CVE-2026-94418 affecting package mariadb 10.11.19-1
Under WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, ProcessPeerCertParse() runs the certificate signature check separately from the parse to keep peak memory down, then merges the two results, but it merged the signature result back only when the parse returned 0, so any parse error hid it. ParseCertRelative() reaches its validity-date, name-constraint and critical-extension checks only after ConfirmSignature() has passed, so splitting the signature check out inverts the precedence that makes "override date errors" a sound policy, and ASN_SIG_CONFIRM_E is never surfaced anywhere. The attacker needs no key material from the real PKI and no CA compromise: a self-made certificate carrying the expected subject name, the trusted CA's subject as its issuer, arbitrary bytes where the signature goes, a validity window in the past and the attacker's own key pair is sufficient. Affected builds define WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, which is off by default, is not set implicitly by any platform or preset header, and is not reachable from any CMake option; the autotools routes are --enable-lowresource, --enable-leantls, --enable-tinytls13=cert and --enable-tinytls13=mutualauth, and examples/configs/user_settings_embedded.h reaches it through WC_CFG_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, which ships as 0, while neither --enable-all nor --enable-distro enables it at all. The application must additionally install a verify callback through wolfSSL_CTX_set_verify() or wolfSSL_set_verify() with WOLFSSL_VERIFY_PEER that returns 1 for ASN
- Products
- mariadb
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-94418
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 30 Oct 2026, 14:03 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
CVE-2026-94418 affecting package mariadb 10.11.19-1
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 27 Sept 2026, 09:16 UTC
Under WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, ProcessPeerCertParse() runs the certificate signature check separately from the parse to keep peak memory down, then merges the two results, but it merged the signature result back only when the parse returned 0, so any parse error hid it. ParseCertRelative() reaches its validity-date, name-constraint and critical-extension checks only after ConfirmSignature() has passed, so splitting the signature check out inverts the precedence that makes "override date errors" a sound policy, and ASN_SIG_CONFIRM_E is never surfaced anywhere. The attacker needs no key material from the real PKI and no CA compromise: a self-made certificate carrying the expected subject name, the trusted CA's subject as its issuer, arbitrary bytes where the signature goes, a validity window in the past and the attacker's own key pair is sufficient. Affected builds define WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, which is off by default, is not set implicitly by any platform or preset header, and is not reachable from any CMake option; the autotools routes are --enable-lowresource, --enable-leantls, --enable-tinytls13=cert and --enable-tinytls13=mutualauth, and examples/configs/user_settings_embedded.h reaches it through WC_CFG_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, which ships as 0, while neither --enable-all nor --enable-distro enables it at all. The application must additionally install a verify callback through wolfSSL_CTX_set_verify() or wolfSSL_set_verify() with WOLFSSL_VERIFY_PEER that returns 1 for ASN
osv:AZL-105182
mariadb
Fixed versions: Not specified
Complete source record
{
"id": "fdfd0b191706fad0c2a808df741ecfb62e016d51bae350f9e11e1def7605561e",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/AZL-105182",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "CVE-2026-94418 affecting package mariadb 10.11.19-1",
"summary": "Under WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, ProcessPeerCertParse() runs the certificate signature check separately from the parse to keep peak memory down, then merges the two results, but it merged the signature result back only when the parse returned 0, so any parse error hid it. ParseCertRelative() reaches its validity-date, name-constraint and critical-extension checks only after ConfirmSignature() has passed, so splitting the signature check out inverts the precedence that makes \"override date errors\" a sound policy, and ASN_SIG_CONFIRM_E is never surfaced anywhere. The attacker needs no key material from the real PKI and no CA compromise: a self-made certificate carrying the expected subject name, the trusted CA's subject as its issuer, arbitrary bytes where the signature goes, a validity window in the past and the attacker's own key pair is sufficient. Affected builds define WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, which is off by default, is not set implicitly by any platform or preset header, and is not reachable from any CMake option; the autotools routes are --enable-lowresource, --enable-leantls, --enable-tinytls13=cert and --enable-tinytls13=mutualauth, and examples/configs/user_settings_embedded.h reaches it through WC_CFG_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, which ships as 0, while neither --enable-all nor --enable-distro enables it at all. The application must additionally install a verify callback through wolfSSL_CTX_set_verify() or wolfSSL_set_verify() with WOLFSSL_VERIFY_PEER that returns 1 for ASN",
"evidence": "osv:AZL-105182",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "mariadb",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "unknown",
"structured": {
"id": "AZL-105182",
"aliases": [
"AZL-105182"
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "10.11.19-1"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "mariadb",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/mariadb",
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/microsoft/AzureLinuxVulnerabilityData/blob/main/osv/AZL-105182.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-15T05:37:09Z",
"provider": "osv",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-94418"
],
"references": [
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-94418"
]
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-94418",
"evidence": "/upstream"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": null
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 321276,
"published_at": "2026-09-27T09:16:36+00:00"
}