OCI layer symlink escape → arbitrary host write
Affected versions of `boxlite` extract OCI image layer tarballs without fully containing path resolution to the extraction root. A crafted layer containing a symlink whose target is an absolute on-host path (e.g. `escape -> /tmp`) followed by a file entry that resolves through that symlink (e.g. `escape//pwned.txt`) caused the extractor to write the payload to the host filesystem outside the intended rootfs directory. The fix in v0.9.0 routes every destructive filesystem operation through a `SafeRoot` handle (`openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT)` on Linux, lexical fallback elsewhere) so that no tar entry can resolve outside the extraction root, even with adversarial symlinks placed by earlier entries in the same layer. This is a container-escape during image extraction, exploitable by any user who pulls or loads a malicious OCI image — including via `SimpleBox(rootfs_path=...)` from an untrusted local layout.
- Products
- boxlite
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 0.9.0
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-46703
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 30 Oct 2026, 08:44 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
OCI layer symlink escape → arbitrary host write
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 16 May 2026, 12:00 UTC
Affected versions of `boxlite` extract OCI image layer tarballs without fully containing path resolution to the extraction root. A crafted layer containing a symlink whose target is an absolute on-host path (e.g. `escape -> /tmp`) followed by a file entry that resolves through that symlink (e.g. `escape//pwned.txt`) caused the extractor to write the payload to the host filesystem outside the intended rootfs directory. The fix in v0.9.0 routes every destructive filesystem operation through a `SafeRoot` handle (`openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT)` on Linux, lexical fallback elsewhere) so that no tar entry can resolve outside the extraction root, even with adversarial symlinks placed by earlier entries in the same layer. This is a container-escape during image extraction, exploitable by any user who pulls or loads a malicious OCI image — including via `SimpleBox(rootfs_path=...)` from an untrusted local layout.
osv:RUSTSEC-2026-0148
boxlite
Fixed versions: 0.9.0
Complete source record
{
"id": "f21d3ea477156080b766c47dbbc68c710917b7c41011e92d146516424904e3a8",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0148",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "OCI layer symlink escape → arbitrary host write",
"summary": "Affected versions of `boxlite` extract OCI image layer tarballs without fully containing path resolution to the extraction root. A crafted layer containing a symlink whose target is an absolute on-host path (e.g. `escape -> /tmp`) followed by a file entry that resolves through that symlink (e.g. `escape//pwned.txt`) caused the extractor to write the payload to the host filesystem outside the intended rootfs directory. The fix in v0.9.0 routes every destructive filesystem operation through a `SafeRoot` handle (`openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT)` on Linux, lexical fallback elsewhere) so that no tar entry can resolve outside the extraction root, even with adversarial symlinks placed by earlier entries in the same layer. This is a container-escape during image extraction, exploitable by any user who pulls or loads a malicious OCI image — including via `SimpleBox(rootfs_path=...)` from an untrusted local layout.",
"evidence": "osv:RUSTSEC-2026-0148",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "boxlite",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "0.9.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "critical",
"structured": {
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0148",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46703",
"GHSA-f396-4rp4-7v2j",
"GO-2026-5344",
"PYSEC-2026-298",
"RUSTSEC-2026-0148"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "boxlite",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/boxlite",
"ecosystem": "crates.io"
},
"database_specific": {
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"source": "https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0148.json",
"categories": [
"privilege-escalation",
"file-disclosure"
],
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affects": {
"os": [],
"arch": [],
"functions": []
},
"affected_functions": null
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-12T18:00:13.556256982Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://crates.io/crates/boxlite",
"https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0148.html",
"https://github.com/boxlite-ai/boxlite/pull/429",
"https://github.com/boxlite-ai/boxlite/pull/446",
"https://github.com/boxlite-ai/boxlite/pull/461"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-46703",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 306446,
"published_at": "2026-05-16T12:00:00+00:00"
}