x86/fpu: Ensure shadow stack is active before "getting" registers
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/fpu: Ensure shadow stack is active before "getting" registers The x86 shadow stack support has its own set of registers. Those registers are XSAVE-managed, but they are "supervisor state components" which means that userspace can not touch them with XSAVE/XRSTOR. It also means that they are not accessible from the existing ptrace ABI for XSAVE state. Thus, there is a new ptrace get/set interface for it. The regset code that ptrace uses provides an ->active() handler in addition to the get/set ones. For shadow stack this ->active() handler verifies that shadow stack is enabled via the ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK bit in the thread struct. The ->active() handler is checked from some call sites of the regset get/set handlers, but not the ptrace ones. This was not understood when shadow stack support was put in place. As a result, both the set/get handlers can be called with XFEATURE_CET_USER in its init state, which would cause get_xsave_addr() to return NULL and trigger a WARN_ON(). The ssp_set() handler luckily has an ssp_active() check to avoid surprising the kernel with shadow stack behavior when the kernel is not ready for it (ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK==0). That check just happened to avoid the warning. But the ->get() side wasn't so lucky. It can be called with shadow stacks disabled, triggering the warning in practice, as reported by Christina Schimpe: WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1773 at arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c:198 ssp_get+
- Products
- Kernel
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 6.12.10, 6.6.72
- CVEs
- CVE-2025-21632
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 7 Nov 2026, 04:40 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
x86/fpu: Ensure shadow stack is active before "getting" registers
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 19 Jan 2025, 10:17 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/fpu: Ensure shadow stack is active before "getting" registers The x86 shadow stack support has its own set of registers. Those registers are XSAVE-managed, but they are "supervisor state components" which means that userspace can not touch them with XSAVE/XRSTOR. It also means that they are not accessible from the existing ptrace ABI for XSAVE state. Thus, there is a new ptrace get/set interface for it. The regset code that ptrace uses provides an ->active() handler in addition to the get/set ones. For shadow stack this ->active() handler verifies that shadow stack is enabled via the ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK bit in the thread struct. The ->active() handler is checked from some call sites of the regset get/set handlers, but not the ptrace ones. This was not understood when shadow stack support was put in place. As a result, both the set/get handlers can be called with XFEATURE_CET_USER in its init state, which would cause get_xsave_addr() to return NULL and trigger a WARN_ON(). The ssp_set() handler luckily has an ssp_active() check to avoid surprising the kernel with shadow stack behavior when the kernel is not ready for it (ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK==0). That check just happened to avoid the warning. But the ->get() side wasn't so lucky. It can be called with shadow stacks disabled, triggering the warning in practice, as reported by Christina Schimpe: WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1773 at arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c:198 ssp_get+
osv:CVE-2025-21632
Kernel
Fixed versions: 6.6.72, 6.12.10
Complete source record
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"method": "structured",
"payload": {
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"title": "x86/fpu: Ensure shadow stack is active before \"getting\" registers",
"summary": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/fpu: Ensure shadow stack is active before \"getting\" registers The x86 shadow stack support has its own set of registers. Those registers are XSAVE-managed, but they are \"supervisor state components\" which means that userspace can not touch them with XSAVE/XRSTOR. It also means that they are not accessible from the existing ptrace ABI for XSAVE state. Thus, there is a new ptrace get/set interface for it. The regset code that ptrace uses provides an ->active() handler in addition to the get/set ones. For shadow stack this ->active() handler verifies that shadow stack is enabled via the ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK bit in the thread struct. The ->active() handler is checked from some call sites of the regset get/set handlers, but not the ptrace ones. This was not understood when shadow stack support was put in place. As a result, both the set/get handlers can be called with XFEATURE_CET_USER in its init state, which would cause get_xsave_addr() to return NULL and trigger a WARN_ON(). The ssp_set() handler luckily has an ssp_active() check to avoid surprising the kernel with shadow stack behavior when the kernel is not ready for it (ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK==0). That check just happened to avoid the warning. But the ->get() side wasn't so lucky. It can be called with shadow stacks disabled, triggering the warning in practice, as reported by Christina Schimpe: WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1773 at arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c:198 ssp_get+",
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"modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:49.810428449Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
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"source_id": "core-osv",
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