nebula-mesh: CA private key not zeroized on web mobile-bundle error paths
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, the web handler renderMobileBundle passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build, resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path. As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8.
- Products
- Not specified
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-53604
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 7 Nov 2026, 09:39 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
nebula-mesh: CA private key not zeroized on web mobile-bundle error paths
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 4 Sept 2026, 19:40 UTC
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, the web handler renderMobileBundle passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build, resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path. As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8.
osv:CVE-2026-53604
Complete source record
{
"id": "2b262fb867a17c6726ba0128bc6fc45a1e14321fc4d982f933ed0306963b942c",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-53604",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "nebula-mesh: CA private key not zeroized on web mobile-bundle error paths",
"summary": "nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, the web handler renderMobileBundle passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build, resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path. As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8.",
"evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-53604",
"products": [],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "CVE-2026-53604",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53604",
"GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5",
"GO-2026-5984"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"repo": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh",
"type": "GIT",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7cb01bab281ded557f8b6c81dab5f48d4c10182e"
},
{
"fixed": "1f1ab9aa8472239763d967e3d50a3cd53a1a79b9"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.8"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "1f1ab9aa8472239763d967e3d50a3cd53a1a79b9"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "7cb01bab281ded557f8b6c81dab5f48d4c10182e"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_TAG",
"original_tag": "v0.3.8"
}
]
}
}
],
"versions": [
"v0.3.7",
"v0.3.6",
"v0.3.5",
"v0.3.4",
"v0.3.3",
"v0.3.2",
"v0.3.1",
"v0.3.0",
"v0.2.0",
"v0.1.2",
"v0.1.1",
"v0.1.0"
],
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-53604.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:50.600466438Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/releases/tag/v0.3.8",
"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/53xxx/CVE-2026-53604.json",
"https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53604",
"https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/1f1ab9aa8472239763d967e3d50a3cd53a1a79b9"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-212",
"CWE-316"
],
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/53xxx/CVE-2026-53604.json"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-53604",
"evidence": "/id"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 518901,
"published_at": "2026-09-04T19:40:51.423+00:00"
}