Vikunja: Cross-tenant task-position rows can be injected into arbitrary project views via the unvalidated project_view_id in the task position endpoint (v1 and v2)
## Summary The task-position endpoint authorizes only the task side of the write: `TaskPosition.CanUpdate` delegates to `Task.CanUpdate` (write access to the task's own project) and the request body's `project_view_id` is never validated to belong to the task's project, nor is any access to that view required. Any authenticated user with a single writable task of their own can persist `(task_id, project_view_id, position)` rows into any other tenant's project view (view IDs are small sequential integers and enumerable). Low position values (below `MinPositionSpacing`, 0.01) enter the recalculation branch, but `RecalculateTaskPositions` aborts on its own project read-access check before recalculating and the whole transaction rolls back, so no cross-tenant recalculation actually executes — only the plain row insert (position ≥ 0.01) persists. This is the same root-cause pattern as GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g (kanban bucket relocation via project_view_id mass-assignment, fixed with a dual-side check for buckets in 2.4.0) surviving in the sibling position endpoint. Verified on Vikunja 2.5.0. ## Details Affected endpoints (both verified): - v1: `POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/position` - v2: `PUT /api/v2/tasks/{id}/position` Root cause in `pkg/models/task_position.go`: - `CanUpdate` (lines 61-64) checks only `Task.CanUpdate` — i.e. the caller's write access to the task's own project. - `updateTaskPosition` (lines 174-232) upserts `(task_id, project_view_id, position)` directly; there is no chec
- Products
- code.vikunja.io/api
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 2.6.0
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-91984
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 08:44 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Vikunja: Cross-tenant task-position rows can be injected into arbitrary project views via the unvalidated project_view_id in the task position endpoint (v1 and v2)
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 9 Oct 2026, 20:51 UTC
## Summary The task-position endpoint authorizes only the task side of the write: `TaskPosition.CanUpdate` delegates to `Task.CanUpdate` (write access to the task's own project) and the request body's `project_view_id` is never validated to belong to the task's project, nor is any access to that view required. Any authenticated user with a single writable task of their own can persist `(task_id, project_view_id, position)` rows into any other tenant's project view (view IDs are small sequential integers and enumerable). Low position values (below `MinPositionSpacing`, 0.01) enter the recalculation branch, but `RecalculateTaskPositions` aborts on its own project read-access check before recalculating and the whole transaction rolls back, so no cross-tenant recalculation actually executes — only the plain row insert (position ≥ 0.01) persists. This is the same root-cause pattern as GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g (kanban bucket relocation via project_view_id mass-assignment, fixed with a dual-side check for buckets in 2.4.0) surviving in the sibling position endpoint. Verified on Vikunja 2.5.0. ## Details Affected endpoints (both verified): - v1: `POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/position` - v2: `PUT /api/v2/tasks/{id}/position` Root cause in `pkg/models/task_position.go`: - `CanUpdate` (lines 61-64) checks only `Task.CanUpdate` — i.e. the caller's write access to the task's own project. - `updateTaskPosition` (lines 174-232) upserts `(task_id, project_view_id, position)` directly; there is no chec
osv:GHSA-w39f-h553-h2mx
code.vikunja.io/api
Fixed versions: 2.6.0
Complete source record
{
"id": "7ccab682a7e7d30d5ca50fc33b3c9a28351e77abff325acab51ca67188646cb4",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-w39f-h553-h2mx",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Vikunja: Cross-tenant task-position rows can be injected into arbitrary project views via the unvalidated project_view_id in the task position endpoint (v1 and v2)",
"summary": "## Summary The task-position endpoint authorizes only the task side of the write: `TaskPosition.CanUpdate` delegates to `Task.CanUpdate` (write access to the task's own project) and the request body's `project_view_id` is never validated to belong to the task's project, nor is any access to that view required. Any authenticated user with a single writable task of their own can persist `(task_id, project_view_id, position)` rows into any other tenant's project view (view IDs are small sequential integers and enumerable). Low position values (below `MinPositionSpacing`, 0.01) enter the recalculation branch, but `RecalculateTaskPositions` aborts on its own project read-access check before recalculating and the whole transaction rolls back, so no cross-tenant recalculation actually executes — only the plain row insert (position ≥ 0.01) persists. This is the same root-cause pattern as GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g (kanban bucket relocation via project_view_id mass-assignment, fixed with a dual-side check for buckets in 2.4.0) surviving in the sibling position endpoint. Verified on Vikunja 2.5.0. ## Details Affected endpoints (both verified): - v1: `POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/position` - v2: `PUT /api/v2/tasks/{id}/position` Root cause in `pkg/models/task_position.go`: - `CanUpdate` (lines 61-64) checks only `Task.CanUpdate` — i.e. the caller's write access to the task's own project. - `updateTaskPosition` (lines 174-232) upserts `(task_id, project_view_id, position)` directly; there is no chec",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-w39f-h553-h2mx",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "code.vikunja.io/api",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "2.6.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "medium",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-w39f-h553-h2mx",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-91984",
"GHSA-w39f-h553-h2mx",
"GO-2026-6755"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.0"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "code.vikunja.io/api",
"purl": "pkg:golang/code.vikunja.io/api",
"ecosystem": "Go"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-w39f-h553-h2mx/GHSA-w39f-h553-h2mx.json",
"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 2.5.0"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-19T21:40:58.721073742Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-w39f-h553-h2mx",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91984",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/3688",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/077dc4de79ce6f1ab59215a2c7bf9b30423685f2",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.6.0",
"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vikunja-before-2.6.0-broken-object-level-authorization-via-task-position"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-863"
],
"severity": "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:51:41Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-91984",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 376764,
"published_at": "2026-10-09T20:51:41+00:00"
}