Timing side-channel in ML-DSA decomposition
### Summary A timing side-channel was discovered in the Decompose algorithm which is used during ML-DSA signing to generate hints for the signature. ### Details The analysis was performed using a constant-time analyzer that examines compiled assembly code for instructions with data-dependent timing behavior. The analyzer flags: - **UDIV/SDIV instructions**: Hardware division instructions have early termination optimizations where execution time depends on operand values. The `decompose` function used a hardware division instruction to compute `r1.0 / TwoGamma2::U32`. This function is called during signing through `high_bits()` and `low_bits()`, which process values derived from secret key components: - `(&w - &cs2).low_bits()` where `cs2` is derived from secret key component `s2` - `Hint::new()` calls `high_bits()` on values derived from secret key component `t0` **Original Code**: ```rust fn decompose(self) -> (Elem, Elem) { // ... let mut r1 = r_plus - r0; r1.0 /= TwoGamma2::U32; // Variable-time division on secret-derived data (r1, r0) } ``` ### Impact The dividend (`r1.0`) is derived from secret key material. An attacker with precise timing measurements could extract information about the signing key by observing timing variations in the division operation. ### Mitigation Integer division was replaced with a constant-time Barrett reduction.
- Products
- ml-dsa
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 0.1.0-rc.3
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-22705
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 30 Oct 2026, 08:44 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Timing side-channel in ML-DSA decomposition
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 12 Dec 2025, 12:00 UTC
### Summary A timing side-channel was discovered in the Decompose algorithm which is used during ML-DSA signing to generate hints for the signature. ### Details The analysis was performed using a constant-time analyzer that examines compiled assembly code for instructions with data-dependent timing behavior. The analyzer flags: - **UDIV/SDIV instructions**: Hardware division instructions have early termination optimizations where execution time depends on operand values. The `decompose` function used a hardware division instruction to compute `r1.0 / TwoGamma2::U32`. This function is called during signing through `high_bits()` and `low_bits()`, which process values derived from secret key components: - `(&w - &cs2).low_bits()` where `cs2` is derived from secret key component `s2` - `Hint::new()` calls `high_bits()` on values derived from secret key component `t0` **Original Code**: ```rust fn decompose(self) -> (Elem, Elem) { // ... let mut r1 = r_plus - r0; r1.0 /= TwoGamma2::U32; // Variable-time division on secret-derived data (r1, r0) } ``` ### Impact The dividend (`r1.0`) is derived from secret key material. An attacker with precise timing measurements could extract information about the signing key by observing timing variations in the division operation. ### Mitigation Integer division was replaced with a constant-time Barrett reduction.
osv:RUSTSEC-2025-0144
ml-dsa
Fixed versions: 0.1.0-rc.3
Complete source record
{
"id": "72b6497f169333f343b1c443c9104677a0c0e86cb74b58d6bcce50aac5e1df6a",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2025-0144",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Timing side-channel in ML-DSA decomposition",
"summary": "### Summary A timing side-channel was discovered in the Decompose algorithm which is used during ML-DSA signing to generate hints for the signature. ### Details The analysis was performed using a constant-time analyzer that examines compiled assembly code for instructions with data-dependent timing behavior. The analyzer flags: - **UDIV/SDIV instructions**: Hardware division instructions have early termination optimizations where execution time depends on operand values. The `decompose` function used a hardware division instruction to compute `r1.0 / TwoGamma2::U32`. This function is called during signing through `high_bits()` and `low_bits()`, which process values derived from secret key components: - `(&w - &cs2).low_bits()` where `cs2` is derived from secret key component `s2` - `Hint::new()` calls `high_bits()` on values derived from secret key component `t0` **Original Code**: ```rust fn decompose(self) -> (Elem, Elem) { // ... let mut r1 = r_plus - r0; r1.0 /= TwoGamma2::U32; // Variable-time division on secret-derived data (r1, r0) } ``` ### Impact The dividend (`r1.0`) is derived from secret key material. An attacker with precise timing measurements could extract information about the signing key by observing timing variations in the division operation. ### Mitigation Integer division was replaced with a constant-time Barrett reduction.",
"evidence": "osv:RUSTSEC-2025-0144",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "ml-dsa",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "0.1.0-rc.3",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
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"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "medium",
"structured": {
"id": "RUSTSEC-2025-0144",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22705",
"GHSA-hcp2-x6j4-29j7",
"RUSTSEC-2025-0144"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.0-rc.3"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "ml-dsa",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/ml-dsa",
"ecosystem": "crates.io"
},
"database_specific": {
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"source": "https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2025-0144.json",
"categories": [
"crypto-failure"
],
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affects": {
"os": [],
"arch": [],
"functions": []
},
"affected_functions": null
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-12T18:00:13.061349808Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://crates.io/crates/ml-dsa",
"https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0144.html",
"https://github.com/RustCrypto/signatures/pull/1144"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"license": "CC-BY-4.0"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-22705",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 306437,
"published_at": "2025-12-12T12:00:00+00:00"
}