Rustls: TLS 1.3 handshake messages incorrectly accepted across encryption level boundaries
Rustls accepted TLS 1.3 handshake messages sent at the wrong encryption level when they followed a key-changing message in the same record. The handshake transcript is still authenticated, so a network-position attacker cannot use this to alter or complete a handshake; the practical effect is that a peer could send handshake messages that should be encrypted in plaintext without rustls rejecting the connection. This issue affects rustls versions 0.23.13 through 0.23.44 inclusive. # Original report ### Summary Rustls (tested version 0.23.44, and it appears still an issue on latest master though I have not tested this) accepts a TLS 1.3 server flight where a plaintext EncryptedExtensions is packed into the same record as the ServerHello. This is very similar to Go's CVE-2025-61730 fixed in https://github.com/golang/go/commit/5046bdf8a612b35a2c1a9e168054c1d5c65e7dd7 ### Details It appears `Deframer::aligned` considers itself aligned as long as all messages remaining in the buffer are complete. Rustls processes the ServerHello, installs the handshake keys, then pulls the complete (plaintext) EncryptedExtensions out of the buffer. This is insufficient per RFC 8446 section 5.1's > Handshake messages MUST NOT span key changes. Implementations MUST verify that all messages immediately preceding a key change align with a record boundary; if not, then they MUST terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert. Because the ClientHello, EndOfEarlyData, ServerHello, Finished, a
- Products
- rustls
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 0.23.45
- CVEs
- Not specified
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 1 Nov 2026, 18:33 UTC · Revision 2
Source evidence
Rustls: TLS 1.3 handshake messages incorrectly accepted across encryption level boundaries
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 5 Oct 2026, 23:30 UTC
Rustls accepted TLS 1.3 handshake messages sent at the wrong encryption level when they followed a key-changing message in the same record. The handshake transcript is still authenticated, so a network-position attacker cannot use this to alter or complete a handshake; the practical effect is that a peer could send handshake messages that should be encrypted in plaintext without rustls rejecting the connection. This issue affects rustls versions 0.23.13 through 0.23.44 inclusive. # Original report ### Summary Rustls (tested version 0.23.44, and it appears still an issue on latest master though I have not tested this) accepts a TLS 1.3 server flight where a plaintext EncryptedExtensions is packed into the same record as the ServerHello. This is very similar to Go's CVE-2025-61730 fixed in https://github.com/golang/go/commit/5046bdf8a612b35a2c1a9e168054c1d5c65e7dd7 ### Details It appears `Deframer::aligned` considers itself aligned as long as all messages remaining in the buffer are complete. Rustls processes the ServerHello, installs the handshake keys, then pulls the complete (plaintext) EncryptedExtensions out of the buffer. This is insufficient per RFC 8446 section 5.1's > Handshake messages MUST NOT span key changes. Implementations MUST verify that all messages immediately preceding a key change align with a record boundary; if not, then they MUST terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert. Because the ClientHello, EndOfEarlyData, ServerHello, Finished, a
osv:GHSA-2mjx-qc3c-rqvc
rustls
Fixed versions: 0.23.45
Complete source record
{
"id": "603a2a46da7a4a291943fedc73e1d0a4d25dda7017e157bbc2129de64e01e91a",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-2mjx-qc3c-rqvc",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Rustls: TLS 1.3 handshake messages incorrectly accepted across encryption level boundaries",
"summary": "Rustls accepted TLS 1.3 handshake messages sent at the wrong encryption level when they followed a key-changing message in the same record. The handshake transcript is still authenticated, so a network-position attacker cannot use this to alter or complete a handshake; the practical effect is that a peer could send handshake messages that should be encrypted in plaintext without rustls rejecting the connection. This issue affects rustls versions 0.23.13 through 0.23.44 inclusive. # Original report ### Summary Rustls (tested version 0.23.44, and it appears still an issue on latest master though I have not tested this) accepts a TLS 1.3 server flight where a plaintext EncryptedExtensions is packed into the same record as the ServerHello. This is very similar to Go's CVE-2025-61730 fixed in https://github.com/golang/go/commit/5046bdf8a612b35a2c1a9e168054c1d5c65e7dd7 ### Details It appears `Deframer::aligned` considers itself aligned as long as all messages remaining in the buffer are complete. Rustls processes the ServerHello, installs the handshake keys, then pulls the complete (plaintext) EncryptedExtensions out of the buffer. This is insufficient per RFC 8446 section 5.1's > Handshake messages MUST NOT span key changes. Implementations MUST verify that all messages immediately preceding a key change align with a record boundary; if not, then they MUST terminate the connection with an \"unexpected_message\" alert. Because the ClientHello, EndOfEarlyData, ServerHello, Finished, a",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-2mjx-qc3c-rqvc",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "rustls",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "0.23.45",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
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"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "medium",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-2mjx-qc3c-rqvc",
"aliases": [
"GHSA-2mjx-qc3c-rqvc",
"RUSTSEC-2026-0285"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.23.13"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.45"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "rustls",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/rustls",
"ecosystem": "crates.io"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-2mjx-qc3c-rqvc/GHSA-2mjx-qc3c-rqvc.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-27T15:30:05.509305490Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/rustls/rustls/security/advisories/GHSA-2mjx-qc3c-rqvc",
"https://github.com/rustls/rustls/pull/3265",
"https://github.com/golang/go/commit/5046bdf8a612b35a2c1a9e168054c1d5c65e7dd7",
"https://github.com/rustls/rustls/commit/98456aea708a7e3c6151e00ca2d4428e7a58257a",
"https://github.com/rustls/rustls",
"https://github.com/rustls/rustls/releases/tag/v/0.23.45",
"https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0285.html"
],
"provider_metadata": {
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"severity": "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-05T23:30:17Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 462561,
"published_at": "2026-10-05T23:30:17+00:00"
}