Vikunja: Planka migration retains an unbounded aggregate of attacker-served attachments and can OOM the API
# Planka migration retains an unbounded aggregate of attacker-served attachments and can OOM the API ## Summary The always-registered Planka migration lets any ordinary user select a Planka server. Although Vikunja caps each JSON response, pagination loop, and attachment independently, it has no aggregate job budget. The conversion stage downloads every advertised non-link attachment and keeps every byte slice live until the complete hierarchy is inserted. A public attacker server can therefore drive memory beyond any finite service allocation. The final Docker run preserved default SSRF policy and OOM-killed the healthy API after five individually valid 20 MiB attachment responses. ## Impact and affected scope - **Type:** Resource Exhaustion Dos - **Affected component:** POST /api/v2/migration/planka/migrate; Asynchronous migration.requested worker for the Planka migrator - **Preconditions:** A low-privilege Vikunja user supplies an attacker-operated public Planka URL and token. That server controls project/board/card/attachment counts and streams each attachment body at or below Vikunja's normal per-file limit. - **Verified revision:** `d66ef3d1a39c6f7289593059a1a34afd1d059260` on 28 August 2026 - **Affected release range:** `> 2.5.0` for the tested post-2.5.0 main branch; no released build was independently reproduced A low-privilege remote user operating a public HTTP server can terminate the shared Vikunja process and make the API unavailable with one migration submissio
- Products
- code.vikunja.io/api
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 2.6.0
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-91970
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 08:44 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Vikunja: Planka migration retains an unbounded aggregate of attacker-served attachments and can OOM the API
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 9 Oct 2026, 20:53 UTC
# Planka migration retains an unbounded aggregate of attacker-served attachments and can OOM the API ## Summary The always-registered Planka migration lets any ordinary user select a Planka server. Although Vikunja caps each JSON response, pagination loop, and attachment independently, it has no aggregate job budget. The conversion stage downloads every advertised non-link attachment and keeps every byte slice live until the complete hierarchy is inserted. A public attacker server can therefore drive memory beyond any finite service allocation. The final Docker run preserved default SSRF policy and OOM-killed the healthy API after five individually valid 20 MiB attachment responses. ## Impact and affected scope - **Type:** Resource Exhaustion Dos - **Affected component:** POST /api/v2/migration/planka/migrate; Asynchronous migration.requested worker for the Planka migrator - **Preconditions:** A low-privilege Vikunja user supplies an attacker-operated public Planka URL and token. That server controls project/board/card/attachment counts and streams each attachment body at or below Vikunja's normal per-file limit. - **Verified revision:** `d66ef3d1a39c6f7289593059a1a34afd1d059260` on 28 August 2026 - **Affected release range:** `> 2.5.0` for the tested post-2.5.0 main branch; no released build was independently reproduced A low-privilege remote user operating a public HTTP server can terminate the shared Vikunja process and make the API unavailable with one migration submissio
osv:GHSA-wq92-8x3r-fm38
code.vikunja.io/api
Fixed versions: 2.6.0
Complete source record
{
"id": "06d1fbe5dc447aa50a331c1d6e0bb49007a797f675b3f324f4030b1cb723d643",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wq92-8x3r-fm38",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Vikunja: Planka migration retains an unbounded aggregate of attacker-served attachments and can OOM the API",
"summary": "# Planka migration retains an unbounded aggregate of attacker-served attachments and can OOM the API ## Summary The always-registered Planka migration lets any ordinary user select a Planka server. Although Vikunja caps each JSON response, pagination loop, and attachment independently, it has no aggregate job budget. The conversion stage downloads every advertised non-link attachment and keeps every byte slice live until the complete hierarchy is inserted. A public attacker server can therefore drive memory beyond any finite service allocation. The final Docker run preserved default SSRF policy and OOM-killed the healthy API after five individually valid 20 MiB attachment responses. ## Impact and affected scope - **Type:** Resource Exhaustion Dos - **Affected component:** POST /api/v2/migration/planka/migrate; Asynchronous migration.requested worker for the Planka migrator - **Preconditions:** A low-privilege Vikunja user supplies an attacker-operated public Planka URL and token. That server controls project/board/card/attachment counts and streams each attachment body at or below Vikunja's normal per-file limit. - **Verified revision:** `d66ef3d1a39c6f7289593059a1a34afd1d059260` on 28 August 2026 - **Affected release range:** `> 2.5.0` for the tested post-2.5.0 main branch; no released build was independently reproduced A low-privilege remote user operating a public HTTP server can terminate the shared Vikunja process and make the API unavailable with one migration submissio",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-wq92-8x3r-fm38",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "code.vikunja.io/api",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "2.6.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-wq92-8x3r-fm38",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-91970",
"GHSA-wq92-8x3r-fm38",
"GO-2026-6757"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.0"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "code.vikunja.io/api",
"purl": "pkg:golang/code.vikunja.io/api",
"ecosystem": "Go"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-wq92-8x3r-fm38/GHSA-wq92-8x3r-fm38.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-19T21:41:00.503878989Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-wq92-8x3r-fm38",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91970",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/3688",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.6.0",
"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vikunja-before-2.6.0-resource-exhaustion-via-planka-migration"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:53:24Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-91970",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 376766,
"published_at": "2026-10-09T20:53:24+00:00"
}