Vikunja: Link-share token can enumerate users through the v2 API
### Summary A link-share token, the credential you hand out to let someone view a shared project, can call the v2 user-search endpoints, which it was never meant to reach. The v1 versions of the same endpoints correctly reject link-share tokens; the v2 versions don't. As a result, anyone with a share link can list every member of the shared project (and its parent projects), and can test whether any username exists anywhere on the instance. ### Details Two endpoints are affected: `GET /api/v2/projects/{id}/users/search` only checks project.CanRead, which a link share satisfies on its own project. With no parameter it returns the full user list, walking up the parent-project chain. `GET /api/v2/users?q=` is a global search. It needs a query term, but any term works as an existence oracle: a hit confirms the username exists somewhere on the instance and returns the display name. Emails are correctly stripped from these responses, so the exposure is limited to identities (usernames and display names), but that's still an instance-wide directory that a share-link holder should never see. The fix is to resolve the caller with GetFromAuth in both handlers, so link-share tokens are rejected the same way v1 already rejects them. ### PoC 1. Get a link-share token. With any account that owns a project, create a read-only link share and note the hash, then exchange it: ``` POST /api/v1/shares//auth {"password":""} ``` The response contains a token, a link-share JWT. 2. Confirm v1 blocks
- Products
- code.vikunja.io/api
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 2.6.0
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-91981
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 08:44 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Vikunja: Link-share token can enumerate users through the v2 API
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 9 Oct 2026, 20:52 UTC
### Summary A link-share token, the credential you hand out to let someone view a shared project, can call the v2 user-search endpoints, which it was never meant to reach. The v1 versions of the same endpoints correctly reject link-share tokens; the v2 versions don't. As a result, anyone with a share link can list every member of the shared project (and its parent projects), and can test whether any username exists anywhere on the instance. ### Details Two endpoints are affected: `GET /api/v2/projects/{id}/users/search` only checks project.CanRead, which a link share satisfies on its own project. With no parameter it returns the full user list, walking up the parent-project chain. `GET /api/v2/users?q=` is a global search. It needs a query term, but any term works as an existence oracle: a hit confirms the username exists somewhere on the instance and returns the display name. Emails are correctly stripped from these responses, so the exposure is limited to identities (usernames and display names), but that's still an instance-wide directory that a share-link holder should never see. The fix is to resolve the caller with GetFromAuth in both handlers, so link-share tokens are rejected the same way v1 already rejects them. ### PoC 1. Get a link-share token. With any account that owns a project, create a read-only link share and note the hash, then exchange it: ``` POST /api/v1/shares//auth {"password":""} ``` The response contains a token, a link-share JWT. 2. Confirm v1 blocks
osv:GHSA-vfxw-3x8p-2vjr
code.vikunja.io/api
Fixed versions: 2.6.0
Complete source record
{
"id": "04067715f81c70c2dd326f0443ac35d3196d6f09328c8413e169f546839ce047",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-vfxw-3x8p-2vjr",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Vikunja: Link-share token can enumerate users through the v2 API",
"summary": "### Summary A link-share token, the credential you hand out to let someone view a shared project, can call the v2 user-search endpoints, which it was never meant to reach. The v1 versions of the same endpoints correctly reject link-share tokens; the v2 versions don't. As a result, anyone with a share link can list every member of the shared project (and its parent projects), and can test whether any username exists anywhere on the instance. ### Details Two endpoints are affected: `GET /api/v2/projects/{id}/users/search` only checks project.CanRead, which a link share satisfies on its own project. With no parameter it returns the full user list, walking up the parent-project chain. `GET /api/v2/users?q=` is a global search. It needs a query term, but any term works as an existence oracle: a hit confirms the username exists somewhere on the instance and returns the display name. Emails are correctly stripped from these responses, so the exposure is limited to identities (usernames and display names), but that's still an instance-wide directory that a share-link holder should never see. The fix is to resolve the caller with GetFromAuth in both handlers, so link-share tokens are rejected the same way v1 already rejects them. ### PoC 1. Get a link-share token. With any account that owns a project, create a read-only link share and note the hash, then exchange it: ``` POST /api/v1/shares//auth {\"password\":\"\"} ``` The response contains a token, a link-share JWT. 2. Confirm v1 blocks",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-vfxw-3x8p-2vjr",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "code.vikunja.io/api",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "2.6.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "medium",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-vfxw-3x8p-2vjr",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-91981",
"GHSA-vfxw-3x8p-2vjr",
"GO-2026-6752"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.0"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "code.vikunja.io/api",
"purl": "pkg:golang/code.vikunja.io/api",
"ecosystem": "Go"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-vfxw-3x8p-2vjr/GHSA-vfxw-3x8p-2vjr.json",
"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 2.5.0"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-19T21:40:54.809992875Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-vfxw-3x8p-2vjr",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91981",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/3688",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.6.0",
"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vikunja-before-2.6.0-user-enumeration-via-v2-api"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-863"
],
"severity": "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:52:39Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-91981",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 376753,
"published_at": "2026-10-09T20:52:39+00:00"
}