mcp-fetch through 1.6.3 Server-Side Request Forgery via Unstripped IPv6 Literal Brackets
mcp-fetch checks a fetch target against its SSRF guard without removing the brackets that surround an IPv6 literal. isSafeUrl reads the hostname from the parsed URL, which for a literal such as http://[::1]/ yields the bracketed string, and then tests it with net.isIP. That call returns zero for a bracketed value, so the branch holding the private-address checks is skipped entirely. The guard falls back to resolving the hostname, the bracketed string is not a resolvable name, no addresses are returned, and the target is reported safe. The HTTP client then strips the brackets and connects. Because the address may be given in IPv4-mapped form, the same path reaches any IPv4 target the loopback and private checks were meant to exclude, including link-local metadata endpoints. isPrivateIPv6 also has no case for the ::ffff: prefix, so the mapped form would still pass even if the brackets were removed. The fetch target is supplied as a tool argument, so an attacker who can influence what the model requests can read internal responses back into the model context.
- Products
- Not specified
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-80347
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 4 Nov 2026, 17:19 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
mcp-fetch through 1.6.3 Server-Side Request Forgery via Unstripped IPv6 Literal Brackets
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 26 Aug 2026, 10:09 UTC
mcp-fetch checks a fetch target against its SSRF guard without removing the brackets that surround an IPv6 literal. isSafeUrl reads the hostname from the parsed URL, which for a literal such as http://[::1]/ yields the bracketed string, and then tests it with net.isIP. That call returns zero for a bracketed value, so the branch holding the private-address checks is skipped entirely. The guard falls back to resolving the hostname, the bracketed string is not a resolvable name, no addresses are returned, and the target is reported safe. The HTTP client then strips the brackets and connects. Because the address may be given in IPv4-mapped form, the same path reaches any IPv4 target the loopback and private checks were meant to exclude, including link-local metadata endpoints. isPrivateIPv6 also has no case for the ::ffff: prefix, so the mapped form would still pass even if the brackets were removed. The fetch target is supplied as a tool argument, so an attacker who can influence what the model requests can read internal responses back into the model context.
osv:CVE-2026-80347
Complete source record
{
"id": "5c3e7759015801056a8f3beb55b2af94d61aaa8b402e847837691f655116eb7f",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-80347",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "mcp-fetch through 1.6.3 Server-Side Request Forgery via Unstripped IPv6 Literal Brackets",
"summary": "mcp-fetch checks a fetch target against its SSRF guard without removing the brackets that surround an IPv6 literal. isSafeUrl reads the hostname from the parsed URL, which for a literal such as http://[::1]/ yields the bracketed string, and then tests it with net.isIP. That call returns zero for a bracketed value, so the branch holding the private-address checks is skipped entirely. The guard falls back to resolving the hostname, the bracketed string is not a resolvable name, no addresses are returned, and the target is reported safe. The HTTP client then strips the brackets and connects. Because the address may be given in IPv4-mapped form, the same path reaches any IPv4 target the loopback and private checks were meant to exclude, including link-local metadata endpoints. isPrivateIPv6 also has no case for the ::ffff: prefix, so the mapped form would still pass even if the brackets were removed. The fetch target is supplied as a tool argument, so an attacker who can influence what the model requests can read internal responses back into the model context.",
"evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-80347",
"products": [],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "CVE-2026-80347",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80347"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"repo": "https://github.com/kazuph/mcp-fetch",
"type": "GIT",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "418e58aad2d0504ebf6ca9ee638feb4b9cbb70c2"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.6.3"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
}
]
}
}
],
"versions": [
"v1.6.3",
"v1.6.2",
"v1.6.1",
"v1.6.0",
"v1.5.2",
"v1.5.1",
"v1.5.0",
"v1.4.2",
"v1.4.1",
"v1.3.3",
"v1.3.2",
"v1.3.1",
"v1.3.0",
"v1.2.0",
"v1.1.3",
"v1.1.2",
"v1.1.1",
"v1.1.0",
"v1.0.0"
],
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-80347.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:37.939432980Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://www.npmjs.com/package/@kazuph/mcp-fetch",
"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/80xxx/CVE-2026-80347.json",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80347",
"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/mcp-fetch-through-1.6.3-server-side-request-forgery-via-unstripped-ipv6-literal-brackets",
"https://github.com/kazuph/mcp-fetch/issues/16",
"https://github.com/kazuph/mcp-fetch"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"cna_assigner": "VulnCheck",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/80xxx/CVE-2026-80347.json"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-80347",
"evidence": "/id"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 505273,
"published_at": "2026-08-26T10:09:47.977+00:00"
}