ApostropheCMS: Host header controls server-side image fetch origin in @apostrophecms/ai-helper, enabling authenticated SSRF
## Summary The `@apostrophecms/ai-helper` package builds the URL for a server-side image fetch by resolving a storage-relative path against `req.baseUrl`. When the site does not set a global base URL (the default), `req.baseUrl` is derived from the incoming HTTP `Host` header. An authenticated editor can generate a base64 AI image (which is persisted without a stored `url`) and then send an unauthorized `PATCH` accept request with an attacker-chosen `Host` header. The server then issues an outbound `GET` to the attacker-selected origin, producing a Server-Side Request Forgery primitive that reaches hosts and ports the client cannot otherwise contact. The affected code lives in `packages/ai-helper/modules/@apostrophecms/ai-helper-image/index.js`. ## Root Cause The image accept route trusts `req.baseUrl` as a safe origin for constructing an internal fetch target, but `req.baseUrl` is attacker-influenced whenever the site has no configured base URL. The URL builder concatenates a default local storage path (which is relative, for example `/uploads`) and resolves it against `req.baseUrl`; because the left operand is relative, the resulting origin is taken entirely from `req.baseUrl`. Two protections that exist elsewhere are missing on this path: the generate route enforces an edit capability, but the accept route performs no authorization or ownership check, and no allowlist or validation constrains the resolved origin before the fetch. ```text packages/ai-helper/modules/@apostro
- Products
- @apostrophecms/ai-helper
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 1.0.0-beta.13
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-113671
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 13:14 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
ApostropheCMS: Host header controls server-side image fetch origin in @apostrophecms/ai-helper, enabling authenticated SSRF
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 20 Oct 2026, 18:11 UTC
## Summary The `@apostrophecms/ai-helper` package builds the URL for a server-side image fetch by resolving a storage-relative path against `req.baseUrl`. When the site does not set a global base URL (the default), `req.baseUrl` is derived from the incoming HTTP `Host` header. An authenticated editor can generate a base64 AI image (which is persisted without a stored `url`) and then send an unauthorized `PATCH` accept request with an attacker-chosen `Host` header. The server then issues an outbound `GET` to the attacker-selected origin, producing a Server-Side Request Forgery primitive that reaches hosts and ports the client cannot otherwise contact. The affected code lives in `packages/ai-helper/modules/@apostrophecms/ai-helper-image/index.js`. ## Root Cause The image accept route trusts `req.baseUrl` as a safe origin for constructing an internal fetch target, but `req.baseUrl` is attacker-influenced whenever the site has no configured base URL. The URL builder concatenates a default local storage path (which is relative, for example `/uploads`) and resolves it against `req.baseUrl`; because the left operand is relative, the resulting origin is taken entirely from `req.baseUrl`. Two protections that exist elsewhere are missing on this path: the generate route enforces an edit capability, but the accept route performs no authorization or ownership check, and no allowlist or validation constrains the resolved origin before the fetch. ```text packages/ai-helper/modules/@apostro
osv:GHSA-527g-ff96-x6wj
@apostrophecms/ai-helper
Fixed versions: 1.0.0-beta.13
Complete source record
{
"id": "65c73377d9c1af95623a0af5d9f6f80ffab5f96823f6ae7b7ff822cf1bbb98f6",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-527g-ff96-x6wj",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "ApostropheCMS: Host header controls server-side image fetch origin in @apostrophecms/ai-helper, enabling authenticated SSRF",
"summary": "## Summary The `@apostrophecms/ai-helper` package builds the URL for a server-side image fetch by resolving a storage-relative path against `req.baseUrl`. When the site does not set a global base URL (the default), `req.baseUrl` is derived from the incoming HTTP `Host` header. An authenticated editor can generate a base64 AI image (which is persisted without a stored `url`) and then send an unauthorized `PATCH` accept request with an attacker-chosen `Host` header. The server then issues an outbound `GET` to the attacker-selected origin, producing a Server-Side Request Forgery primitive that reaches hosts and ports the client cannot otherwise contact. The affected code lives in `packages/ai-helper/modules/@apostrophecms/ai-helper-image/index.js`. ## Root Cause The image accept route trusts `req.baseUrl` as a safe origin for constructing an internal fetch target, but `req.baseUrl` is attacker-influenced whenever the site has no configured base URL. The URL builder concatenates a default local storage path (which is relative, for example `/uploads`) and resolves it against `req.baseUrl`; because the left operand is relative, the resulting origin is taken entirely from `req.baseUrl`. Two protections that exist elsewhere are missing on this path: the generate route enforces an edit capability, but the accept route performs no authorization or ownership check, and no allowlist or validation constrains the resolved origin before the fetch. ```text packages/ai-helper/modules/@apostro",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-527g-ff96-x6wj",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "@apostrophecms/ai-helper",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "1.0.0-beta.13",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "medium",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-527g-ff96-x6wj",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-113671",
"GHSA-527g-ff96-x6wj"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0-beta.10"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0-beta.13"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "@apostrophecms/ai-helper",
"purl": "pkg:npm/%40apostrophecms/ai-helper",
"ecosystem": "npm"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-527g-ff96-x6wj/GHSA-527g-ff96-x6wj.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-20T18:30:03.589840564Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-527g-ff96-x6wj",
"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/9500b8b0e1d630d5e07fbb5fd2c25ed0943845ce",
"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/f84fd41cbf6c22eb8d0008fc9c25df1f7130b350",
"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe",
"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/releases/tag/@apostrophecms/ai-helper@1.0.0-beta.13"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"severity": "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-20T18:11:01Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-113671",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 390145,
"published_at": "2026-10-20T18:11:01+00:00"
}