Excelize ANCHORARRAY: mutually-referencing array formulas recurse unboundedly via re-entrant CalcCellValue, causing a fatal stack overflow
### Summary `ANCHORARRAY` (calc.go:15137 on current master) evaluates each cell of the referenced spill range by calling the **exported** `CalcCellValue`, which unconditionally constructs a fresh `calcContext` — fresh entry marker, fresh iterations map, full `MaxCalcIterations` budget (calc.go:896-900). The circular-reference control only exists **within one context**: the entry-exclusion marker and per-ref iteration budget are fields of that single context, and completion-based caching (`formulaArgCache`/`calcRawCache`) only ever stores results of evaluations that *finish*. During a pure cycle no nested evaluation ever finishes, so nothing is ever cached to break the recursion, and each hop re-arms the entire budget. Two ordinary, Excel-legal constructs in an attacker-supplied workbook are enough: - `A1` (dynamic array formula, ref `A1:A1`): `_xlfn.ANCHORARRAY($B$1)` - `B1` (dynamic array formula, ref `B1:B1`): `_xlfn.ANCHORARRAY($A$1)` → `CalcCellValue → calcCellValue → evalInfixExp → parseReference → cellResolver → … → ANCHORARRAY → CalcCellValue → …` forever, ending in a **fatal, unrecoverable** Go runtime error: `runtime: goroutine stack exceeds …-byte limit / fatal error: stack overflow`. Go stack overflows cannot be recovered — the whole process aborts. ### Details - The terminating edge the iterations gate is supposed to provide does not exist across contexts: there is no in-flight tracking shared between nested `CalcCellValue` calls. - Both formulas are ordinary Exce
- Products
- github.com/xuri/excelize/v2
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 2.11.1-0.20260911060113-ea12859e43c6
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-107216
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 08:45 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Excelize ANCHORARRAY: mutually-referencing array formulas recurse unboundedly via re-entrant CalcCellValue, causing a fatal stack overflow
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 8 Oct 2026, 16:31 UTC
### Summary `ANCHORARRAY` (calc.go:15137 on current master) evaluates each cell of the referenced spill range by calling the **exported** `CalcCellValue`, which unconditionally constructs a fresh `calcContext` — fresh entry marker, fresh iterations map, full `MaxCalcIterations` budget (calc.go:896-900). The circular-reference control only exists **within one context**: the entry-exclusion marker and per-ref iteration budget are fields of that single context, and completion-based caching (`formulaArgCache`/`calcRawCache`) only ever stores results of evaluations that *finish*. During a pure cycle no nested evaluation ever finishes, so nothing is ever cached to break the recursion, and each hop re-arms the entire budget. Two ordinary, Excel-legal constructs in an attacker-supplied workbook are enough: - `A1` (dynamic array formula, ref `A1:A1`): `_xlfn.ANCHORARRAY($B$1)` - `B1` (dynamic array formula, ref `B1:B1`): `_xlfn.ANCHORARRAY($A$1)` → `CalcCellValue → calcCellValue → evalInfixExp → parseReference → cellResolver → … → ANCHORARRAY → CalcCellValue → …` forever, ending in a **fatal, unrecoverable** Go runtime error: `runtime: goroutine stack exceeds …-byte limit / fatal error: stack overflow`. Go stack overflows cannot be recovered — the whole process aborts. ### Details - The terminating edge the iterations gate is supposed to provide does not exist across contexts: there is no in-flight tracking shared between nested `CalcCellValue` calls. - Both formulas are ordinary Exce
osv:GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2
Fixed versions: 2.11.1-0.20260911060113-ea12859e43c6
Complete source record
{
"id": "f3a99e9bd59702bfc99634f5cbdb4e59e28fd5ba90115a42897286e7a62d9e10",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Excelize ANCHORARRAY: mutually-referencing array formulas recurse unboundedly via re-entrant CalcCellValue, causing a fatal stack overflow",
"summary": "### Summary `ANCHORARRAY` (calc.go:15137 on current master) evaluates each cell of the referenced spill range by calling the **exported** `CalcCellValue`, which unconditionally constructs a fresh `calcContext` — fresh entry marker, fresh iterations map, full `MaxCalcIterations` budget (calc.go:896-900). The circular-reference control only exists **within one context**: the entry-exclusion marker and per-ref iteration budget are fields of that single context, and completion-based caching (`formulaArgCache`/`calcRawCache`) only ever stores results of evaluations that *finish*. During a pure cycle no nested evaluation ever finishes, so nothing is ever cached to break the recursion, and each hop re-arms the entire budget. Two ordinary, Excel-legal constructs in an attacker-supplied workbook are enough: - `A1` (dynamic array formula, ref `A1:A1`): `_xlfn.ANCHORARRAY($B$1)` - `B1` (dynamic array formula, ref `B1:B1`): `_xlfn.ANCHORARRAY($A$1)` → `CalcCellValue → calcCellValue → evalInfixExp → parseReference → cellResolver → … → ANCHORARRAY → CalcCellValue → …` forever, ending in a **fatal, unrecoverable** Go runtime error: `runtime: goroutine stack exceeds …-byte limit / fatal error: stack overflow`. Go stack overflows cannot be recovered — the whole process aborts. ### Details - The terminating edge the iterations gate is supposed to provide does not exist across contexts: there is no in-flight tracking shared between nested `CalcCellValue` calls. - Both formulas are ordinary Exce",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "github.com/xuri/excelize/v2",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
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"id": "GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r",
"aliases": [
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"GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r",
"GO-2026-6688"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
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"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
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"purl": "pkg:golang/github.com/xuri/excelize/v2",
"ecosystem": "Go"
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"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r/GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r.json"
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"modified": "2026-10-19T21:41:18.715896320Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/security/advisories/GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107216",
"https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/commit/ea12859e43c64d498ecf839263c5f917391f3316",
"https://github.com/qax-os/excelize"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-07T18:17:19Z",
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T16:31:21Z"
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"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 376798,
"published_at": "2026-10-08T16:31:21+00:00"
}Mutually-referencing array formulas recurse unboundedly, causing a fatal stack overflow in github.com/xuri/excelize
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 19 Oct 2026, 21:08 UTC
Mutually-referencing array formulas recurse unboundedly, causing a fatal stack overflow in github.com/xuri/excelize
osv:GO-2026-6688
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2
Fixed versions: 2.11.1-0.20260911060113-ea12859e43c6
Complete source record
{
"id": "c864e64cd4b0a676fcef0aa913d37ba39ebbc4345ee87a0d03bad147a49d4367",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6688",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Mutually-referencing array formulas recurse unboundedly, causing a fatal stack overflow in github.com/xuri/excelize",
"summary": "Mutually-referencing array formulas recurse unboundedly, causing a fatal stack overflow in github.com/xuri/excelize",
"evidence": "osv:GO-2026-6688",
"products": [
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"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
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"events": [
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"modified": "2026-10-19T21:31:49.924461633Z",
"provider": "osv",
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"https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/commit/ea12859e43c64d498ecf839263c5f917391f3316"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6688",
"review_status": "REVIEWED"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-107216",
"evidence": "/aliases"
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"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": null
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 376691,
"published_at": "2026-10-19T21:08:21+00:00"
}