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MediumFix available

ApostropheCMS: Exposure of Sensitive Information via predictable export filenames

Type: advisorySources: OSV

## Summary When a user exports content through `@apostrophecms/import-export`, the module copies the generated archive into uploadfs at `/exports/` and returns a public URL under `/uploads/exports/`. The filename is fully deterministic: site `shortName`, document type, a `YYYYMMDDHHmmss` timestamp, and the format extension. There is no secret token. Anyone who can guess that path can download the archive with a normal unauthenticated HTTP GET while the file is still present (10 minutes by default, longer if the site raises `importExport.export.expiration`). That is a different model from attachment URLs, which rely on hard-to-guess IDs. Sites that disable export, store uploads on a private backend with no anonymous read, or serve `/uploads` only behind authentication are not hit by the network download step—but the predictable naming is still a design flaw for the default local/public uploadfs layout. Import-only workflows and imports themselves are out of scope; this is specific to the export download URL. ## Affected configurations All of the following must apply: 1. The `@apostrophecms/import-export` module is enabled and export is allowed for at least one page or piece type, **and** 2. Export files are served the usual way: `copyIn` to `/exports/…` and delivery via the public `uploads` URL (default local uploadfs or any deployment that exposes the same path without per-file auth). If export is turned off per type or globally, or `/uploads` is not world-readable, an anonym

Products
@apostrophecms/import-export
Affected versions
Not specified
Fixed versions
3.7.1
CVEs
CVE-2026-112953
Confirmed fixed CVEs
Not specified
Updated in this feed
31 Oct 2026, 16:08 UTC · Revision 1

Source evidence

ApostropheCMS: Exposure of Sensitive Information via predictable export filenames

core-osv · Original source

Published 21 Oct 2026, 19:45 UTC

## Summary When a user exports content through `@apostrophecms/import-export`, the module copies the generated archive into uploadfs at `/exports/` and returns a public URL under `/uploads/exports/`. The filename is fully deterministic: site `shortName`, document type, a `YYYYMMDDHHmmss` timestamp, and the format extension. There is no secret token. Anyone who can guess that path can download the archive with a normal unauthenticated HTTP GET while the file is still present (10 minutes by default, longer if the site raises `importExport.export.expiration`). That is a different model from attachment URLs, which rely on hard-to-guess IDs. Sites that disable export, store uploads on a private backend with no anonymous read, or serve `/uploads` only behind authentication are not hit by the network download step—but the predictable naming is still a design flaw for the default local/public uploadfs layout. Import-only workflows and imports themselves are out of scope; this is specific to the export download URL. ## Affected configurations All of the following must apply: 1. The `@apostrophecms/import-export` module is enabled and export is allowed for at least one page or piece type, **and** 2. Export files are served the usual way: `copyIn` to `/exports/…` and delivery via the public `uploads` URL (default local uploadfs or any deployment that exposes the same path without per-file auth). If export is turned off per type or globally, or `/uploads` is not world-readable, an anonym

osv:GHSA-5gc8-frw3-3vqm

@apostrophecms/import-export

Fixed versions: 3.7.1

Complete source record
{
  "id": "b47a4ca7dfd83b4d65820a20e1885daeefc7642e56d2e164d49c3edfe2c633df",
  "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-5gc8-frw3-3vqm",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "ApostropheCMS: Exposure of Sensitive Information via predictable export filenames",
    "summary": "## Summary When a user exports content through `@apostrophecms/import-export`, the module copies the generated archive into uploadfs at `/exports/` and returns a public URL under `/uploads/exports/`. The filename is fully deterministic: site `shortName`, document type, a `YYYYMMDDHHmmss` timestamp, and the format extension. There is no secret token. Anyone who can guess that path can download the archive with a normal unauthenticated HTTP GET while the file is still present (10 minutes by default, longer if the site raises `importExport.export.expiration`). That is a different model from attachment URLs, which rely on hard-to-guess IDs. Sites that disable export, store uploads on a private backend with no anonymous read, or serve `/uploads` only behind authentication are not hit by the network download step—but the predictable naming is still a design flaw for the default local/public uploadfs layout. Import-only workflows and imports themselves are out of scope; this is specific to the export download URL. ## Affected configurations All of the following must apply: 1. The `@apostrophecms/import-export` module is enabled and export is allowed for at least one page or piece type, **and** 2. Export files are served the usual way: `copyIn` to `/exports/…` and delivery via the public `uploads` URL (default local uploadfs or any deployment that exposes the same path without per-file auth). If export is turned off per type or globally, or `/uploads` is not world-readable, an anonym",
    "evidence": "osv:GHSA-5gc8-frw3-3vqm",
    "products": [
      {
        "name": {
          "value": "@apostrophecms/import-export",
          "evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
        },
        "prerequisites": [],
        "fixed_versions": [
          {
            "value": "3.7.1",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
          }
        ],
        "affected_versions": []
      }
    ],
    "severity": "medium",
    "structured": {
      "id": "GHSA-5gc8-frw3-3vqm",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2026-112953",
        "GHSA-5gc8-frw3-3vqm"
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "type": "CVSS_V4",
          "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "ranges": [
            {
              "type": "SEMVER",
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "3.7.1"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "package": {
            "name": "@apostrophecms/import-export",
            "purl": "pkg:npm/%40apostrophecms/import-export",
            "ecosystem": "npm"
          },
          "database_specific": {
            "source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-5gc8-frw3-3vqm/GHSA-5gc8-frw3-3vqm.json"
          }
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-21T20:01:39.005726863Z",
      "provider": "osv",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-5gc8-frw3-3vqm",
        "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112953",
        "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/06e4b377f3c360f9e89c32dccd7e505ad5ddf498",
        "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/40b989b1a9dd23d30029b8ce7668634265cfe5ea",
        "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe",
        "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/releases/tag/@apostrophecms/import-export@3.7.1"
      ],
      "provider_metadata": {
        "cwe_ids": [
          "CWE-200"
        ],
        "severity": "MODERATE",
        "github_reviewed": true,
        "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T16:17:06Z",
        "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-21T19:45:03Z"
      }
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2026-112953",
        "evidence": "/aliases"
      }
    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
  },
  "source_id": "core-osv",
  "document_id": 399303,
  "published_at": "2026-10-21T19:45:03+00:00"
}