`Program` accepts arbitrary executable programs
Affected versions of `anchor-lang` did not properly validate accounts declared as `Program<'info, System>`. The generic `Program` validation path used `Pubkey::default()` as a sentinel to decide whether any executable program should be accepted. Since the system program id is also the default pubkey, `Program<'info, System>` was treated like the untyped `Program<'info>` case and accepted any executable program account. Programs commonly rely on `Program<'info, System>` to ensure that CPI calls and instruction builders target the real Solana system program. With the faulty validation, an attacker could supply another executable program where the system program was expected, causing downstream logic to make false assumptions about payments, account creation, or other system-program CPIs. The issue was fixed in `anchor-lang` 1.0.2 by separating the typed `Program` validation path from the untyped `Program<()>` path, so `Program<'info, System>` now checks the provided account key against the system program id. Users should upgrade to `anchor-lang` 1.0.2 or later.
- Products
- anchor-lang
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 1.0.2
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-45137
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 30 Oct 2026, 08:44 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
`Program` accepts arbitrary executable programs
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 7 May 2026, 12:00 UTC
Affected versions of `anchor-lang` did not properly validate accounts declared as `Program<'info, System>`. The generic `Program` validation path used `Pubkey::default()` as a sentinel to decide whether any executable program should be accepted. Since the system program id is also the default pubkey, `Program<'info, System>` was treated like the untyped `Program<'info>` case and accepted any executable program account. Programs commonly rely on `Program<'info, System>` to ensure that CPI calls and instruction builders target the real Solana system program. With the faulty validation, an attacker could supply another executable program where the system program was expected, causing downstream logic to make false assumptions about payments, account creation, or other system-program CPIs. The issue was fixed in `anchor-lang` 1.0.2 by separating the typed `Program` validation path from the untyped `Program<()>` path, so `Program<'info, System>` now checks the provided account key against the system program id. Users should upgrade to `anchor-lang` 1.0.2 or later.
osv:RUSTSEC-2026-0144
anchor-lang
Fixed versions: 1.0.2
Complete source record
{
"id": "0bfcede4f92fa5d1304d763e4f66ac7ad2bdce7d55f391913d361041913c6719",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0144",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "`Program` accepts arbitrary executable programs",
"summary": "Affected versions of `anchor-lang` did not properly validate accounts declared as `Program<'info, System>`. The generic `Program` validation path used `Pubkey::default()` as a sentinel to decide whether any executable program should be accepted. Since the system program id is also the default pubkey, `Program<'info, System>` was treated like the untyped `Program<'info>` case and accepted any executable program account. Programs commonly rely on `Program<'info, System>` to ensure that CPI calls and instruction builders target the real Solana system program. With the faulty validation, an attacker could supply another executable program where the system program was expected, causing downstream logic to make false assumptions about payments, account creation, or other system-program CPIs. The issue was fixed in `anchor-lang` 1.0.2 by separating the typed `Program` validation path from the untyped `Program<()>` path, so `Program<'info, System>` now checks the provided account key against the system program id. Users should upgrade to `anchor-lang` 1.0.2 or later.",
"evidence": "osv:RUSTSEC-2026-0144",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "anchor-lang",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "1.0.2",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0144",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45137",
"GHSA-c6rc-8jpp-2fgc",
"RUSTSEC-2026-0144"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.2"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "anchor-lang",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/anchor-lang",
"ecosystem": "crates.io"
},
"database_specific": {
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"source": "https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0144.json",
"categories": [],
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affects": {
"os": [],
"arch": [],
"functions": []
},
"affected_functions": null
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-12T18:00:13.559737310Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://crates.io/crates/anchor-lang",
"https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0144.html",
"https://github.com/solana-foundation/anchor/commit/3eb1fb0427d4fed0e944b627aef76db651a93aab",
"https://github.com/solana-foundation/anchor/releases/tag/v1.0.2"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"license": "CC-BY-4.0"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-45137",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 306448,
"published_at": "2026-05-07T12:00:00+00:00"
}