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CriticalFix available

Vibe-Trading FastAPI endpoints permit unauthenticated access, file upload, and an RCE chain

Type: advisorySources: OSV

### Summary: 5 findings — unauthenticated full-API exposure (F1, lead Critical), read-side authorization gap that persists even with `API_AUTH_KEY` set (F2), unauthenticated file write of `.py`/`.sh`/`.yaml` to a server-returned path (F3), default-permissive CORS that combines with a loopback-only check to grant any browser page on whitelisted localhost ports credentialed cross-origin access (F-A4), and partial API-key disclosure via `_mask_secret()` (F-A5). --- ### Shared baseline (applies to all 5 findings) The shipped `agent/.env.example` line 112 ships `# API_AUTH_KEY=` commented out. `require_auth()` at `agent/api_server.py` line 303 executes `if not api_key: return` and returns `None` immediately when `API_AUTH_KEY` is unset, so every endpoint decorated with `dependencies=[Depends(require_auth)]` operates as unauthenticated. The shipped `Dockerfile` does **not** contain a `USER` directive, so the FastAPI process runs as `uid=0(root)` inside the container (verified: `docker exec id` returns `uid=0(root) gid=0(root)`). The `docker-compose.yml` binds `0.0.0.0:8899` with no network restriction. The only operator action required beyond a clean install is supplying a working LLM API key so the agent loop can complete its tool-call round trip — this is the normal first step to make the agent functional, not an additional security opt-in. F-A4 and F-A5 do *not* require an LLM key (see per-finding notes); F1 and F3 do not require an LLM key for the unauth surface itself, only fo

Products
vibe-trading-ai
Affected versions
0.1.0, 0.1.1, 0.1.2, 0.1.3, 0.1.4, 0.1.5, 0.1.6
Fixed versions
0.1.7
CVEs
CVE-2026-114108
Confirmed fixed CVEs
Not specified
Updated in this feed
31 Oct 2026, 14:09 UTC · Revision 1

Source evidence

Vibe-Trading FastAPI endpoints permit unauthenticated access, file upload, and an RCE chain

core-osv · Original source

Published 2 Oct 2026, 22:44 UTC

### Summary: 5 findings — unauthenticated full-API exposure (F1, lead Critical), read-side authorization gap that persists even with `API_AUTH_KEY` set (F2), unauthenticated file write of `.py`/`.sh`/`.yaml` to a server-returned path (F3), default-permissive CORS that combines with a loopback-only check to grant any browser page on whitelisted localhost ports credentialed cross-origin access (F-A4), and partial API-key disclosure via `_mask_secret()` (F-A5). --- ### Shared baseline (applies to all 5 findings) The shipped `agent/.env.example` line 112 ships `# API_AUTH_KEY=` commented out. `require_auth()` at `agent/api_server.py` line 303 executes `if not api_key: return` and returns `None` immediately when `API_AUTH_KEY` is unset, so every endpoint decorated with `dependencies=[Depends(require_auth)]` operates as unauthenticated. The shipped `Dockerfile` does **not** contain a `USER` directive, so the FastAPI process runs as `uid=0(root)` inside the container (verified: `docker exec id` returns `uid=0(root) gid=0(root)`). The `docker-compose.yml` binds `0.0.0.0:8899` with no network restriction. The only operator action required beyond a clean install is supplying a working LLM API key so the agent loop can complete its tool-call round trip — this is the normal first step to make the agent functional, not an additional security opt-in. F-A4 and F-A5 do *not* require an LLM key (see per-finding notes); F1 and F3 do not require an LLM key for the unauth surface itself, only fo

osv:GHSA-v2f8-6655-7grj

vibe-trading-ai

Fixed versions: 0.1.7

Complete source record
{
  "id": "053dbb92e597f3fd423d7eb5c831601399bd29023ba178f811edef53f39c9e87",
  "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-v2f8-6655-7grj",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "Vibe-Trading FastAPI endpoints permit unauthenticated access, file upload, and an RCE chain",
    "summary": "### Summary: 5 findings — unauthenticated full-API exposure (F1, lead Critical), read-side authorization gap that persists even with `API_AUTH_KEY` set (F2), unauthenticated file write of `.py`/`.sh`/`.yaml` to a server-returned path (F3), default-permissive CORS that combines with a loopback-only check to grant any browser page on whitelisted localhost ports credentialed cross-origin access (F-A4), and partial API-key disclosure via `_mask_secret()` (F-A5). --- ### Shared baseline (applies to all 5 findings) The shipped `agent/.env.example` line 112 ships `# API_AUTH_KEY=` commented out. `require_auth()` at `agent/api_server.py` line 303 executes `if not api_key: return` and returns `None` immediately when `API_AUTH_KEY` is unset, so every endpoint decorated with `dependencies=[Depends(require_auth)]` operates as unauthenticated. The shipped `Dockerfile` does **not** contain a `USER` directive, so the FastAPI process runs as `uid=0(root)` inside the container (verified: `docker exec id` returns `uid=0(root) gid=0(root)`). The `docker-compose.yml` binds `0.0.0.0:8899` with no network restriction. The only operator action required beyond a clean install is supplying a working LLM API key so the agent loop can complete its tool-call round trip — this is the normal first step to make the agent functional, not an additional security opt-in. F-A4 and F-A5 do *not* require an LLM key (see per-finding notes); F1 and F3 do not require an LLM key for the unauth surface itself, only fo",
    "evidence": "osv:GHSA-v2f8-6655-7grj",
    "products": [
      {
        "name": {
          "value": "vibe-trading-ai",
          "evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
        },
        "prerequisites": [],
        "fixed_versions": [
          {
            "value": "0.1.7",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
          }
        ],
        "affected_versions": [
          {
            "value": "0.1.0",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
          },
          {
            "value": "0.1.1",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
          },
          {
            "value": "0.1.2",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
          },
          {
            "value": "0.1.3",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
          },
          {
            "value": "0.1.4",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
          },
          {
            "value": "0.1.5",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
          },
          {
            "value": "0.1.6",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "severity": "critical",
    "structured": {
      "id": "GHSA-v2f8-6655-7grj",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2026-114108",
        "GHSA-v2f8-6655-7grj"
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "type": "CVSS_V3",
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "ranges": [
            {
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "0.1.0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "0.1.7"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "package": {
            "name": "vibe-trading-ai",
            "purl": "pkg:pypi/vibe-trading-ai",
            "ecosystem": "PyPI"
          },
          "versions": [
            "0.1.0",
            "0.1.1",
            "0.1.2",
            "0.1.3",
            "0.1.4",
            "0.1.5",
            "0.1.6"
          ],
          "database_specific": {
            "source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-v2f8-6655-7grj/GHSA-v2f8-6655-7grj.json"
          }
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-21T10:57:26.240527692Z",
      "provider": "osv",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/HKUDS/Vibe-Trading/security/advisories/GHSA-v2f8-6655-7grj",
        "https://github.com/HKUDS/Vibe-Trading/commit/9454d4a27a763b80e1d6eb5763b86c88e9e4e714",
        "https://github.com/HKUDS/Vibe-Trading",
        "https://github.com/HKUDS/Vibe-Trading/releases/tag/v0.1.7"
      ],
      "provider_metadata": {
        "cwe_ids": [
          "CWE-200",
          "CWE-306",
          "CWE-434",
          "CWE-862",
          "CWE-942"
        ],
        "severity": "CRITICAL",
        "github_reviewed": true,
        "nvd_published_at": null,
        "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-02T22:44:26Z"
      }
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2026-114108",
        "evidence": "/aliases"
      }
    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
  },
  "source_id": "core-osv",
  "document_id": 392982,
  "published_at": "2026-10-02T22:44:26+00:00"
}