Vikunja: WebSocket authentication ignores server-side session state, so revoked sessions keep receiving live pushes
### Summary Vikunja v2.6.0 introduced server-side sessions with revocation semantics: `DELETE /api/v2/user/sessions/{id}` documents "Revokes a specific session by its UUID", and enabling TOTP calls `DeleteAllUserSessions` to invalidate all sessions. The WebSocket endpoint accepts any cryptographically valid user JWT without ever resolving its `sid` (session id) claim against the sessions table. A connection authenticated before revocation stays authenticated and continues to receive live pushes indefinitely, and even brand-new WebSocket connections are accepted with a token whose session was deleted. The revocation feature therefore does not cover the WebSocket boundary at all. ### Details User access JWTs carry a session reference: `NewUserJWTAuthtoken` (`pkg/modules/auth/auth.go:188`) sets `claims["sid"] = sessionID`, and the API login-session documentation describes the claim as tying the JWT to a server-side session. On the HTTP side nothing consumes the claim per request either (REST access tokens simply expire after their short TTL, a design the maintainers documented when fixing GHSA-96q5, and refresh tokens are correctly invalidated when the session row is deleted). The WebSocket endpoint `GET /api/v2/ws` authenticates through the first client message. `Connection.handleAuth` (`pkg/websocket/connection.go:168`) validates the token exclusively with `auth.GetUserIDFromToken` (`pkg/modules/auth/auth.go:292`): ```go func GetUserIDFromToken(tokenString string) (int64, erro
- Products
- code.vikunja.io/api
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 2.7.0
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-111917
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 1 Nov 2026, 18:34 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Vikunja: WebSocket authentication ignores server-side session state, so revoked sessions keep receiving live pushes
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 9 Oct 2026, 20:57 UTC
### Summary Vikunja v2.6.0 introduced server-side sessions with revocation semantics: `DELETE /api/v2/user/sessions/{id}` documents "Revokes a specific session by its UUID", and enabling TOTP calls `DeleteAllUserSessions` to invalidate all sessions. The WebSocket endpoint accepts any cryptographically valid user JWT without ever resolving its `sid` (session id) claim against the sessions table. A connection authenticated before revocation stays authenticated and continues to receive live pushes indefinitely, and even brand-new WebSocket connections are accepted with a token whose session was deleted. The revocation feature therefore does not cover the WebSocket boundary at all. ### Details User access JWTs carry a session reference: `NewUserJWTAuthtoken` (`pkg/modules/auth/auth.go:188`) sets `claims["sid"] = sessionID`, and the API login-session documentation describes the claim as tying the JWT to a server-side session. On the HTTP side nothing consumes the claim per request either (REST access tokens simply expire after their short TTL, a design the maintainers documented when fixing GHSA-96q5, and refresh tokens are correctly invalidated when the session row is deleted). The WebSocket endpoint `GET /api/v2/ws` authenticates through the first client message. `Connection.handleAuth` (`pkg/websocket/connection.go:168`) validates the token exclusively with `auth.GetUserIDFromToken` (`pkg/modules/auth/auth.go:292`): ```go func GetUserIDFromToken(tokenString string) (int64, erro
osv:GHSA-4hv6-xc92-j86g
code.vikunja.io/api
Fixed versions: 2.7.0
Complete source record
{
"id": "de6916b35fb6367e0e6b56ce976b3bd8b264f3402ea63721b7976e750e349987",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-4hv6-xc92-j86g",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Vikunja: WebSocket authentication ignores server-side session state, so revoked sessions keep receiving live pushes",
"summary": "### Summary Vikunja v2.6.0 introduced server-side sessions with revocation semantics: `DELETE /api/v2/user/sessions/{id}` documents \"Revokes a specific session by its UUID\", and enabling TOTP calls `DeleteAllUserSessions` to invalidate all sessions. The WebSocket endpoint accepts any cryptographically valid user JWT without ever resolving its `sid` (session id) claim against the sessions table. A connection authenticated before revocation stays authenticated and continues to receive live pushes indefinitely, and even brand-new WebSocket connections are accepted with a token whose session was deleted. The revocation feature therefore does not cover the WebSocket boundary at all. ### Details User access JWTs carry a session reference: `NewUserJWTAuthtoken` (`pkg/modules/auth/auth.go:188`) sets `claims[\"sid\"] = sessionID`, and the API login-session documentation describes the claim as tying the JWT to a server-side session. On the HTTP side nothing consumes the claim per request either (REST access tokens simply expire after their short TTL, a design the maintainers documented when fixing GHSA-96q5, and refresh tokens are correctly invalidated when the session row is deleted). The WebSocket endpoint `GET /api/v2/ws` authenticates through the first client message. `Connection.handleAuth` (`pkg/websocket/connection.go:168`) validates the token exclusively with `auth.GetUserIDFromToken` (`pkg/modules/auth/auth.go:292`): ```go func GetUserIDFromToken(tokenString string) (int64, erro",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-4hv6-xc92-j86g",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "code.vikunja.io/api",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "2.7.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "medium",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-4hv6-xc92-j86g",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-111917",
"GHSA-4hv6-xc92-j86g",
"GO-2026-6715"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.7.0"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "code.vikunja.io/api",
"purl": "pkg:golang/code.vikunja.io/api",
"ecosystem": "Go"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-4hv6-xc92-j86g/GHSA-4hv6-xc92-j86g.json",
"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 2.6.0"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-27T15:30:05.449149864Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-4hv6-xc92-j86g",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/46ae98355462acbea451356326146675d3feeaab",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.7.0"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-613"
],
"severity": "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:57:34Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-111917",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 462571,
"published_at": "2026-10-09T20:57:34+00:00"
}