OpenReception: Staff deletion removes pending invites cross-tenant by email match
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.6, when a TENANT_ADMIN deletes an existing staff user, the underlying `StaffService.deleteStaffMember()` runs an additional invite cleanup that deletes from the central `user_invite` table by email. The `email` clause has no `tenantId` predicate. Any pending invite in any tenant that shares the deleted staff's email is removed. A TENANT_ADMIN of tenant A who deletes a staff record with email `victim[@]example[.]com` also deletes the pending invite for `victim[@]example[.]com` in tenant B, even though they have no relationship to tenant B. The user-side delete is correctly scoped (`eq(user.id, staffId), eq(user.tenantId, tenantId)`), and the pending-invite-only delete path (when `staffId` is itself an invite ID) is also tenant-scoped. The bug is specifically in the invite cleanup that runs as a side effect of deleting an existing staff user. Version 1.0.6 patches the issue.
- Products
- Not specified
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-48074
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 3 Nov 2026, 01:32 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
OpenReception: Staff deletion removes pending invites cross-tenant by email match
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 6 Aug 2026, 20:27 UTC
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.6, when a TENANT_ADMIN deletes an existing staff user, the underlying `StaffService.deleteStaffMember()` runs an additional invite cleanup that deletes from the central `user_invite` table by email. The `email` clause has no `tenantId` predicate. Any pending invite in any tenant that shares the deleted staff's email is removed. A TENANT_ADMIN of tenant A who deletes a staff record with email `victim[@]example[.]com` also deletes the pending invite for `victim[@]example[.]com` in tenant B, even though they have no relationship to tenant B. The user-side delete is correctly scoped (`eq(user.id, staffId), eq(user.tenantId, tenantId)`), and the pending-invite-only delete path (when `staffId` is itself an invite ID) is also tenant-scoped. The bug is specifically in the invite cleanup that runs as a side effect of deleting an existing staff user. Version 1.0.6 patches the issue.
osv:CVE-2026-48074
Complete source record
{
"id": "b7890e26b9d60edf4e30b832dbe12fe674e84573503e03c41ee8dbb226006e85",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-48074",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "OpenReception: Staff deletion removes pending invites cross-tenant by email match",
"summary": "OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.6, when a TENANT_ADMIN deletes an existing staff user, the underlying `StaffService.deleteStaffMember()` runs an additional invite cleanup that deletes from the central `user_invite` table by email. The `email` clause has no `tenantId` predicate. Any pending invite in any tenant that shares the deleted staff's email is removed. A TENANT_ADMIN of tenant A who deletes a staff record with email `victim[@]example[.]com` also deletes the pending invite for `victim[@]example[.]com` in tenant B, even though they have no relationship to tenant B. The user-side delete is correctly scoped (`eq(user.id, staffId), eq(user.tenantId, tenantId)`), and the pending-invite-only delete path (when `staffId` is itself an invite ID) is also tenant-scoped. The bug is specifically in the invite cleanup that runs as a side effect of deleting an existing staff user. Version 1.0.6 patches the issue.",
"evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-48074",
"products": [],
"severity": "low",
"structured": {
"id": "CVE-2026-48074",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48074",
"GHSA-6f8g-wfxp-mqxw"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"repo": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software",
"type": "GIT",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "a9ed62b57a5388cf9dcaaad979b176e64ee76bae"
},
{
"fixed": "5e77fd1df4262d09bfa6b59acfec4f66408de570"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.6"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "5e77fd1df4262d09bfa6b59acfec4f66408de570"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
}
]
}
}
],
"versions": [
"v1.0.5",
"v1.0.4",
"v1.0.2",
"v1.0.1",
"v1.0.0",
"v1.0.0-rc2",
"v1.0.0-rc"
],
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-48074.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:24.986386795Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48074.json",
"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-6f8g-wfxp-mqxw",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48074",
"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/5e77fd1df4262d09bfa6b59acfec4f66408de570"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48074.json"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-48074",
"evidence": "/id"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 491651,
"published_at": "2026-08-06T20:27:21.24+00:00"
}