configurations All of the following must apply: 1. The `@apostrophecms/import-export` module is enabled and export is allowed for at least one page or piece type, **and** 2. Export files are served the usual way: `copyIn` to `/exports/…` and delivery via the public `uploads` URL (default local uploadfs or any deployment that exposes the same path without per-file auth). If export is turned off per type or globally, or `/uploads` is not world-readable, an anonym
osv:GHSA-5gc8-frw3-3vqm
@apostrophecms/import-export
Fixed versions: 3.7.1
Complete source record
{
"id": "b47a4ca7dfd83b4d65820a20e1885daeefc7642e56d2e164d49c3edfe2c633df",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-5gc8-frw3-3vqm",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "ApostropheCMS: Exposure of Sensitive Information via predictable export filenames",
"summary": "## Summary When a user exports content through `@apostrophecms/import-export`, the module copies the generated archive into uploadfs at `/exports/` and returns a public URL under `/uploads/exports/`. The filename is fully deterministic: site `shortName`, document type, a `YYYYMMDDHHmmss` timestamp, and the format extension. There is no secret token. Anyone who can guess that path can download the archive with a normal unauthenticated HTTP GET while the file is still present (10 minutes by default, longer if the site raises `importExport.export.expiration`). That is a different model from attachment URLs, which rely on hard-to-guess IDs. Sites that disable export, store uploads on a private backend with no anonymous read, or serve `/uploads` only behind authentication are not hit by the network download step—but the predictable naming is still a design flaw for the default local/public uploadfs layout. Import-only workflows and imports themselves are out of scope; this is specific to the export download URL. ## Affected configurations All of the following must apply: 1. The `@apostrophecms/import-export` module is enabled and export is allowed for at least one page or piece type, **and** 2. Export files are served the usual way: `copyIn` to `/exports/…` and delivery via the public `uploads` URL (default local uploadfs or any deployment that exposes the same path without per-file auth). If export is turned off per type or globally, or `/uploads` is not world-readable, an anonym",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-5gc8-frw3-3vqm",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "@apostrophecms/import-export",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "3.7.1",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "medium",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-5gc8-frw3-3vqm",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-112953",
"GHSA-5gc8-frw3-3vqm"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.1"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "@apostrophecms/import-export",
"purl": "pkg:npm/%40apostrophecms/import-export",
"ecosystem": "npm"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-5gc8-frw3-3vqm/GHSA-5gc8-frw3-3vqm.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-21T20:01:39.005726863Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-5gc8-frw3-3vqm",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112953",
"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/06e4b377f3c360f9e89c32dccd7e505ad5ddf498",
"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/40b989b1a9dd23d30029b8ce7668634265cfe5ea",
"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe",
"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/releases/tag/@apostrophecms/import-export@3.7.1"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"severity": "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T16:17:06Z",
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-21T19:45:03Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-112953",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 399303,
"published_at": "2026-10-21T19:45:03+00:00"
}