BIP-322 address ownership verification bypass for P2WPKH and P2SH-P2WPKH addresses
Affected versions of `bip322` accepted a BIP-322 proof created with an attacker-controlled private key as a valid signature for an unrelated victim P2WPKH or P2SH-P2WPKH address, allowing complete authentication bypass in applications using `verify_simple`, `verify_simple_encoded`, `verify_full`, or `verify_full_encoded` as proof that a user controls a Bitcoin address. In `verify_full`, the verifier obtained the public key from the caller-controlled witness and passed it to `verify_full_p2wpkh`, where the supposed public-key mismatch check read the key from the same witness and compared it with itself: ```rust let witness_pub_key = &witness.to_vec()[1]; if &pub_key.to_bytes() != witness_pub_key { return Err(Error::PublicKeyMismatch); } ``` Since `pub_key` was originally parsed from that exact witness element, this comparison was tautological. The code verified that the signature was valid for the public key embedded in the witness, but never verified that this public key hashes to the claimed address, violating BIP-322's requirement that the `message_signature` satisfy the `message_challenge` (the claimed address's scriptPubKey). As a result, an attacker could select any victim P2WPKH or P2SH-P2WPKH address, construct the BIP-322 challenge for that address and message, sign it with their own unrelated private key, and have the proof accepted. No victim key or victim interaction was required. Application-level nonces do not mitigate this, since the attacker can construct and s
- Products
- bip322
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 0.0.11
- CVEs
- Not specified
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 28 Oct 2026, 11:06 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
BIP-322 address ownership verification bypass for P2WPKH and P2SH-P2WPKH addresses
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 14 Aug 2026, 12:00 UTC
Affected versions of `bip322` accepted a BIP-322 proof created with an attacker-controlled private key as a valid signature for an unrelated victim P2WPKH or P2SH-P2WPKH address, allowing complete authentication bypass in applications using `verify_simple`, `verify_simple_encoded`, `verify_full`, or `verify_full_encoded` as proof that a user controls a Bitcoin address. In `verify_full`, the verifier obtained the public key from the caller-controlled witness and passed it to `verify_full_p2wpkh`, where the supposed public-key mismatch check read the key from the same witness and compared it with itself: ```rust let witness_pub_key = &witness.to_vec()[1]; if &pub_key.to_bytes() != witness_pub_key { return Err(Error::PublicKeyMismatch); } ``` Since `pub_key` was originally parsed from that exact witness element, this comparison was tautological. The code verified that the signature was valid for the public key embedded in the witness, but never verified that this public key hashes to the claimed address, violating BIP-322's requirement that the `message_signature` satisfy the `message_challenge` (the claimed address's scriptPubKey). As a result, an attacker could select any victim P2WPKH or P2SH-P2WPKH address, construct the BIP-322 challenge for that address and message, sign it with their own unrelated private key, and have the proof accepted. No victim key or victim interaction was required. Application-level nonces do not mitigate this, since the attacker can construct and s
osv:RUSTSEC-2026-0334
bip322
Fixed versions: 0.0.11
Complete source record
{
"id": "a01acd7941f8fc3535c562c4f4ea39d940d6b692c6e46d31a12c71db5d9867a7",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0334",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "BIP-322 address ownership verification bypass for P2WPKH and P2SH-P2WPKH addresses",
"summary": "Affected versions of `bip322` accepted a BIP-322 proof created with an attacker-controlled private key as a valid signature for an unrelated victim P2WPKH or P2SH-P2WPKH address, allowing complete authentication bypass in applications using `verify_simple`, `verify_simple_encoded`, `verify_full`, or `verify_full_encoded` as proof that a user controls a Bitcoin address. In `verify_full`, the verifier obtained the public key from the caller-controlled witness and passed it to `verify_full_p2wpkh`, where the supposed public-key mismatch check read the key from the same witness and compared it with itself: ```rust let witness_pub_key = &witness.to_vec()[1]; if &pub_key.to_bytes() != witness_pub_key { return Err(Error::PublicKeyMismatch); } ``` Since `pub_key` was originally parsed from that exact witness element, this comparison was tautological. The code verified that the signature was valid for the public key embedded in the witness, but never verified that this public key hashes to the claimed address, violating BIP-322's requirement that the `message_signature` satisfy the `message_challenge` (the claimed address's scriptPubKey). As a result, an attacker could select any victim P2WPKH or P2SH-P2WPKH address, construct the BIP-322 challenge for that address and message, sign it with their own unrelated private key, and have the proof accepted. No victim key or victim interaction was required. Application-level nonces do not mitigate this, since the attacker can construct and s",
"evidence": "osv:RUSTSEC-2026-0334",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "bip322",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "0.0.11",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "critical",
"structured": {
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0334",
"aliases": [
"GHSA-5chw-87w3-j9cv",
"RUSTSEC-2026-0334"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.6"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.11"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "bip322",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/bip322",
"ecosystem": "crates.io"
},
"database_specific": {
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"source": "https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0334.json",
"categories": [
"crypto-failure"
],
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affects": {
"os": [],
"arch": [],
"functions": [
"bip322::verify_full",
"bip322::verify_full_encoded",
"bip322::verify_simple",
"bip322::verify_simple_encoded"
]
},
"affected_functions": null
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-09T08:15:18.366782769Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://crates.io/crates/bip322",
"https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0334.html",
"https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/bip322/commit/e8accbe7d39f48f030e44f333b4796e28f6aad80"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
}
},
"related_cves": [],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 111384,
"published_at": "2026-08-14T12:00:00+00:00"
}