Apache Karaf: Authorization bypass in JMX MBean lifecycle operations
Apache Karaf exposes a JMX MBeanServer guarded by KarafMBeanServerGuard, which enforces role-based access control (RBAC) on MBean operations invoked over the remote JMX connector (RMI registry/server, enabled by default on ports 1099 and 44444). The guard is implemented as a java.lang.reflect.Proxy around the MBeanServer, and only forwards a fixed list of operation names to the RBAC check, defined in MBeanInvocationHandler#guarded: private final List guarded = Collections.unmodifiableList( Arrays.asList("invoke", "getAttribute", "getAttributes", "setAttribute", "setAttributes")); The MBean lifecycle operations MBeanServer#createMBean, #registerMBean and #unregisterMBean are not in this list. Calls to these methods are forwarded directly to the underlying MBeanServer with no role check at all, regardless of the roles configured in etc/jmx.acl.*.cfg. As a result, any user who can authenticate to the JMX endpoint, including a user holding only the least-privileged "viewer" role, can call createMBean() to instantiate an arbitrary class as a MBean, and unregisterMBean() to remove it again afterwards, with no authorization check and no audit log entry (logging in KarafMBeanServerGuard only occurs on the RBAC-denial path, which this bypass never reaches). This is significant because javax.management.loading.MLet, a standard JDK MBean, can be instantiated this way. MLet acts as a remote classloader: its getMBeansFromURL(URL) operation fetches an MLet text file from an attacker-contro
- Products
- Not specified
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-92142
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 4 Nov 2026, 08:04 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Apache Karaf: Authorization bypass in JMX MBean lifecycle operations
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 29 Sept 2026, 08:40 UTC
Apache Karaf exposes a JMX MBeanServer guarded by KarafMBeanServerGuard, which enforces role-based access control (RBAC) on MBean operations invoked over the remote JMX connector (RMI registry/server, enabled by default on ports 1099 and 44444). The guard is implemented as a java.lang.reflect.Proxy around the MBeanServer, and only forwards a fixed list of operation names to the RBAC check, defined in MBeanInvocationHandler#guarded: private final List guarded = Collections.unmodifiableList( Arrays.asList("invoke", "getAttribute", "getAttributes", "setAttribute", "setAttributes")); The MBean lifecycle operations MBeanServer#createMBean, #registerMBean and #unregisterMBean are not in this list. Calls to these methods are forwarded directly to the underlying MBeanServer with no role check at all, regardless of the roles configured in etc/jmx.acl.*.cfg. As a result, any user who can authenticate to the JMX endpoint, including a user holding only the least-privileged "viewer" role, can call createMBean() to instantiate an arbitrary class as a MBean, and unregisterMBean() to remove it again afterwards, with no authorization check and no audit log entry (logging in KarafMBeanServerGuard only occurs on the RBAC-denial path, which this bypass never reaches). This is significant because javax.management.loading.MLet, a standard JDK MBean, can be instantiated this way. MLet acts as a remote classloader: its getMBeansFromURL(URL) operation fetches an MLet text file from an attacker-contro
osv:CVE-2026-92142
Complete source record
{
"id": "e926fb11b565bad2d843f581d9265e9524e88977aa4a3187c442c23ec01387e9",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-92142",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Apache Karaf: Authorization bypass in JMX MBean lifecycle operations",
"summary": "Apache Karaf exposes a JMX MBeanServer guarded by KarafMBeanServerGuard, which enforces role-based access control (RBAC) on MBean operations invoked over the remote JMX connector (RMI registry/server, enabled by default on ports 1099 and 44444). The guard is implemented as a java.lang.reflect.Proxy around the MBeanServer, and only forwards a fixed list of operation names to the RBAC check, defined in MBeanInvocationHandler#guarded: private final List guarded = Collections.unmodifiableList( Arrays.asList(\"invoke\", \"getAttribute\", \"getAttributes\", \"setAttribute\", \"setAttributes\")); The MBean lifecycle operations MBeanServer#createMBean, #registerMBean and #unregisterMBean are not in this list. Calls to these methods are forwarded directly to the underlying MBeanServer with no role check at all, regardless of the roles configured in etc/jmx.acl.*.cfg. As a result, any user who can authenticate to the JMX endpoint, including a user holding only the least-privileged \"viewer\" role, can call createMBean() to instantiate an arbitrary class as a MBean, and unregisterMBean() to remove it again afterwards, with no authorization check and no audit log entry (logging in KarafMBeanServerGuard only occurs on the RBAC-denial path, which this bypass never reaches). This is significant because javax.management.loading.MLet, a standard JDK MBean, can be instantiated this way. MLet acts as a remote classloader: its getMBeansFromURL(URL) operation fetches an MLet text file from an attacker-contro",
"evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-92142",
"products": [],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "CVE-2026-92142",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-92142"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"repo": "https://github.com/apache/karaf",
"type": "GIT",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "189048fff3422afaadcbbb57d95b257cb35248ad"
}
],
"database_specific": {
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{
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:karaf:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.4.12"
}
],
"source": "CPE_RANGE"
}
]
}
}
],
"versions": [
"karaf-4.4.8",
"karaf-4.4.7",
"karaf-4.4.6",
"karaf-4.4.5",
"karaf-4.4.4",
"karaf-4.4.3",
"karaf-4.4.2",
"karaf-4.4.1",
"karaf-4.4.0",
"karaf-4.3.3",
"karaf-4.3.2",
"karaf-4.3.1",
"karaf-4.3.0",
"karaf-4.3.0.RC1",
"karaf-4.2.3",
"karaf-4.2.2",
"karaf-4.2.1",
"karaf-4.2.0",
"karaf-4.2.0.M2",
"karaf-4.2.0.M1",
"karaf-4.1.1",
"karaf-4.1.0",
"karaf-4.0.4",
"karaf-4.0.3",
"karaf-4.0.2",
"karaf-4.0.1",
"karaf-4.0.0.M2",
"karaf-4.0.0.M1",
"karaf-3.0.0"
],
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-92142.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:33.608238602Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/92xxx/CVE-2026-92142.json",
"https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-92142.txt",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92142"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"cna_assigner": "apache",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "4.4.12"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
}
]
}
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/92xxx/CVE-2026-92142.json"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-92142",
"evidence": "/id"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 501045,
"published_at": "2026-09-29T08:40:07.961+00:00"
}