Outgoing datagram buffer accounting can panic the sender in quinn-proto
The limit on memory used to buffer outgoing datagrams, introduced in 0.11.17, subtracted an evicted datagram's size from the buffered byte counter twice when `Datagrams::send` was called with `drop = true` (as `Connection::send_datagram` in the `quinn` crate does) while the buffer was full. Under sustained eviction the counter drifts below its true value: debug builds panic with an integer underflow, while release builds wrap the counter, drain the whole queue, and then panic on a desynchronization check in a later `send` call. In `quinn`, this panic occurs while the connection lock is held, poisoning it and causing a double panic (and thus an abort) when the connection is dropped. This can be triggered without a malicious peer, by an application that sends a burst of datagrams and then idles. It can also be triggered by a peer that keeps the connection alive with PING frames while withholding acknowledgements, so that the sender's congestion window stays closed and the outgoing queue never drains. Applications that use `send_datagram_wait` are not affected. Only 0.11.17 is affected; the flaw was corrected in 0.11.18 by removing the redundant subtraction. Thanks to [@alexpyattaev](https://github.com/alexpyattaev) for reporting and [@vcarus](https://github.com/vcarus) for fixing this issue.
- Products
- quinn-proto
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 0.11.18
- CVEs
- Not specified
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 30 Oct 2026, 08:44 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Outgoing datagram buffer accounting can panic the sender in quinn-proto
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 14 Sept 2026, 12:00 UTC
The limit on memory used to buffer outgoing datagrams, introduced in 0.11.17, subtracted an evicted datagram's size from the buffered byte counter twice when `Datagrams::send` was called with `drop = true` (as `Connection::send_datagram` in the `quinn` crate does) while the buffer was full. Under sustained eviction the counter drifts below its true value: debug builds panic with an integer underflow, while release builds wrap the counter, drain the whole queue, and then panic on a desynchronization check in a later `send` call. In `quinn`, this panic occurs while the connection lock is held, poisoning it and causing a double panic (and thus an abort) when the connection is dropped. This can be triggered without a malicious peer, by an application that sends a burst of datagrams and then idles. It can also be triggered by a peer that keeps the connection alive with PING frames while withholding acknowledgements, so that the sender's congestion window stays closed and the outgoing queue never drains. Applications that use `send_datagram_wait` are not affected. Only 0.11.17 is affected; the flaw was corrected in 0.11.18 by removing the redundant subtraction. Thanks to [@alexpyattaev](https://github.com/alexpyattaev) for reporting and [@vcarus](https://github.com/vcarus) for fixing this issue.
osv:RUSTSEC-2026-0343
quinn-proto
Fixed versions: 0.11.18
Complete source record
{
"id": "472b0c537f69a0f9dbe64c20b30f7bcc3ff4d439fc7868b3c3a3c2802347f3e2",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0343",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Outgoing datagram buffer accounting can panic the sender in quinn-proto",
"summary": "The limit on memory used to buffer outgoing datagrams, introduced in 0.11.17, subtracted an evicted datagram's size from the buffered byte counter twice when `Datagrams::send` was called with `drop = true` (as `Connection::send_datagram` in the `quinn` crate does) while the buffer was full. Under sustained eviction the counter drifts below its true value: debug builds panic with an integer underflow, while release builds wrap the counter, drain the whole queue, and then panic on a desynchronization check in a later `send` call. In `quinn`, this panic occurs while the connection lock is held, poisoning it and causing a double panic (and thus an abort) when the connection is dropped. This can be triggered without a malicious peer, by an application that sends a burst of datagrams and then idles. It can also be triggered by a peer that keeps the connection alive with PING frames while withholding acknowledgements, so that the sender's congestion window stays closed and the outgoing queue never drains. Applications that use `send_datagram_wait` are not affected. Only 0.11.17 is affected; the flaw was corrected in 0.11.18 by removing the redundant subtraction. Thanks to [@alexpyattaev](https://github.com/alexpyattaev) for reporting and [@vcarus](https://github.com/vcarus) for fixing this issue.",
"evidence": "osv:RUSTSEC-2026-0343",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "quinn-proto",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
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"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
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"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0343",
"aliases": [
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"RUSTSEC-2026-0343"
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"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
}
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"affected": [
{
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"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
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"purl": "pkg:cargo/quinn-proto",
"ecosystem": "crates.io"
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"database_specific": {
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"source": "https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0343.json",
"categories": [
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"ecosystem_specific": {
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],
"modified": "2026-10-12T18:15:01.961745820Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://crates.io/crates/quinn-proto",
"https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0343.html",
"https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn/pull/2806"
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"provider_metadata": {
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"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
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"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 306470,
"published_at": "2026-09-14T12:00:00+00:00"
}