smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas() The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0. The strncmp() later reads ea->ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea->ea_data + nlen + 1 + vlen. Isn't pointer math fun? The earlier check (u8 *)ea > end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the 8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8 bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past the end of iov. Fix this mess all up by using ea->ea_data as the base for the bounds check. An "untrusted" server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is interpreted as.
- Products
- Kernel
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 6.12.83, 6.18.24, 6.19.14, 6.6.136, 7.0.1
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-31614
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 4 Nov 2026, 16:19 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 24 Apr 2026, 14:42 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas() The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0. The strncmp() later reads ea->ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea->ea_data + nlen + 1 + vlen. Isn't pointer math fun? The earlier check (u8 *)ea > end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the 8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8 bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past the end of iov. Fix this mess all up by using ea->ea_data as the base for the bounds check. An "untrusted" server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is interpreted as.
osv:CVE-2026-31614
Kernel
Fixed versions: 6.6.136, 6.12.83, 6.18.24, 6.19.14, 7.0.1
Complete source record
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"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-31614",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()",
"summary": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas() The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0. The strncmp() later reads ea->ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea->ea_data + nlen + 1 + vlen. Isn't pointer math fun? The earlier check (u8 *)ea > end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the 8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8 bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past the end of iov. Fix this mess all up by using ea->ea_data as the base for the bounds check. An \"untrusted\" server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is interpreted as.",
"evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-31614",
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"modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:37.227299232Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
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"security_relevant": true,
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"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 504621,
"published_at": "2026-04-24T14:42:34.153+00:00"
}