Skip to content
Heist/ feed
Back to feed
Medium

Network-AI: ApprovalInbox HTTP server has no authentication — anyone can approve pending agent actions

Type: advisorySources: OSV

Network-AI, a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator, has a shipped, exported, documented feature called `ApprovalInbox` (`lib/approval-inbox.ts`). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which `ApprovalGate` uses to require explicit human approval for high-risk operations. The HTTP server it exposes has no authentication of any kind and sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every route, including the state-changing `POST /approvals/:id/approve` and `/deny`. As a result, in versions 5.0.0 through 5.12.1, any party who can send an HTTP request to the inbox port — a co-located process, a container/SSRF on the same host, a remote client when the operator binds a non-loopback address, or any website the operator visits in a browser (via the wildcard CORS) — can enumerate pending approvals and approve them, defeating the entire human-in-the-loop control and causing the gated high-risk action (e.g. a shell command the agent was holding for review) to execute without consent. This issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `ApprovalInbox` now accepts a `secret` option. When set, the mutating endpoints `POST /:id/approve` and `POST /:id/deny` require an `Authorization: Bearer ` header, validated in constant time with `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. `startServer()` already binds to `127.0.0.1` by default; operators exposing the inbox on a network must set a secret.

Products
Not specified
Affected versions
Not specified
Fixed versions
Not specified
CVEs
CVE-2026-58482
Confirmed fixed CVEs
Not specified
Updated in this feed
8 Nov 2026, 02:41 UTC · Revision 1

Source evidence

Network-AI: ApprovalInbox HTTP server has no authentication — anyone can approve pending agent actions

core-osv · Original source

Published 20 Jul 2026, 16:38 UTC

Network-AI, a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator, has a shipped, exported, documented feature called `ApprovalInbox` (`lib/approval-inbox.ts`). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which `ApprovalGate` uses to require explicit human approval for high-risk operations. The HTTP server it exposes has no authentication of any kind and sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every route, including the state-changing `POST /approvals/:id/approve` and `/deny`. As a result, in versions 5.0.0 through 5.12.1, any party who can send an HTTP request to the inbox port — a co-located process, a container/SSRF on the same host, a remote client when the operator binds a non-loopback address, or any website the operator visits in a browser (via the wildcard CORS) — can enumerate pending approvals and approve them, defeating the entire human-in-the-loop control and causing the gated high-risk action (e.g. a shell command the agent was holding for review) to execute without consent. This issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `ApprovalInbox` now accepts a `secret` option. When set, the mutating endpoints `POST /:id/approve` and `POST /:id/deny` require an `Authorization: Bearer ` header, validated in constant time with `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. `startServer()` already binds to `127.0.0.1` by default; operators exposing the inbox on a network must set a secret.

osv:CVE-2026-58482
Complete source record
{
  "id": "1d48df222885b7b6d7b183f71904efbdc66dcc3ea397cd0096ab1ad68fefc9be",
  "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-58482",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "Network-AI: ApprovalInbox HTTP server has no authentication — anyone can approve pending agent actions",
    "summary": "Network-AI, a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator, has a shipped, exported, documented feature called `ApprovalInbox` (`lib/approval-inbox.ts`). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which `ApprovalGate` uses to require explicit human approval for high-risk operations. The HTTP server it exposes has no authentication of any kind and sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every route, including the state-changing `POST /approvals/:id/approve` and `/deny`. As a result, in versions 5.0.0 through 5.12.1, any party who can send an HTTP request to the inbox port — a co-located process, a container/SSRF on the same host, a remote client when the operator binds a non-loopback address, or any website the operator visits in a browser (via the wildcard CORS) — can enumerate pending approvals and approve them, defeating the entire human-in-the-loop control and causing the gated high-risk action (e.g. a shell command the agent was holding for review) to execute without consent. This issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `ApprovalInbox` now accepts a `secret` option. When set, the mutating endpoints `POST /:id/approve` and `POST /:id/deny` require an `Authorization: Bearer ` header, validated in constant time with `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. `startServer()` already binds to `127.0.0.1` by default; operators exposing the inbox on a network must set a secret.",
    "evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-58482",
    "products": [],
    "severity": "medium",
    "structured": {
      "id": "CVE-2026-58482",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2026-58482",
        "GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj"
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "type": "CVSS_V3",
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N"
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "ranges": [
            {
              "repo": "https://github.com/jovancoding/network-ai",
              "type": "GIT",
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "c7891a948d643c22fb40ae36ac05174fd1bf0e5b"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3"
                }
              ],
              "database_specific": {
                "extracted_events": [
                  {
                    "range": [
                      {
                        "introduced": "5.0.0"
                      },
                      {
                        "fixed": "5.12.2"
                      }
                    ],
                    "source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
                    "strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
                  },
                  {
                    "range": [
                      {
                        "fixed": "a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3"
                      }
                    ],
                    "source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
                  },
                  {
                    "range": [
                      {
                        "fixed": "a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3"
                      }
                    ],
                    "source": "REFERENCES_TAG",
                    "original_tag": "v5.12.2"
                  },
                  {
                    "cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:network-ai:network-ai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                    "range": [
                      {
                        "introduced": "5.0.0"
                      },
                      {
                        "fixed": "5.12.2"
                      }
                    ],
                    "source": "CPE_RANGE"
                  }
                ]
              }
            }
          ],
          "versions": [
            "v5.12.1",
            "v5.12.0",
            "v5.11.0",
            "v5.10.2",
            "v5.10.1",
            "v5.10.0",
            "v5.9.1",
            "v5.9.0",
            "v5.8.9",
            "v5.8.8",
            "v5.8.7",
            "v5.8.6",
            "v5.8.5",
            "v5.8.4",
            "v5.8.3",
            "v5.8.2",
            "v5.8.1",
            "v5.8.0",
            "v5.7.2",
            "v5.7.1",
            "v5.7.0",
            "v5.6.1",
            "v5.6.0",
            "v5.5.9",
            "v5.5.8",
            "v5.5.7",
            "v5.5.6",
            "v5.5.5",
            "v5.5.4",
            "v5.5.3",
            "v5.5.2",
            "v5.5.1",
            "v5.5.0",
            "v5.4.5",
            "v5.4.4",
            "v5.4.3",
            "v5.4.2",
            "v5.4.1",
            "v5.4.0",
            "v5.3.2",
            "v5.3.1",
            "v5.3.0",
            "v5.2.2",
            "v5.2.1",
            "v5.2.0",
            "v5.1.4",
            "v5.1.3",
            "v5.1.2",
            "v5.1.1",
            "v5.1.0",
            "v5.0.0"
          ],
          "database_specific": {
            "source": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-58482.json"
          }
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:52.974912212Z",
      "provider": "osv",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2",
        "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/58xxx/CVE-2026-58482.json",
        "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj",
        "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58482",
        "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3"
      ],
      "provider_metadata": {
        "cwe_ids": [
          "CWE-352",
          "CWE-862"
        ],
        "cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
        "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/58xxx/CVE-2026-58482.json"
      }
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2026-58482",
        "evidence": "/id"
      }
    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
  },
  "source_id": "core-osv",
  "document_id": 521879,
  "published_at": "2026-07-20T16:38:55.576+00:00"
}