Apache Karaf: config:install missing ACL entry allows privilege escalation to admin
Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl..cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user. The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role. config:install fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes
- Products
- Not specified
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-91085
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 3 Nov 2026, 16:19 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Apache Karaf: config:install missing ACL entry allows privilege escalation to admin
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 29 Sept 2026, 08:39 UTC
Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl..cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user. The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role. config:install fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes
osv:CVE-2026-91085
Complete source record
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"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-91085",
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"title": "Apache Karaf: config:install missing ACL entry allows privilege escalation to admin",
"summary": "Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl..cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user. The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role. config:install fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes ",
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