A PinchTab Security Policy Bypass in /wait Allows Arbitrary JavaScript Execution
PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.8.3` through `v0.8.5` allow arbitrary JavaScript execution through `POST /wait` and `POST /tabs/{id}/wait` when the request uses `fn` mode, even if `security.allowEvaluate` is disabled. `POST /evaluate` correctly enforces the `security.allowEvaluate` guard, which is disabled by default. However, in the affected releases, `POST /wait` accepted a user-controlled `fn` expression, embedded it directly into executable JavaScript, and evaluated it in the browser context without checking the same policy. This is a security-policy bypass rather than a separate authentication bypass. Exploitation still requires authenticated API access, but a caller with the server token can execute arbitrary JavaScript in a tab context even when the operator explicitly disabled JavaScript evaluation. The current worktree fixes this by applying the same policy boundary to `fn` mode in `/wait` that already exists on `/evaluate`, while preserving the non-code wait modes. As of time of publication, a patched version is not yet available.
- Products
- Not specified
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-33622
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 4 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
A PinchTab Security Policy Bypass in /wait Allows Arbitrary JavaScript Execution
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 26 Mar 2026, 20:44 UTC
PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.8.3` through `v0.8.5` allow arbitrary JavaScript execution through `POST /wait` and `POST /tabs/{id}/wait` when the request uses `fn` mode, even if `security.allowEvaluate` is disabled. `POST /evaluate` correctly enforces the `security.allowEvaluate` guard, which is disabled by default. However, in the affected releases, `POST /wait` accepted a user-controlled `fn` expression, embedded it directly into executable JavaScript, and evaluated it in the browser context without checking the same policy. This is a security-policy bypass rather than a separate authentication bypass. Exploitation still requires authenticated API access, but a caller with the server token can execute arbitrary JavaScript in a tab context even when the operator explicitly disabled JavaScript evaluation. The current worktree fixes this by applying the same policy boundary to `fn` mode in `/wait` that already exists on `/evaluate`, while preserving the non-code wait modes. As of time of publication, a patched version is not yet available.
osv:CVE-2026-33622
Complete source record
{
"id": "452e72c4481abba869299f1e13f9b82568621f59e7d6e60fd5ae32628f47d66d",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-33622",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "A PinchTab Security Policy Bypass in /wait Allows Arbitrary JavaScript Execution",
"summary": "PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.8.3` through `v0.8.5` allow arbitrary JavaScript execution through `POST /wait` and `POST /tabs/{id}/wait` when the request uses `fn` mode, even if `security.allowEvaluate` is disabled. `POST /evaluate` correctly enforces the `security.allowEvaluate` guard, which is disabled by default. However, in the affected releases, `POST /wait` accepted a user-controlled `fn` expression, embedded it directly into executable JavaScript, and evaluated it in the browser context without checking the same policy. This is a security-policy bypass rather than a separate authentication bypass. Exploitation still requires authenticated API access, but a caller with the server token can execute arbitrary JavaScript in a tab context even when the operator explicitly disabled JavaScript evaluation. The current worktree fixes this by applying the same policy boundary to `fn` mode in `/wait` that already exists on `/evaluate`, while preserving the non-code wait modes. As of time of publication, a patched version is not yet available.",
"evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-33622",
"products": [],
"severity": "medium",
"structured": {
"id": "CVE-2026-33622",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33622",
"GHSA-w5pc-m664-r62v",
"GO-2026-4824"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"repo": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab",
"type": "GIT",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "e0c3e5748c1c3a1a0cab7790872bf0b3ec648bb4"
},
{
"last_affected": "ce7efa1c3d564cafcf094fcdbd22ffdd7863e71d"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0.8.3"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.8.5"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:pinchtab:pinchtab:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0.8.3"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.8.5"
}
],
"source": "CPE_RANGE"
}
]
}
}
],
"versions": [
"v0.8.5",
"v0.8.4",
"v0.8.3"
],
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-33622.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:39.173878597Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/33xxx/CVE-2026-33622.json",
"https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/security/advisories/GHSA-w5pc-m664-r62v",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33622"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-693",
"CWE-94"
],
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/33xxx/CVE-2026-33622.json"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-33622",
"evidence": "/id"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 506652,
"published_at": "2026-03-26T20:44:48.22+00:00"
}